लौकिकन्यायाञ्जलिः ॥

तृतीयो भागः ॥

A THIRD HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS

CURRENT IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE.

COLLECTED BY

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PREFACE.

It is with somewhat of a feeling of regret that I launch this third instalment of nyâyas; for I had hoped that they might be embodied in a revised re-issue of the first and second, so as to have the whole alphabetically arranged in one volume. There are not many, however, amongst India's two hundred and ninety millions, who take much interest in an effort of this kind, so we were compelled to follow a less ambitious course. To facilitate reference, I have prepared an index to the whole of the 430 nyâyas explained in the three volumes, and have written additional notes on several of those contained in the first and second. The latter will be found in the Superaddenda.

The present 'handful' differs materially from the two which preceded it in that it contains a goodly number of technical nyâyas; to wit, most of those representing important *adhikaraṇas* in the Mîmâṁsâ system, as well as certain *paribhâṣâs* from Patanjali and Nâgojî Bhaṭṭa. All of these appear to be quoted as nyâyas by writers on the various schools of philosophy; and I hope that such explanations of them as I have been able to give will prove of service to young students of these interesting works, and that the numerous references to the *Mahâbhâṣya* will not be considered superfluous. That work, as presented in Benares editions, used to have a most forbidding aspect; for sûtra, vârtika, and bhâṣya, were crowded together, like sardines in a box, without numbers or any distinguishing marks to facilitate reference, and then this conglomerate was frequently (as in my own copy) sandwiched between two equally compressed portions of Kaiyaṭa! Dr. Kielhorn, however, has turned the impenetrable jungle into a well-laid-out park in which one can roam about with ease and comfort! Amongst other treasures, I was delighted to find there my two mango-tree nyâyas, namely, "आम्रसेकपितृतर्पण" and "आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे."

Now for a word regarding the title of these pamphlets. I am by no means satisfied with 'maxim' as the equivalent of nyâya, but adopted it because many great scholars had already done so. As to the naturalness of such a course on my part let two Indian poets speak:—"यद्यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदेवेतरो जनः। स यत्प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्तते." "एकस्य कर्म संवीक्ष्य करोत्यन्योऽपि गर्हितम्। गतानुगतिको लोको न लोकः पारमार्थिकः" ॥ The nyâyas dealt with by me come under three distinct heads, and are either (1) Illustrations [dṛiṣṭânta], (2) Rules, or principles [as in the case of paribhâṣâs &c.], or (3) Topics [adhikaraṇas, as in the case of the *kapinjalanyâya* and others from the same source]. It would, therefore, be better, in my opinion, to adopt the term nyâya itself, without translating it into English.

This would seem to be the most suitable place for a note on the *Khaṇḍanoddhâra*, a work now in course of publication in *The Paṇḍit*, and from which I have occasionally quoted in the following pages. It has been stated by some Indian scholars of repute (beginning with Paṇḍit Târânâtha Tarkavâcaspati, in 1871, in the preface to his edition of *Sânkhyatattvakaumudî*), and the statement is now stereotyped in the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the Government College, Calcutta, for the year 1900, that the Vâcaspati who wrote the above work in refutation of S'ri Harsha's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya*, is identical with the celebrated philosopher Vâcaspati Mis'ra. No reasons have been given for this assertion, and no evidence in its favor seems to be forthcoming from the work itself.

In a prefatory note by Mr. Arthur Venis, issued with the first part of the *Târkikarakṣâ* (in the Paṇḍit for Nov. 1899), he tells us that Vâcaspati Mis'ra and Udayana were contemporaries, the *Nyâyasûcî* of the former having been written in 976 A.D., whilst the latter composed his *Lakṣaṇâvali* in 984–5. He adds that Udayana was "probably much the younger man, as his *Paris'uddhi* is a commentary on Vacaspati's *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*; and he may be supposed to have lived as late as 1050 A.D." Now, on page 13, the author of *Khaṇḍanoddhâra* quotes *Kusumânjali* i. 19, prefaced with the words "तदुक्तमा-

चार्यैः," and, on the next page, cites i. 10 of the same, with the words "आचार्या अप्याहुः." On page 45, he refers to *Âtmatattvaviveka* in the same way. Is it in the least likely that a renowned Âcârya like Vâcaspati Mis'ra would quote a *very junior contemporary* in such language as that, even if he condescended to notice him at all? Again, on page 25, the author of the *Uddhâra* says "विस्तरस्तु तत्त्वालोके मयैवोक्त इतीहोपरम्यते," but the author of the *Bhâmatî* has never been credited with a treatise of that name, though we know of his *Tattvasamîkṣâ.* Lastly, on page 35, there is a reference to विवरणमत, and, on page 40, to नरसिंहहरिशर्ममत, which could hardly carry us back to the tenth century.

It has been suggested by some that S'rî Harsha, too, was a contemporary of Vâcaspati Mis'ra and Udayana,—but, since he quotes the former on page 354 of the *Khaṇdana* (as I pointed out on page 29 of the Second Handful), and cites Udayana four times at least (see, especially, pages 633–637), this position can hardly be maintained. In 1871, Dr. Bühler, on the authority of a Jain writer named Râjas'ekhara, placed S'rî Harsha in the twelfth century; and, if that is correct, the question of the authorship of the *Uddhâra* is finally settled as far as Vâcaspati Mis'ra is concerned. There was a prolonged discussion as to S'rî Harsha's date in the first three volumes (1872–4) of the *Indian Antiquary*, but nothing was conclusively established as against Dr. Bühler's view which is recorded on page 30 of the first volume.

On page 49 of *Khaṇḍanoddhâra* we read:—"अथ खण्डनकृत् षोडशपदार्थीं खण्डयिष्यंस्तत्र मूर्धन्यं प्रमाणं खण्डयितुं तदुपधायिकां प्रमामादौ खण्डयति स्म 'तत्त्वानुभूतिः प्रमेत्ययुक्तम्.'" The passage in question will be found on page 143 of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya*, and the commentator S'ankara Mis'ra ascribes this definition of *pramâ* to the *Lakṣaṇamâlâ*, a work which the editor, in a footnote, attributes to S'ivâditya, the author of the *Saptapadârthî.* The latter was published in the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series in 1893, and in the Preface we have the same authorship of the

Lakṣaṇamâlâ asserted on the authority of a *Citsukhîvyâkhyâ*, the date of which is not stated. In opposition to this, however, I would point out that Varadarâja quotes the *Lakṣaṇamâlâ* on pages 179 and 225 of his *Târkikarakṣâ*, and, in both cases, the famous commentator Mallinâtha ascribes it to Udayana. The doubt expressed by Fitzedward Hall, on page 27 of his *Index*, as to this being "the well-known commentator on the poems of Kâlidâsa and others," is set aside by Mallinâtha's quoting, on page 39, a portion of his commentary on *Raghuvams'a* ii. 34, and adding "इति स्फुटीकृतं चैतदस्माभिः पञ्चकाव्यादिटीकासु 'अलं महीपाल तव श्रमेणेत्यादौ.'"

G. A. J.

REDHILL, SURREY.
October 1904.

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A THIRD HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS.



अकाले कृतमकृतं स्यात् ॥

A thing done at a wrong time [might as well be left undone, for it] *would be regarded as not done.* It occurs in the following passage of Mâdhava's *Nyâyamâlâvistara* 10. 1. 1:—"किं चतुर्धाकरणादूर्ध्वमावाह्यते किंवा प्रयाजेभ्यः पुरा । नाद्यः । अकाले कृतमकृतं स्यादिति न्यायेनावाहनस्य निरर्थकत्वात्."

Again, in S'abara on Jaimini 6. 2. 25, with reference to the times prescribed for the Agnihotra, and New and Full Moon sacrifices, we read "तस्मादन्येषु कालेषु अविहितत्वात्कृतमप्यकृतं स्यात्."

अग्निहोत्रन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the Agnihotra sacrifice* [consisting of morning and evening libations]. It forms the subject of Jaimini 6. 2. 23–26, where the injunction "यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति" is discussed. The interpretation put upon these words by the pûrvapakṣin is that the householder is to do nothing else but offer the Agnihotra during his whole life! Kunte thus summarizes his argument:—"From the time of the establishment of a sacred fire to the time of death the Agnihotra is to be performed continuously, without the remission of a moment. This is the duty of an Ârya. He cannot rest for a moment. The Agnihotra is not a constituent part of any other sacrifice. It is an independent sacrifice by itself. It therefore accomplishes the purpose of a person; and must therefore be unremittingly adhered to; and it does not matter if, in performing a principal act, minor acts are neglected. It is therefore reasonable to perform the Agnihotra-sacrifice alone continuously for life". The reply to all this is that the

meaning of the *vidhi* is simply that it is to be offered every morning at daybreak, and every evening, according to the injunction "प्रदोषमग्निहोत्रं होतव्यं व्युष्टायां प्रातः." For a description of the Agnihotra, see *S'atapatha Brâhmaṇa*, Kâṇḍa 2, Adhyâyas 3 and 4; also a very useful excursus of Kunte's on pages 410-420 of his *Ṣaḍdars'anacintanikâ*. *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 3. 4. 32 shows how Vedantists apply the injunction relating to the Agnihotra.

अङ्गुलिदीपिकया ध्वान्तध्वंसविधिः ॥

Attempting to dispel the darkness with a lamp no bigger than your finger! Endeavouring to bring about a great result by the use of manifestly inadequate means. It occurs in the following passage of *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 52:—"न चास्माकमिव तवाप्यत्र मूकतैव शरणं सर्वथा वचनविरोधे ह्युदासीनस्य सा शोभते । न चात्र विधौ विरोधः कश्चित् । न च त्वमुदासीनः प्रयोजने प्रवृत्तत्वात् । तस्मादलमङ्गुलिदीपिकया ध्वान्तध्वंसविधिमनुष्ठाय." I am indebted to Mr. Arthur Venis for an explanation of this nyâya.

अङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृश्यते ॥

The tip of a finger cannot be touched by itself. Akin to the sayings "A man cannot mount on his own shoulder", and "The edge of a sword cannot cut itself." It occurs in *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ* page 466, line 10 from bottom:—"यथाङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृश्यत एवं ज्ञानं न तेनैव ज्ञानेन ग्रहीतुं शक्यते." We meet with it again in Pârthasârathi's comment on the S'ûnyavâda section of the *S'lokavârtika* (page 288):—"न हि पाकः पच्यते छिदा वा छिद्यते । नापि करणकर्मत्वं कर्तृकर्मत्वं वा एकस्य संभवति । न ह्यङ्गुल्यग्रेणैवाङ्गुल्यग्रं स्पृश्यते नाप्यङ्गुल्यग्रमात्मानं स्पृशति । तेनासां विधानां दृष्टान्ते क्वचिदप्यदर्शनाज्ज्ञानेऽपि नास्ति संभवः."

I do not understand the double statement here about the

finger-tip. Pârthasârathi could not mean that the tip of one finger cannot be touched by the tip of another finger! The second part of the statement looks like a marginal gloss which has got into the text. The first part of the extract is found in *Bhâmatî* 2. 2. 28 (page 448):—"अपि च भेदाश्रयः कर्मफलभावो नाभिन्ने ज्ञाने भवितुमर्हति। नो खलु छिदा छिद्यते किन्तु दारु नापि पाकः पच्यतेऽपि तु तण्डुलाः। तदिहापि न ज्ञानं स्वांशेन ज्ञेयम्."

अङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्ते ॥

There are a hundred herds of elephants on the tip of my finger! This illustration of an absurdity occurs frequently. In *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 232 *g*, we read:—अत्र केचिच्चोदयन्ति। व्यर्थोऽयं व्युत्पत्तिनिरूपणप्रयासः। शब्दस्यार्थासंस्पर्शित्वात्। न ह्यङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इत्यादिशब्दैः कश्चिदर्थः प्रमीयते। यत्राप्तवाक्ये प्रमीयते तत्रापि मानान्तरनिबन्धना सा प्रमितिर्न शब्दनिबन्धनेति." Then in *Citsukhî* ii. 32:—"आप्तोदीरितवाक्येषु मालतीमाधवादिषु। व्यभिचारान्न तद्युक्तमाप्तत्वस्यानिरुक्तितः ॥ ३२ ॥ स्वकपोलकल्पितमालतीमाधवादिवाक्येषु प्रामाण्याभावादतिव्याप्तिः। नहि पुराप्त एव सन्नाटकनाटिकादिप्रबन्धविरचनमात्रेणानाप्तो भवति भवभूतिः। उक्तं चैतदुम्बकेन 'यदाप्तोऽपि कस्मैचिदुपदिशति न त्वयाननुभूतार्थविषयं वाक्यं प्रयोक्तव्यं यथाङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इति'। तत्रार्थव्यभिचारः स्फुटः."

In the commentary on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya*, page 104, the saying is modified to "अङ्गुल्यग्रे करिशतं विहरति," and another of a like kind is added, namely "मम कर्णकुहरं प्रविश्य सिंहः क्रीडति;" and in *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 65, Udayana gives us "मम कर्णे प्रविश्य गजो गर्जति भेषजमुच्यताम्." The Umbaka quoted above is perhaps the Umbeka referred to by Hall (on page 166) as an authority on Mîmâṃsâ. In the Catalogus Catalogorum, the latter is identified with Maṇḍanamis'ra, which is one of the names by which Sures'varâcârya is known.

अत्यन्तबलवन्तोऽपि पौरजानपदा जनाः । दुर्बलैरपि बाध्यन्ते पुरुषैः पार्थिवाश्रितैः ॥

Even very powerful men from town and country are held in check by weaker men who have the king's support. This verse from the *Tantravârtika* (page 863) is thus applied by Raghunâtha :—"यत्र निर्बलेनापि प्रबलसहायेन प्रबलो बाध्यते तत्र 'अत्यन्तबलवन्तोऽपि पौरजानपदा जनाः । दुर्बलैरपि बाध्यन्ते पुरुषैः पार्थिवाश्रितैः' इति न्यायोऽवतरति । स्पष्टार्थोऽयम् । उदाहरणं तु श्रुत्यपेक्षाया दुर्बलाया अपि स्मृतेराचमनरूपप्रबलपदार्थाश्रितत्वेन प्राबल्यम् । अतः श्रौतक्रमत्यागेन वेदकरणानन्तरं क्षुते आचमनमेव कार्यमिति दिक्." We may compare with this the following from Sures'vara's large vârtika, page 753 :—

"आशंसते बलीयांसमबलीयानपि स्वयम् ।
धर्मं बलं समाश्रित्य जेतुं लोके तथा यथा ॥
राज्ञा बलेनाल्पबलो बलीयांसं कुटुम्बिनम् ।
जेतुमाशंसते तस्माद्धर्मः स्याद्बलवत्तमः" ॥

अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

A truth or conclusion which implies another truth or conclusion. This is the third of four kinds of सिद्धान्त defined in *Nyâyasûtras* 1. 1. 28–31, the others being (1) सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त, (2) प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त, and (4) अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्त. Ballantyne's rendering of the four is (1) a dogma of all the schools, (2) a dogma peculiar to some school, (3) a hypothetical dogma, and (4) a dogmatic corollary. In *Târkikarakṣâ* i. 29 (page 126) we have the following description of *manas*:— "युगपद्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति । एवं चाणुतयैव मनसः सिद्धिः । अन्यथा युगपदनेकेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानाद्युगपद्ज्ञानोदयप्रसंगात्" । On this, Mallinâtha comments thus:— "एवं चेति । जगत्कर्तुः सर्वज्ञत्वादिवन्मनसोऽणुत्वमधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायाद्धर्मिग्राहकादेव सिद्धमित्यर्थः" ॥ There is another example in *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 83, line 9; and a third in Yâmunâcârya's *Âgamaprâmâṇya*, page 17, line 1.

अधिकारन्यायः ॥

The rule regarding the *qualifications* [required of a sacrificer] Jaimini 6. 1. 1–3 deals with part of this. The decision is that he must be desirous of heaven, according to the vidhis "दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत," "ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत." The principal thing here is the desire for heaven, whilst the sacrificial act is subordinate. The remainder of the pâda deals with the physical and social fitness demanded. See under आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां &c, below. For a full description of the four kinds of injunction, of which *adhikâravidhi* is the third, see Laugâkṣibhâskara's *Arthasangraha*, page 4, with Dr. Thibaut's translation, page 7 &c.

अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा भवति प्रतिषेधो वा ॥

[A rule containing] *an injunction or a prohibition* [enjoins or forbids only] *that which is nearest* [to it in some other rule]. Here is one of Raghunâtha's grammatical nyâyas, included in both of his works. My translation is based on that of Dr. Kielhorn in his well-known edition and translation of the *Paribhâṣendus'ekhara*, where it appears as Paribhâṣâ LXI. Nâgojî-Bhaṭṭa took it, of course, from the *Mahâbhâṣya*, and I have noted the following ten instances of its occurrence:—1. 1. 43 (vârt. 3); 1. 2. 48 (vârt. 7); 1. 3. 12 (vârt. 7); 1. 3. 14 (vârt. 3); 1. 3. 58 (vârt. 3); 1. 4. 17 ; 3. 1. 67 (vârt. 5); 7. 1. 21 (vârt. 1) 7. 2. 3 (vârt. 2); and 7. 3. 85 (vârt. 4).

अन्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गयोरन्तरङ्गं बलीयः ॥

Of the proximate [or, more closely related] *and the remote* [or, less closely related], *the former is the stronger.* I find it most difficult to give a rendering of this nyâya. It seems to belong primarily to the grammarians, though found also in philosophical works. It is included in Sîradeva's list of paribhâṣâs, but not in that of Nâgojî Bhaṭṭa. The terms अन्तरङ्ग and बहिरङ्ग

are, however, explained by the latter, under his paribhâṣâ "असिद्धं बहिरङ्गमन्तरङ्गे," in the following manner, and I subjoin Dr. Kielhorn's translation. As this eminent scholar gives no English equivalent of the two terms here described, it may fairly be assumed that no satisfactory one is to be found. "अन्तर्मध्ये बहिरङ्गशास्त्रीयनिमित्तसमुदायमध्येऽन्तर्भूतान्यङ्गानि निमित्तानि यस्य तदन्तरङ्गम् । एवं तदीयनिमित्तसमुदायाद्बहिर्भूताङ्गकं बहिरङ्गम्." "*Antaranga* is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie within (or before) the sum of the causes of a *bahiranga* rule; in like manner (that rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie without (or beyond) the sum of the causes of that (*antaranga* rule) is *bahiranga*." The Professor adds the following in a footnote:—"अन्तरङ्ग and बहिरङ्ग are two Bahuvrîhi–compounds and denote a rule, or an operation, or that which is taught in a rule. The word अङ्ग here neither denotes a member of the body, nor is it the grammatical term अङ्ग as defined in P. 1. 4. 13; but it is equivalent to उपकारक 'that which assists (an operation),' or, in other words, it denotes the निमित्त, that is, 'the cause' of an operation".

The nyâya is employed by S'abara on Jaimini 12. 2. 27, and by Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 1. 4; and there is another example of it in the following passage of the *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* (page 15):—"कार्यस्य तावदुपादानापेक्षा प्रथममुत्पद्यते पश्चाद्विरोधिसंसर्गाभावापेक्षा तथा चान्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गयोरन्तरङ्गं बलवदिति न्यायेनान्तरङ्गोपादानविषयत्वमेव तयोर्न्याय्यम्."

अन्यवेश्मस्थिताद्धूमान्न वेश्मान्तरमग्निमत् ॥

From seeing smoke rising from one house we do not infer that there is a fire in another house. This is from *Tantravârtika* (page 180, line 9) on Jaimini's sûtra "अनुमानव्यवस्थानात्तत्संयुक्तं प्रमाणं स्यात्" (1. 3. 15).

अन्यार्थमपि प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति ॥

A thing, though made for one purpose, may also serve for another. This is found in *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 1. 23 (vârt. 4), 1. 3. 12 (vârt. 5), and 6. 1. 50, as follows:—"यत्तावदुच्यते न चान्यार्थं प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवतीत्यन्यार्थमपि प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति। तद्यथा। शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते ताभ्यश्च पानीयं पीयत उपस्पृश्यते च शालयश्च भाव्यन्ते." It is quoted by S'abara on Jaimini 3. 1. 12 (page 220), and is referred to by Kumârila in his long and interesting discussion of शेष (an accessory—that which serves the purpose of something else) in the opening part of the third chapter of the *Tantravârtika*. On page 668, line 13, we read:—"न हि कश्चिदपि शालिकुल्यास्थमुदकं पिबन्मदर्थमेताः प्रणीता इत्यध्यवस्यति। तस्मादन्यत्तादर्थ्येमन्यश्चोपकार इति विज्ञायते."

अपच्छेदन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the interruption* [of a procession of priests]. It is thus explained by Goldstücker:—"Used in the liturgical writings of the interruption of a procession of priests, caused by the inadvertence of one or several amongst them; thus, it being the rule that at the first Savana of the Jyotishṭoma the priests must proceed one after the other 'in the black-ant fashion,' the one that comes after holding his preceder by the hem of his garment, an interruption caused by the dropping of the hem, on the part of one priest would be एककर्तृकोऽपच्छेदः &c." This curious ceremony is discussed in Jaimini 6. 5. 49–56, where certain penalties are prescribed for letting go the garment (कच्छविमोचन). The matter is well and concisely put in the Nyâyamâlâvistara on the above portion of Jaimini, and much information is contained in Kunte's notes on the same sûtras.

The nyâya is employed by writers on Vedânta. It is found, for example, in *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 10, line 8:—"ज्येष्ठस्यापीति। अपच्छेदन्यायेन पूर्वस्य परेण बाधमाशंक्य तदपेक्षस्येति विशेषितं तेनोत्तरस्य पूर्वापेक्षायामुपक्रमाधिकरणन्याय एव प्रवर्तत इति सूचितमित्यर्थः" ॥

The passage of the *Vedântakalpataru* here explained is found on page 6, line 8:—"ज्येष्ठस्यापि पौर्वापर्यन्यायेन बाधमाशंक्याह तदपेक्षस्येति." The पौर्वापर्यन्याय is a part of the अपच्छेदन्याय, and derives its name from sûtra 54, namely "पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत्," the subject of the adhikaraṇa being that when the priests, walking in procession, let go their hold one after another, the one who does so last is liable to a penalty. This same sûtra is quoted in full in *Bhâmati*, page 5, last line, and is immediately followed by a verse from Kumârila's *Tantravârtika*, page 819; where, however, the reading of the first line is पौर्वापर्यबलीयस्त्वं instead of the पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वं of the *Bhâmatî*. The same verse is quoted by Vâcaspatimis'ra at the bottom of page 59 of his *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ*, where the reading agrees with that of the Bhâmatî. The अपच्छेदन्याय is found also in *S'rîbhâṣya*, page 143.

अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत्

Scripture can attach a meaning [to an act &c.] *when such* [a meaning] *has not been established* [and could not be established in any other way]. I take this to be the drift of this somewhat difficult nyâya which forms part of Jaimini's sûtra 6. 2. 18. In *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 3. 3. 18 there is a discussion as to the aim of certain S'rutis which prescribe the rinsing of the mouth, before and after eating, in connection with the *prâṇavidyâ*. Were they intended to enforce आचमन as an act of cleanliness, and also as an act of ritual directed to prâṇa? The decision is that the former was already provided for by smṛiti, and that s'ruti merely attached to it its significance as a religious ceremonial. Bhâratitîrtha sums up the case in *Adhikaraṇamâlâ* 3. 3. 9, as follows:—"इति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः 'अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत्' इति न्यायेन मानान्तराप्राप्तमनग्नताचिन्तनमेव विधेयम्...आचमनं तु शुद्ध्यर्थतया स्मृतिबलादेव प्राप्तमिति न विधीयते...तस्मादाचमनस्य प्राप्तत्वादनग्नताबुद्धिरेव प्राणोपासक प्रति विधेया." The nyâya is found also in *Tantravârtika*, page 145, line 3, and again on page 232; in

Citsukhî i. 7 (Paṇḍit, vol. iv. page 475, line 2), and again in the Râmânuja chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 69, line 12 of Jivânanda's edn.), where Professor Gough renders it— "Before its signification is attained the system is significant."

अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वम् ॥

The more worthy should come first. These words form part of Patanjali's comment on a vârtika on Pâṇini's rule 2. 2. 34 in regard to the position of words in a dvandva compound. The whole sentence is as follows:—"अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वं निपततीति वक्तव्यम् । मातापितरौ श्रद्धामेधे" ॥ Its use is not restricted to grammar, however, as the following extract from the first paragraph of Sâyaṇa's introduction to his commentary on the Ṛigveda shows:— "ऋग्वेदस्य प्राथम्येन सर्वत्राम्नातत्वादभ्यर्हितं पूर्वमिति न्यायेनाभ्यर्हितत्वात्तद्व्याख्यानमादौ युक्तम्" ॥ Again, at the commencement of the twelfth chapter of the *Jaiminîyanyâyamâlâvistara,* we read as follows:—"अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वमिति न्यायमाश्रित्य तत्रप्रसङ्गप्रतिपादकयोरेकादशद्वादशाध्याययोः पूर्वोत्तरभाव उपपादितः" ॥ And in Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 1. 4. 28:—"प्रधानवादस्यैव प्राधान्येन निरासे हेत्वन्तरमाह स चेति । न केवलमभ्यर्हितत्वात्तस्य प्राधान्यं स्मृतिमूलत्वादपीत्याह."

अम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलाबूनि ग्रावाणः प्लवन्ते ॥

Gourds sink in water, but stones float ! This is often quoted as, an illustration of an absurdity. It is as old as the *Mahâbhârata* and appears at the end of chapter LXIV of the Sabhâparvan:— "मज्जन्त्यलाबूनि शिलाः प्लवन्ते मुह्यन्ति नावोऽम्भसि शश्वदेव." I have met with it twice in S'abara's bhâshya. In 1. 1. 5 (page 11):—"एवंजातीयकं प्रमाणविरुद्धं वचनमप्रमाणम् । अम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलाबूनि ग्रावाणः प्लवन्त इति यथा." In 4. 3. 10:—"न चैवंजातीयकं प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धं वचनं प्रमाणं भवति । यथाम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलाबूनि शिलाः प्लवन्ते पावकः शीत इति."

अरुणैकहायनीन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a red* [cow] *one year old.* This nyâya, found in *Tantravârtika* 1. 2. 41, in *Nyâyamanjari*, page 294 (line 2 from bottom), and in *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 619 (line 4), is the आरुणिन्याय of Jaimini 3. 1. 12, and is based on the following words connected with the ritual of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice—"अरुणया पिङ्गाक्ष्यैकहायन्या सोमं क्रीणाति," "he buys Soma with a red-coloured, yellow-eyed [cow] of a year old." The Mîmâmsaka delights in hair-splitting, and in trifling with language; and we have a typical instance of this idiosyncrasy in the way in which this simple sentence is dealt with. Because the cow is not actually mentioned, and the word अरुणा denotes a quality (redness), an objector says "how can one buy Soma with a mere quality ?" S'abara's reply to this occupies ten octavo pages, whilst that of Kumârila fills twenty-nine ! The objection is concisely put in the *Nyâyamâlâvistara*, part of which is as follows:—

"अरुणाशब्दोऽरुणिमानं गुणमाचष्टे । गुणिविषयतया प्रयुज्यमानस्यापि 'नागृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टे बुद्धिः' इति न्यायेन गुणबोधकत्वात् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गुणमात्रे तद्व्युत्पत्तेश्च । तस्य चारुणिमगुणस्य तृतीयाश्रुत्या सोमक्रयसाधनत्वं प्रतीयते तच्चानुपपन्नम् । अमूर्तस्य गुणस्य वासोहिरण्यादिवत्क्रयसाधनत्वासंभवात्" ॥ The reply to this is:—"यद्यप्यमूर्तो गुणस्तथापि हायनवदक्षिवच्च गोद्रव्यमवच्छिनत्ति । तच्च द्रव्यं साधनमिति तद्द्वारा गुणस्य क्रयेणान्वयो भवति । एवं सति वाक्यभेदो न भविष्यति" ॥

अवतप्तेनकुलस्थितम् ॥

A mungoose's standing on hot ground. Used of a fickle, changeable person who never sticks to a thing. It is found in *Mahâbhâṣya* 2. 1. 47, as follows:—"यथावतप्ते नकुला न चिरं स्थातारो भवन्त्येवं कार्याण्यारभ्य यो न चिरं तिष्ठति स उच्यतेऽवतप्तेनकुलस्थितं त एतदिति." It occurs a second time in 6. 2. 49 (vârt. 6), in company with the expression उदकेविशीर्णं. The compound तीर्थकाक

which is found in 2. 1. 42, has much the same meaning. Patanjali says:—"यथा तीर्थे काका न चिरं स्थातारो भवन्त्येवं यो गुरुकुलानि गत्वा न चिरं तिष्ठति स उच्यते तीर्थकाक इति." In Marâṭhî, however, the name is applied to "a person ever watchful after some booty or spoil," a meaning which seems more in accord with the character of the crow than that assigned to it by Patanjali!

अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी ॥

For this paribhâṣâ see under रथकारन्याय. It is quoted by Kumârila in *Tantravârtika* 1. 4. 11, more than once, but one example will suffice:—"लब्धात्मिका हि समुदायप्रसिद्धिरवयवप्रसिद्धिं बाधते तस्यास्त्वात्मलाभो यत्र प्रमाणान्तरेण पूर्वानुभूतावयवार्थरहितेऽर्थे शब्दप्रयोगो दृश्यते। यथाश्वत्वकर्णत्वरहिते वृक्षेऽश्वकर्णशब्दस्य." As a parallel to this, we might take our word cockroach, which is neither a cock nor a roach! For other examples of the paribhâṣâ see *Tantravârtika* pages 538, 1002, 1048, and 1149.

अविरविकन्यायः ॥

The principle of the words *avi* and *avika*. Though both mean 'a sheep,' yet a derivative in the sense of the flesh of a sheep (आविक) can be formed only from the latter. It occurs in *Mahâbhâṣya* 4. 1. 88 (vârt. 2) as follows:—"तत्र द्वयोः शब्दयोः समानार्थयोरेकेन विग्रहोऽपरस्मादुत्पत्तिर्भविष्यत्यविरविकन्यायेन । तद्यथा । अवेर्मांसमिति विगृह्य अविकशब्दादुत्पत्तिर्भवति आविकमिति" ॥ Similarly in 8. 1. 89 (vârt. 6); 4. 2. 60; 4. 3. 131; 5. 1. 7; 5. 1. 28; and 6. 2. 11 (vârt. 2). This inaccurate compound is one of the instances brought forward by Kumârila of the way in which grammar &c. are set aside by learned writers. On this, see the nyâya "अश्वारूढाः &c." below.

अश्वारूढाः कथं चाश्वान्विस्मरेयुः सचेतनाः ॥

How could men of intelligence be mounted on horses and yet

forget their horses? Yet grammarians and others sometimes ignore their own rules! In *Tantravârtika* 1. 3. 18 (according to the incorrect numbering of the Benares edition), Kumârila comments at great length on the corrupt forms of words employed by even learned writers. On page 200, he says "अन्तो नास्त्यपशब्दानामितिहासपुराणयोः" and then instances the curious word उभाभ्य which is made to mean "a blow given by an elephant with both tusks" (युगपदुभाभ्यां दन्ताभ्यां प्रहारः). On the following page he says:—"येऽपि व्याकरणस्यैव परे पारे प्रतिष्ठिताः । सुतरां तेऽपि गाव्यादितुल्यानेव प्रयुञ्जते ॥ सूत्रवार्तिकभाष्येषु दृश्यते चापशब्द-नम् । अश्वारूढाः कथं चाश्वान्विस्मरेयुः सचेतनाः" ॥

Mallinâth probably had this in mind when, in his comment on Varadarâja's *Târkikarakṣâ* (page 20), he wrote:—"तदे-तत्तुरगाधिरूढस्य तुरगविस्मरणं यद्वेदप्रामाण्यसाधने प्रवृत्तस्य मीमांसागुरो-स्तत्प्रमाद इति सोपहासं परिहरति." See Addenda.

असाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति ॥

Names are given in consideration of some speciality. This was perhaps taken from *Sânkhyasûtra* V. 112:—"सर्वेषु पृथि-व्युपादानमसाधारण्यात्तद्व्यपदेशः पूर्ववत्." "In all [bodies] earth is the material: in consideration [however] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case." This is Dr. Ballantyne's rendering. The nyâya is found in the early part of the Akṣapâda section of *Sarvadars'ana-sangraha*, and I append Prof. Cowell's translation:—"ननु प्रमाणादिपदार्थषोडशके प्रतिपाद्यमाने कथमिदं न्यायशास्त्रमिति व्यपदिश्यते । सत्यम् । तथाप्यसाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति न्यायेन न्यायस्य परार्था-नुमानापरपर्यायस्य सकलविद्यानुग्राहकतया सर्वकर्मानुष्ठानसाधनतया प्रधानत्वेन तथा व्यपदेशो युज्यते".

"But here an objector may say, 'If these sixteen topics, proof &c, are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name of the Nyâya S'âstra [as reasoning, *i. e. Nyâya*, or

logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?']. We allow the force of the objection; still, as names are proverbially said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name Nyâya was rightly applied to Gotama's System, since 'reasoning', or inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit." See also *S'âlikâ*, page 98.

असिधारामधुलेहनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *licking honey from the edge of a sword!* This is found in the Jaina chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 45 of Jîvânanda's edn.), as follows:—"सदसद्वेदनीयस्य सुखदुःखोत्पादकत्वमसिधारामधुलेहनवत्," which Prof. Cowell renders, "An object recognized as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge—this is *vedanîya*."

आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी ॥

Power [of understanding on the part of the hearer] *co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense.* This is Dr. Thibaut's rendering of the nyâya as it appears in Laugâkshibhâskara's *Arthasangraha* (page 16) in a passage explanatory of *adhikâra-vidhi.* The portion connected with the nyâya, and the translation, are as follows:—"एवं सामर्थ्यमपि । आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायात्समर्थं प्रत्येव विधिप्रवृत्तेः" ॥ "In the same manner, capability (to perform the duty is an understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those who are capable (by bodily strength and health, mental power &c.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the words 'power (of understanding on the part of the hearer) co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense' (the verbs although possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not able to understand it)." The commentator, Râmes'vara S'ivayogibhikshu, explains

that blind, deaf, and lame persons are excluded as being incapable of performing various parts of the sacrificial ritual.

A much earlier instance of the employment of this nyâya is met with in Sures'vara's *Sambandhavârtika*, verse 75, which I here subjoin, together with Ânandagiri's comment.

"सहकर्त्री भवेच्छक्तिरिति न्यायाद्भवेद्यदि ।
मनुष्यगोचरोऽपीति नाख्यातासंभवात्तथा ॥ ७५ ॥

आख्यातानामर्थं बोधयतामधिकारिशक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायाद्विधेयार्थानुष्ठानशक्तमधिकारिणं विना विधेर्विधित्वायोगात्काम्यादि मुमुक्षुर्वर्जयेदित्याख्यातस्य मनुष्यं प्रतिस्वार्थं बोधयतो मनुष्यशक्तिसापेक्षत्वाद्देवमात्रगोचरत्वमस्यासिद्धमिति शंकते । सहकर्त्रीति । यत्राख्यातमस्ति तत्र तत्सहकर्त्री कर्तृशक्तिरिष्टा न च मोक्षकामी काम्यादि वर्जयेदित्याख्यातं ख्यात्यतो न मनुष्यगोचरतोक्तहेतोरिति समाधत्ते नाख्यातेति" ॥

The nyâya probably originated with S'abara who makes use of it in his bhâṣya on Jaimini 1. 4. 30. There, however, the reading is आख्यातशब्दानामर्थं &c. The expression "सर्वाख्यातसहकारिशक्त्यनुसारेण" in *Tantravârtika* 2. 2. 27, page 558, line 9, incorporates the same nyâya. See Addenda.

आर्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते ॥

A wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind. This illustration is taken from the Jaina section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 44 of Jivânanda's edn). The text, and Professor Cowell's translation, are as follows:—"यथार्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते तथा कषायजलार्द्रं आत्मा योगानीतं कर्म सर्वप्रदेशैर्गृह्णाति । यथा वा निष्टप्तायःपिण्डे जले क्षिप्तेऽम्भः समन्ताद्गृह्णाति तथा कषायोष्णो जीवो योगानीतं कर्म समन्तादादत्ते." "As a wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins, collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions which are brought to it by *yoga*. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the *jîva*, heated by

previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought by *yoga*." In a footnote, the Professor adds:—"Yoga seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act."

इष्यमाणस्यैव प्राधान्यं न त्विच्छायाः ॥

The thing wished for is of more importance than the wish. This occurs in *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 56, as follows:—"ननु विध्यन्वयित्वेनाविवक्षितमपि प्रैषानुवचनमनुवाद्यतया यथा-विधेयदण्डान्वयि एवमिच्छापि प्रारभ्यमाणब्रह्मज्ञानान्वयिनी सती ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य प्रयोजनत्वं ब्रह्मणः सन्दिग्धत्वं च गमयेत् । इच्छेष्यमाणसमभिव्याहारे चेष्यमा-णप्राधान्यं यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादौ क्लृप्तम् । अत इहापीच्छाप्राधान्यं विहाये-ष्यमाणप्राधान्यमभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तम्" ॥ Again, on page 62 of the same:—"प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानमिति सामान्यन्यायादिच्छेष्यमाणसमभिव्याहृता-विष्यमाणं प्रधानमिति स्वर्गकामपदादिषु क्लृप्तो विशेषन्यायो बलवानिति भावः" ॥ So too, in Râmânuja's *Srîbhâṣya*, page 31:—"ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । इच्छाया इष्यमाणप्रधानत्वादिष्यमाणं ज्ञानमिह विधीयते" ॥ This is repeated *verbatim* in the Râmânuja section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, page 69 (Jîvânanda's edn).

उपसंजनिष्यमाणनिमित्तोऽप्यपवाद उपसंजातनिमित्तमप्युत्सर्गं बाधते ॥

This is another of Raghunâtha's grammatical nyâyas. It is not met with in the *Mahâbhâṣya*, but forms one of Nâgojîbhaṭṭas paribhâṣâs. The following is Prof. Kielhorn's rendering of it:—"An *apavâda*, even though the causes of its (application) are still to present themselves, supersedes a general rule the causes (of the application) of which are already present." In connection with this paribhâṣâ we have the देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्याय which see below.

उभयतःपाशा रज्जुः ॥

A rope which binds at both ends. An embarrassing position;

a dilemma. The following is from the Jaimini section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 133, Bib. Ind., or 150 of Jîvânanda's edition), with Professor Cowell's translation (page 198):—
"अभावः कारणमेव न भवतीति चेत्तदा वक्तव्यमभावस्य कार्यत्वमस्ति न वा । यदि नास्ति तदा पटप्रध्वंसानुपपत्त्या नित्यताप्रसङ्गः । अथास्ति किमपराद्धं कारणत्वेनेति । सेयमुभयतःपाशा रज्जुः" ॥

"If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its 'emergent non-existence' or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you at both ends."

The following example is from the opening part of *Citsukhî* (Paṇḍit, vol. iv. page 466):—"स्वप्रकाशतायां सति प्रमाणे तद्वेद्यत्वम् । असति च साधकाभावादेव न तत्सिद्धिरिति सैषौपनिषदानामुभयतःपाशा रज्जुरित्यलमतिविस्तरेण" ॥ Other instances will be found in *Kusumânjali* iii. 6 (page 374); in the same author's *Lakṣaṇâvali*, page 56; in *Târkikarakṣâṭikâ*, page 26; and in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya*, page 530. See Addenda.

एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत् ॥

My rendering of this in the Second Handful was not quite correct. It should rather be—*A thing that is changed in one part does not thereby become something else* (literally, like something else). For example, as Patanjali says under 1. 1. 56 (vârt. 10), the cutting of a dog's ears or tail does not turn it into a horse or a donkey, but it is still a dog! Other passages of the Mahâbhâṣya where this paribhâṣâ occurs are as follows:— S'ivasûtra 2, vârtika 4 (*i. e.* vol. i. page 21); 2. 4. 85 (vârt. 10); 4. 1. 83; 6. 1. 69 (vârt. 3); 6. 4. 149 (vârt. 2); and 8. 3. 85. Raghunâtha probably took this, with his other grammatical nyâyas, from the *Paribhâṣendus'ekhara*, Professor Kielhorn's translation of which enabled me to correct my rendering. For other illustrations of the above, see under "श्वा कर्णे वा &c."

एकसम्बन्धिदर्शनेऽन्यसम्बन्धिस्मरणम् ॥

On seeing one thing we are reminded of others connected with it. The nyâya is found in this form in the *Nyâyapradîpa* on *Tarkabhâṣâ*, page 44, where the presence of smoke is said to remind the spectator of the invariably connected fire. In both of Raghunâthavarman's books it is given as **एकसम्बन्धिदर्शनमन्यसम्बन्धिस्मारकम्**, and, in the larger of the two, he illustrates it thus:—"**यथा हस्तिपकदर्शनं हस्तिस्मारकं तथा नद्यादिज्ञानस्य कुशकाशजलतुंबिकाजलूकानां तत्सम्बन्धिनां स्मरणहेतुत्वम्.**" Târânâtha (s. v. **न्याय**) quotes the saying in the form **एकसम्बन्धिज्ञानं** &c. He reverses the above illustration by saying that the elephant reminds one of the driver; and adds that a word reminds one of its meaning, a statement which, in these degenerate times, is not universally true!

कपिञ्जलन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the Kapinjalas* [a kind of partridge]. In *Vâjasaneyi-Saṁhitâ* xxiv. 20, we read "**वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानालभते,**" and the question arises, *how many* of these birds are to be sacrificed? Jaimini devotes eight sûtras [11. 1. 38-45] to the discussion of this point, and finally decides that *three*, the lowest figure representing *plurality* (two being merely duality), will satisfy the requirements of the s'ruti. S'abara's lengthy argument is very concisely summed up in the *Nyâyamâlâvistara*, as follows:—

"कपिञ्जलेषु त्रित्वाद्या ऐच्छिकास्त्रित्वमेव वा ।
आद्यो बहुत्वसाम्यान्न त्रित्वेनैव कृतत्वतः ॥

अश्वमेधे 'वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानालभत' इति त्रित्वचतुष्ट्वादिसंख्यानां बहुत्वसाम्यादिच्छया या काचिद्बहुत्वसंख्या स्वीकार्येति चेत् । न । त्रित्वेनैव शास्त्रस्य कृतत्वात् । यो हि चतुष्ट्वादिसंख्यामुपादत्ते तेन न तदन्तर्भूतं त्रित्वं वर्जयितुं शक्यं त्रित्वमुपाददानेन त्वनन्तर्भूतं चतुष्ट्वादिकं वर्जयितुं शक्यते अतोऽवश्यंभावित्वेन प्रथमभावित्वेन लाघवेन च त्रित्व उपात्ते शास्त्रार्थसिद्धौ ततोऽधिकपक्षिहिंसायां प्रत्यवायात् । तस्मात्त्रित्वमेवोपादेयम्" ॥

I have met with the nyâya in *Tantravârtika* 2. 1. 12 (page 394), in 3. 5. 26 (page 1049), and in *Vedântakalpatarupari-mala*, page 550, line 3; and the abridged St. Petersburg Lexicon gives a reference to Kullûka on *Manu* viii. 105, where certain offerings are directed to be made to Sarasvatî. In accordance with the *kapinjalanyâya*, Kullûka decides that three are sufficient; and Medhâtithi is of the same opinion. This maxim is manifestly akin to सकृत्कृते कृतः शास्त्रार्थः, and in accord with the Marâṭhî phrase शास्त्रापुरता as defined by Molesworth.

कंबलनिर्णेजनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the cleansing of a coarse blanket* [by beating it on the feet, and so dusting them at the same time]! One of the numerous examples of the accomplishment of two objects by one operation;—"killing two birds with one stone." It is found in S'abara 2. 2. 25:—"अपि च दधि उभयमसमर्थं कर्तुं फलं साधयितुं होमं च। ननु कंबलनिर्णेजनवदेतद्भविष्यति। निर्णेजनं हि उभयं करोति। कंबलशुद्धिं पादयोश्च निर्मलताम्" ॥ The कंबल (the कांबळ of the Marâṭhas) is made of extremely coarse and rough material, and generally black or black and grey. In the case of the very poor, it is often their sole garment by day as well as their only covering at night.

करिबृंहितन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the trumpeting of an elephant.* The word करि is really redundant, since the whole meaning is conveyed by बृंहित alone—बृंहितं करिगर्जितमित्यमरः—but the addition, in this and similar cases, is made for some special purpose. Raghunâtha defines it thus:—"विशिष्टवाचकानामपि पदानां सति पृथग्विशेषणवाचक-पदसमवधाने विशेष्यमात्रपरतायां करिबृंहितन्यायः प्रवर्तते." This principle may be exemplified by the following verse from *Kâvyapra-kâs'a* vii. 10:—

"सौन्दर्यसम्पत्तारुण्यं यस्यास्ते ते च विभ्रमाः ।
षट्पदान्पुष्पमालेव कान्ताकर्षति सा सखे" ॥

Here the author of the *Kâvyapradîpa* remarks (page 295):—"मालाशब्दो यद्यपि पुष्पस्यैव स्रजि शक्तस्तथापि न पुष्पपदमपुष्टार्थम् । लक्षणयोत्कृष्टत्वप्रतिपादकत्वात् । अयमेव करिबृंहितन्यायः" ॥ So, too, the *Udâharaṇacandrikâ*:—अत्र निरुपपदान्मालाशब्दादेव पुष्पस्रक्प्रतीतेः पुष्पपदमुत्कृष्टपुष्पत्वे संक्रमितवाच्यम् । एवमेव करिबृंहितादिष्वपि बोध्यम्."

The following additional nyâyas are cited by Raghunâtha as belonging to the same class:—गजघटान्याय, नीलेन्दीवरन्याय, पर्वताधित्यकान्याय, पर्वतोपत्यकान्याय, वाजिमन्दुरान्याय, मृगवागुरान्याय. In each case the first word might be omitted without affecting the meaning.

कलञ्जन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [abstention from] *the flesh of an animal killed with a poisoned arrow.* It is deduced from Jaimini 6. 2 19, 20,—an adhikaraṇa designed to teach the evil result of doing forbidden things. The words "न कलञ्जं भक्षयितव्यं न लशुनं न गृञ्जनं च" are discussed, and the question arises as to whether this is an instance of पर्युदास or of प्रतिषेध,—whether it means अभक्षणं कर्तव्यम् or भक्षणं न कर्तव्यम्. The subtle intellect of the Mîmâṁsaka sees a great difference between these two, the former being something to be done, and the latter being something to be avoided! The siddhântin decides in favor of the latter. I would advise my readers to study pages 39-41 of Dr. Thibaut's excellent translation of *Arthasangraha,* in order to get, if possible, to a clear understanding of this irrational tenet. Many years ago, when in India, I heard a statement made by a Brahman, to the effect that the words "put no oil in the lamp" did not mean "don't put oil in the lamp," but rather "put in the lamp" some "no-oil"; in other words, it was not a prohibition of an act but an injunction to do something! This

is just the position of the Mîmâṁsaka. The above nyâya is quoted by Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 3. 4. 28, and 4. 1. 13.

कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम् ॥

Like the building of a temple on the summit of which [at its consecration] *an earthen vessel* [filled with water] *has been placed.* Used ironically of one who considers that he is doing something as meritorious as the building of a temple. This explanation was given me by the Principal of the Sanskrit College, Benares. The illustration occurs in S'ârngadhara's ṭîkâ on Udayana's definition of *dravya* in his *Lakṣanâvali* (page 4). The definition is—"तत्र गुणात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणं द्रव्यम्," and, whilst explaining it, the commentator attacks the views of Citsukha Muni as follows:—"यत्त्वत्र तत्त्वप्रदीपिकाकारेणोत्पत्त्यनन्तरक्षणे अव्याप्तिमुद्भाव्य गुणवत्त्वात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वे च परिहारमाशंक्योत्पत्त्यनन्तरक्षणविशिष्टे कदाचिदपि गुणानुदयात्पुनरव्याप्तेस्तदवस्थत्वान्नैवमिति परिहृतम् । तत्कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम्." It is necessary here to bear in mind the tenet of the logicians—"उत्पन्नं द्रव्यं क्षणमगुणं तिष्ठति." The *Tattvapradîpikâ*, better known as *Citsukhî*, is described by Hall as "a confutation of the Nyâya philosophy, on the basis of the Vedânta." The wrath of the logicians would of course, therefore, be kindled against it. The passage complained of above is the s'loka ii. 4 with the vṛitti. The former stands thus:—"अव्याप्तेरप्यतिव्याप्तेर्द्रव्यं नैव गुणाश्रयः । आद्ये क्षणे गुणाभावाद्गुणादावपि वीक्षणात्." See Addenda.

काकदधिघातकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a crow as a destroyer of curds.* An example of *upalakṣaṇa*, where one represents many, or a part stands for the whole. So if any one were warned to keep the crows off the curds, it would imply that all other possible raiders were also to be warded off. It is thus put by Bhartṛihari in *Vâkyapadîya* ii. 314:—

"काकेभ्यो रक्ष्यतां सर्पिरिति बालोऽपि चोदितः ।
उपघातपरे वाक्ये न श्वादिभ्यो न रक्षति" ॥

This is reproduced, with slight variations, in *Tantravârtika*, page 731. Raghunâtha's application of the maxim is as follows:—"तदुक्तमीश्वरगीतायाम् । 'ये त्विमं विष्णुमव्यक्तं मां च देवं महेश्वरम् । एकीभावेन पश्यन्ति न तेषां पुनरुद्भवः' इति । अत्र हरिहरयोर्ग्रहणं काकदधिघातकन्यायेन विधेरप्युपलक्षणम्." The *Îs'varagîtâ* forms part of the uttarabhâga of the *Kûrma Purâṇa*, and the verse here quoted is xi. 8. In the ग्रहैकत्वन्याय, too, a part represents the whole.

काकाधिकरणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *something on which a crow is perched.* This illustration seems to have originated with Patanjali, and is found in *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 1. 26 (vârtikas 3 and 4):—"अनुबन्धोऽन्यत्वकर इति चेत्तन्न । किं कारणम् । लोपात् । लुप्यतेऽत्रानुबन्धः । लुप्तेऽत्रानुबन्धे नान्यत्वं भविष्यति । तद्यथा । कतरद्देवदत्तस्य गृहम् । अदो यत्रासौ काक इति । उत्पतिते काके नष्टं तद्गृहं भवति । एवमिहापि लुप्तेऽनुबन्धे नष्टः प्रत्ययो भवति । यद्यपि लुप्यते जानाति त्वसौ सानुबन्धकस्येयं संज्ञा कृतेति । तद्यथा । इतरत्रापि कतरद्देवदत्तस्य गृहम् । अदो यत्रासौ काक इति । उत्पतिते काके यद्यपि नष्टं तद्गृहं भवत्यन्ततस्तमुद्देशं जानाति."

It occurs in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* (page 195) in the course of a discussion on Bâdarâyaṇa's second sûtra:—"ततः कारणसंबन्धिनो जन्मादेरलक्षणत्वमिति चेन्मैवम् । काकाधिकरणत्ववदुपपत्तेः । काकाधिकरणत्वं हि न गृहेऽन्तर्भवति । तथा च सति काकविगमे गृहैकदेशभङ्गबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । अतो गृहस्याधिकरणत्वं नामौपाधिको धर्मः स च परिशेषाल्लक्षणे एवान्तर्भवति । तन्निरूपकस्य काकस्य यथा लक्षणत्वं तथा ब्रह्मणोऽपि कारणत्वमौपाधिको धर्मो लक्षणान्तःपाती." Similarly in *Sankṣepa-s'ârîraka* i. 206:—"यत्रैष काक इदमेव तु देवदत्तवेश्मेति लाक्षणिकवृत्तिरिहाभ्युपेता । काकास्पदत्वमवधीर्य तथापि वेश्ममात्राकृतिर्भवति लाक्षणिकी तु बुद्धिः" ॥ With slight modifications it is found also in *Tantra-*

vârtika, page 277, line 8:—"यथानभिधीयमानमपि काकनिलयनं देवदत्तगृहशब्दस्य स्वार्थमभिदधतश्चिह्नभूततां प्रतिपद्यते तद्वदाकृतिश्चिह्नं व्यक्त्यभिधाने भविष्यति."

काण्डानुसमयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of "the performance of all prescribed acts of ritual in orderly succession for a particular object before performing the same acts in the same order for a second object." This is Sir Monier-Williams' definition based on the commentary on Âs'valâyana's *Gṛhyasûtra* 1. 24. 7 which prescribes certain gifts commencing with विष्टर and ending with गो. The commentator says "ऋत्विजां मधुपर्कदाने द्वे गती संभवतः। पदार्थानुसमयः काण्डानुसमय इति । तत्र पदार्थानुसमयो नाम सर्वेषां वरणक्रमेण विष्टरं दत्त्वा ततः पाद्यं ततोऽर्घ्यमिति । काण्डानुसमयो नाम एकस्यैव विष्टरादिगोनिवेदनान्तं समाप्य ततोऽन्यस्य सर्वं ततोऽन्यस्येति." In a case of this kind, where there is merely a bestowal of gifts, and not the performance of sacrificial ritual, the definition given by Molesworth is more suitable:—"The order, when a suit or set of things is to be given, to each individual of a multitude, *of giving at once* all the articles composing the suit or set, as distinguished from पदार्थानुसमय."

The nyâya represents the purport of Jaimini 5. 2. 3. Kunte says that the word अभ्यावृत्ति used in the sûtra means *kâṇḍânusamaya*. His notes on sûtras 1–3 contain some very interesting items of information, of especial value to us of the West. See पदार्थानुसमयन्याय, below.

किं चक्षुषा ममैतेन दृष्टं दीपेन यन्मया ॥

What do I want with eyes when I can see by means of a lamp! This bit of wit—worthy of an Irishman—is not a nyâya, but its inclusion here may help to show that even such a solid work as the *S'lokavârtika* contains an element of amusement. The quotation is from page 508:—

"उद्विग्नो ह्यन्धकारेण कश्चिद्देवं ब्रवीत्यपि ।
किं चक्षुषा ममैतेन दृष्टं दीपेन यन्मया ॥
नित्यवृत्तो तु नान्धानां दृष्टिर्दीपशतैरपि ।
रूपादिदर्शने यस्मात्तस्माच्चक्षुः प्रकाशकम्" ॥

कुल्याप्रणयनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the laying down of a water-course for irrigation.* An example of a thing made for one purpose subserving other purposes also. It is found in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 118, line 9:—" अतो न विधेयप्रत्यये तात्पर्यमिति कुल्याप्रणयनन्यायेनोभयार्थत्वाविधेयत्वात् । यथा शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते ताभ्य एव पानीयं च पीयते तद्वत् ॥ "

For the source of this nyâya, see अन्यार्थं प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति.

कूटकार्षापणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the unwitting employment of] *base money* [in one's business]. It is used by Kumârila (in Tantravârtika 1. 3. 3, page 95) in the course of an argument on the relative value of S'ruti and Smṛiti. He maintains that if any teaching of the latter is found to be in opposition to that of the former, it must be given up; just as a man who finds that he has been using counterfeit coins must at once abstain from so doing. The portion containing the nyâya is as follows:—"यो हि कूटकार्षापणेन कंचित्कालमज्ञो लोकमध्ये व्यवहरति न तेन विवेकज्ञानजनितव्युत्पत्तिनापि तथैव व्यवहर्तव्यम्." The word कार्षापण here evidently means money in general, and not a coin of a certain value. Somes'vara, however, in his commentary *Nyâyasudhâ* (page 145, line 12), seems to take it in the latter sense. He says:—"यो हीति । द्वात्रिंशत्कृष्णलरजतपरिमाणं कार्षापणः । कूटाकूटविलक्षणविवेकज्ञानेन जनिता व्युत्पत्तिः कूटत्वनिश्चयो यस्य स तथोक्तः ॥ "

In *Tantravârtika* 1. 3. 8 (page 149, line 3 from bottom), Kumârila compares words to coins which can be tested by in-

telligent people. He says:—"शब्दापभ्रंशवदेव गौणभ्रान्त्यादिप्रयोगनिमित्ता अर्थापभ्रंशा भवन्ति ते शास्त्रस्थैरेवाविप्लुतार्थक्रियानिमित्तपुण्यार्थिभिः शक्यन्ते साध्वसाधुकार्षापणमध्यादिव तत्परीक्षिभिर्विवेक्तुम्."

The nyâya is found in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 162, as follows:—"नापि बाधकाभावपरिच्छेदात्प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः स हि तात्कालिको वा स्यात्कालान्तरभावी वा। तात्कालिको न पर्याप्तः प्रामाण्यपरिनिश्चये। कूटकार्षापणादौ किंचित्कालमनुत्पन्नबाधकेऽपि कालान्तरे तदुत्पाददर्शनात्." It occurs again on page 169, line 3, on page 187, line 4 from bottom, and on page 531, line 1.

कूपखानकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the well-digger*. It is applied by Raghunâtha as follows:—"यथा कूपखानके पतितं पंकादि कूपान्निःसृतेनाम्भसा प्रक्षाल्यते तथा तत्तद्विग्रहावच्छिन्नेशभेदबुद्धिजो दोषस्तदुपासनाजन्यसुकृतमहिम्नोत्पन्नेनाद्वैतबोधेन समूलं निवर्त्यत इति ज्ञेयम् ॥" This illustration is as old as Patanjali who made use of it in the introductory chapter of the *Mahâbhâṣya* (vol. i. page 11):—"अथवा कूपखानकवदेतद्भविष्यति। तद्यथा कूपखानकः कूपं खनन्यद्यपि मृदा पांसुभिश्चावकीर्णो भवति सोऽप्सु संजातासु तत एव तं गुणमासादयति येन स च दोषो निर्हण्यते भूयसा चाभ्युदयेन योगो भवत्येवमिहापि &c."

कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षा ॥

This is identical in meaning with मुण्डितशिरोनक्षत्रान्वेषणम् for which see the Second Handful. It occurs in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 164:—"अनिश्चितप्रामाण्यस्य तु प्रवृत्तौ पश्चात्तन्निर्णयो भवन्नपि कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षावदफल एवेत्युक्तम्." Lower down on the same page, there is another nyâya of similar import, in the following verse:—

"समर्थकारणज्ञानाद्योऽपि प्रामाण्यनिश्चयम्।
ब्रूते सोऽपि कृतोद्वाहस्तत्र लग्नं परीक्षते." ॥

कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसम्प्रत्ययः ॥

The maxim that "whenever it may appear doubtful whether an operation has reference to that which is expressed by the technical or to that which is expressed by the ordinary meaning of a particular term, the operation refers (only) to that which is expressed by the technical meaning of the term in question." This is Professor Kielhorn's rendering of the nyâya as it appears in Nâgojibhaṭṭa's vritti to Paribhâṣâ ix:—"ननु संख्याग्रहणे बह्वादीनामेव ग्रहणं स्यात्प्रकरणस्याभिधानियामकत्वसिद्धात्कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति न्यायात्" ॥ The maxim is taken from the Mahâbhâṣya where it appears several times. In 1. 1. 23 (vârt. 3), it is followed by the example "लोके गोपालकमानय कटजकमानयेति यस्यैषा संज्ञा भवति स आनीयते न यो गाः पालयति यो वा कटे जातः".

केवलैर्वचनैर्निर्धनाधमर्णिक इव साधून् भ्रामयन् ॥

Like an impecunious debtor deceiving the money-lenders with empty promises. This occurs in *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 20, as follows:—"अवस्तुत्वादिति चेन्नन्वेतदपि कुतः सिद्धम् । सर्वसामर्थ्यविरहादिति चेत्सोऽयमितस्ततः केवलैर्वचनैर्निर्धनाधमर्णिक इव साधून्भ्रामयन्परस्पराश्रयदोषमपि न पश्यति".

क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्तु ॥

Action may vary, but substance cannot. This is plainly set forth in *S'ânkarabhâṣya* 1. 1. 2 (page 37) as follows:—"कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म । यथाश्वेन गच्छति पद्भ्यामन्यथा वा न वा गच्छतीति । ......न तु वस्त्वेवं नैवमस्ति नास्तीति वा विकल्प्यते". Similarly in 2. 1. 27 (page 471):—"क्रियाविषये हि...... विकल्पाश्रयणं......इह तु विकल्पाश्रयणेनापि न विरोधपरिहारः संभवत्यपुरुषतन्त्रत्वाद्वस्तुनः".

Then, in Ânandagiri's comment on 1. 4. 1 (page 325), we find the expresssion "क्रियायामिव वस्तुनि विकल्पाभावात्," and on

page 359, "न हि वस्तुनि विकल्पोऽस्ति." It occurs also on the first page of the Râmânuja chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* :—" न च सदसत्त्वयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोः समुच्चयासंभवे विकल्पः किं न स्यादिति वदितव्यं क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्त्विति न्यायात्." Nor should any one say: Granting the impossibility of the coëxistence of existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why should there not be an alternation between existence and non-existence, there being the rule that it is action, not *Ens*, that alternates?" This rendering is Professor Gough's. The nyâya is found, too, in *S'âstradîpikâ* 1. 3. 8 (page 154, line 6), and *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* iii. 82.

क्षामेष्टिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the scorched offering* [*i. e.* the Puroḍâs'a-cake]. This is the topic of Jaimini 6. 4. 17-21, and deals with the question of the penance to be performed when the whole of a sacrificial cake is burnt. A partial scorching needs no penance.

गर्गशतदण्डनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the infliction of a fine of one hundred on the Gargas.* There are two paribhâṣâs which are frequently found together in the Mahâbhâṣya, *viz.* "प्रत्येकं वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः" and "समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः". Professor Kielhorn (in his translation of Nâgojîbhaṭṭa) renders them (the latter slightly modified) thus:—"What is stated (in grammar of several things) must be understood (to have been stated) of each of them separately." And "sometimes (it) also (happens that what is stated in grammar of several things) must be understood (to have been stated) of all of them collectively." Patanjali's illustration of the former is "देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्रा भोज्यन्ताम्," where, of course, each separate person is to be fed; and his illustration of the latter is "गर्गाः शतं दण्ड्यन्ताम्" where the Gargas collectively are to be fined a hundred. The passages where these occur are 1. 1. 1 (vârt. 12); 1. 1. 7 (vârt. 1); 2. 1 4; 2. 3. 46; 6. 1. 5 (vârt. 2); 8. 3. 58; and 8. 4. 2 (vârt. 3).

The two paribhâṣâs and examples are quoted by S'abara on Jaimini 3. 1. 12 (page 223), and the second one is referred to as follows by Kumârila in his vârtika on the same passage (page 712):—"परः पुनराह सत्यमेष न दोष इति । क्रियाप्राधान्ये तु तद्वशीकृतविशेषणसमुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः । गर्गशतदण्डनहोमाभिषवभक्षवदिति परिहारः । न तु दण्डस्य दण्ड्यसंस्कारत्वाद्भोजनादिवत्प्रतिगर्गमावृत्तिः प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः ।

शारीरो निग्रहो यत्र तत्र प्रत्येकभिन्नता ।
हिरण्यादानदण्डस्तु समुदाये समाप्यते" ॥

This paribhâṣâ occurs also in *Tantravârtika* 1. 4. 3 (page 294, line 15), and in 1. 4. 8 (page 300); whilst the former one is quoted in 1. 4. 18 (page 314).

गार्हपत्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the Gârhapatya-fire* [one of the three sacred fires perpetually maintained by a householder, and from which fires for sacrificial purposes are lighted]. It represents Jaimini 3. 2. 3, 4, where the topic of the application to this fire of mantras relating to Indra is discussed. The question is raised whether, since the mantras refer to Indra, he should be worshipped rather than the Gârhapatya fire. Jaimini's decision is in favour of the latter as the more important. On account of the mantras this nyâya is also called the ऐन्द्रीन्याय. See the Nyâyamâlâvistara 3. 2. 2.

गोदोहनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the milk-pail.* It is laid down that a sacrificer who wishes for cattle must bring the water for his sacrifice in a milk-pail. The *godohana* is therefore used as an illustration of something which is *occasionally,* and not universally, connected with an act or performance as an essential part of it. It occurs in *S'ânkarabhâṣya* 3. 3. 42, as follows:—"सन्ति कर्माङ्गव्यपाश्रयाणि विज्ञानानि 'ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत'

इत्येवमादीनि । किं तानि नित्यान्येव स्युः कर्मसु पर्णमयीत्वादिवदुतानित्यानि गोदोहनादिवदिति विचारयामः ". Then, at the close of the same:—"तस्माद्यथा क्रत्वाश्रयाण्यपि गोदोहनादीनि फलसंयोगादनित्यान्येवमुद्गीथाद्युपासनानीत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्." It appears again in 3. 3. 65; 3. 4. 45, and in 4. 1. 6. Sures'vara quotes it also in his vârtika on the *Bṛihadâraṇyakopaniṣad* 3. 3. 51:—"न च गोदोहनन्यायः काम्यकर्मसु युज्यते । तेषां मुक्तिफलत्वे हि न मानं विद्यते यतः" ॥

गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसम्प्रत्ययः ॥

When a word has both a primary and a secondary meaning, an operation takes effect (only) *when the word conveys its primary meaning.* This is an abridgment of Professor Kielhorn's rendering of Nâgojîbhaṭṭa's fifteenth *paribhâṣâ*; and the following extracts from the *vṛitti* may help to explain it:—"A word which is employed in a secondary sense is so employed (only) because (the character of that which it denotes in) its primary sense is ascribed (to that which it denotes in a secondary sense)." "For example, the word गो 'ox' conveys the secondary meaning 'one who is only fit for bearing burdens, an unintelligent person,' because (such a person has) certain qualities such as stupidity &c. (in common with an ox)".

The maxim appears in the above form in *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 1. 15, and 6. 3. 46; but in 1. 4. 108, and in 8. 3. 82, the word कार्य is omitted. In this shortened form it is quoted by Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûṭrabhâṣya* 1. 2. 13 (page 185), and 1. 3. 14 (page 246). Then in 4. 3. 12, S'ankara says "परं हि ब्रह्म ब्रह्मशब्दस्य मुख्यमालंबनं गौणमपरम् । मुख्यगौणयोश्च मुख्ये संप्रत्ययो भवति". In *Vedântakalpataru*, page 346, line 3, we read:—"ननु सन्दिग्धं वस्तु प्रायदर्शनान्निर्णीयते । गौणमुख्यग्रहणविशये च मुख्ये सम्प्रत्ययः ".

In S'abara's bhâṣya on Jaimini 3. 2. 1 we have a very interesting discussion on गौण and मुख्य, in the course of which he

says "नह्यनभिधाय मुख्यं गौणमभिवदति शब्दः." The conclusion arrived at is thus expressed:—"तस्मान्मुख्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये कार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति सिद्धम्".

ग्रहैकत्वन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the mention of] *one cup only.* This summarizes Jaimini 3. 1. 13, 14, the topic of which is the Vedic passage relating to the washing of the soma-cups. The passage in question is "दशापवित्रेण ग्रहं सम्मार्ष्टि", "he cleanses the cup with a fringed filtering-cloth." But there are many such *grahas* in use; is he to cleanse only one of them? The decision is that one represents the whole number, and that all may be cleansed. Kumârila explains this in the following kârikâ, under 3. 1. 14:—"व्यक्तीरुद्दिश्य यत्कर्म स्वजात्याद्युपलक्षिताः । विहितं गुणभावेन तत्सर्वार्थं प्रतीयते" ॥ See also *Tantravârtika* 2. 1. 1, page 339, line 4 from bottom; and again under 2. 2. 26, page 551. The latter passage is as follows:—"न हि तस्यार्थप्रत्यायनमात्रमेवैकं प्रयोजनमिति वक्तव्यम् । ननूच्यमानेऽपीति प्रत्ययानुग्रहार्थं धातुरुच्चार्यमाणः स्वार्थं प्रत्याययतीति । न चास्य ग्रहैकत्ववदविवक्षाकारणं किंचिदस्ति". This nyâya may be compared with काकदधिघातकन्याय.

The use of the ग्रहैकत्वन्याय is not confined to the Mîmâmsâ. It appears in the *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 287, in a discussion on मन्त्रप्रामाण्य, as follows:—"किं मन्त्रेभ्योऽर्थप्रतीतिरेव नास्ति किं वा भवन्त्यपि निर्निमित्तासावुत सन्निमित्तापि ग्रहैकत्वप्रतीतिवदविवक्षितेति...... नापि संभवन्त्यपि मन्त्रेभ्योऽर्थप्रतीतिर्ग्रहैकत्वप्रतीतिवदविवक्षिता भवितुमर्हत्यविवक्षानिबन्धनस्य क्वचिदप्यभावात्." The passage from which this is extracted is full of matter drawn from the Mîmâmsâ, and is unintelligible apart from the latter.

चन्दनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *Sandal-oil.* Bâdarâyana uses this as an illustration in sûtras 2. 3. 23, 24. As the application of a drop of

the oil to one part of the body produces a pleasant sensation in the whole of it, so soul, abiding in one part, namely in the heart, is yet perceived as present in the entire frame. S'ankara's exposition of the former sûtra is as follows:—

"यथा हरिचन्दनबिन्दुः शरीरैकदेशसंबद्धोऽपि सन्सकलदेहव्यापिनमाह्लादं करोत्येवमात्मापि देहैकदेशस्थः सकलदेहव्यापिनीमुपलब्धिं करिष्यति । त्वक्संबन्धाच्चास्य सकलशरीरगता वेदना न विरुध्यते । त्वगात्मनोर्हि संबन्धः कृत्स्नायां त्वचि वर्तते । त्वक्च कृत्स्नशरीरव्यापिनीति". This gives a very materialistic notion of *âtman*!

चित्राङ्गनान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a woman in a picture.* An illustration of that which has only an appearance of reality. Raghunâtha connects with this the चित्रानलन्याय and चित्रामृतन्याय, and, in his larger work, quotes भगवान्वसिष्ठः as follows:—"चित्रामृतं नामृतमेव विद्धि चित्रानलं नानलमेव विद्धि । चित्राङ्गना नूनमनङ्गनेति वाचाविवेकस्त्वविवेक एवेति". Like his other quotations from Vasiṣṭha, this, too, is doubtless from the *Yogavâsiṣṭha,* though I do not remember having met with it there.

जलतुंबिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a gourd in water.* The idea is that of a gourd, thickly covered with mud, and therefore sinking in the water, but gradually resuming its buoyancy as the mud is washed off. The Digambara Jains use the figure to illustrate the release of the soul from the encumbrance of the body. Raghunâtha puts it thus:—"यथा पंकलिप्ता तुंबिका नदीसमुद्रादौ मज्जन्ती पंके क्षीणेऽवकाश आगत्य तिष्ठति तथा जीवो देहादिपंके क्षीणेऽलोकाकाशे गत्वा तिष्ठति । अयमेव तस्य मोक्ष इति दिगम्बराः । इति जलतुंबिकान्यायः" ॥

This description, without mention of the nyâya, is found in very similar language in the Jaina chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 48 of Jîvânanda's edition), and also in *Vedân-*

takalpatauparimala, for which see the पञ्जरमुक्तपक्षिन्याय below. The former passage is as follows:—"यथा वा मृत्तिकालेपकृतमलाबुद्रव्यं जलेऽधःपतति पुनरपेतमृत्तिकाबन्धमूर्ध्वं गच्छति तथा कर्मरहित आत्मा असङ्गत्वादूर्ध्वं गच्छति बन्धच्छेदादेरण्डबीजवच्चोर्ध्वगतिस्वभावाच्चाग्निशिखावत्." The figure of the castor-oil seed is found in the latter passage also. The term अलोकाकाश which appears in Raghunâtha's definition, is the name of a subdivision of one of the five categories (*astikâya*) of the Jaina system. It is explained as follows by Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 2. 33 (page 563):—"आकाशास्तिकायो द्वेधा लौकिकाकाशोऽलौकिकाकाशश्च । लोकानामन्तर्वर्ती लोकाकाशः । तदुपरि मोक्षस्थानमलोकाकाशः". This is referred to in a verse quoted by Mâdhava in the immediate context of the passage already cited from the *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, namely:—"गत्वा गत्वा निवर्तन्ते चन्द्रसूर्यादयो ग्रहाः । अद्यापि न निवर्तन्ते त्वालोकाकाशमागताः" ॥ Professor Cowell's rendering is:—"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, moon, and the rest; but never to this day have returned any who have gone to Âlokâkâs'a." I think, however, that we must say Alokâkâs'a, and regard the long vowel as including the preposition आ 'up to,' 'as far as,' "those who have *reached* Alokâkâs'a" (आ अलोकाकाशम्).

जातेष्टिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the oblation on the birth of a son.* This is the subject of Jaimini 4. 3. 38, 39. The question arises whether the offering is for the benefit of the father or the son (तत्र सन्देहः किमात्मनिःश्रेयसाय उत पुत्रनिःश्रेयसाय), and the answer is that it benefits the latter.

ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकम् ॥

Knowledge [of Brahma] *abolishes nothing but the ignorance* [which obscures that Impersonality]. This is a bit of Vedantism pure and simple, and has scant claims to a place amongst

popular maxims. It is admitted solely because Raghunâtha includes it in his list. His explanation is as follows:—"अस्मिंश्चाध्यासेऽज्ञानं कारणम् । तत्त्वज्ञानेन वातदीपन्यायेन तन्निवृतावस्नेहदीपन्यायेन तदध्यासोऽपि निवर्तते । न च ज्ञानेनैवोभयनिवृत्तिः । कुतो न स्यात् । ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमिति न्यायविरोधात् । द्विविधा हि निवृत्तिः । विरोधिना सामग्रीनिवृत्त्या च । यथा वातादिना दीपनाशो यथा च तैलवर्त्यादिनिवृत्त्या दीपनिवृत्तिः । तत्राद्या निवृत्तिरज्ञानस्य द्वितीया कार्यवर्गस्येति बोध्यम्" ॥

The so-called nyâya is found in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 8, line 9, and in *Pancapâdikâ*, page 1.

तत्क्रतुन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *meditation on that* [*viz.* Brahman]. Or, *one who meditates on that*. This is taken from *Brahmasûtra* 4. 3. 15, "अप्रतीकालंबनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथाऽदोषात्तत्क्रतुश्च". The bhâṣya on the last term is as follows:—"तत्क्रतुश्चोभयथाभावस्य समर्थको हेतुर्द्रष्टव्यः । यो हि ब्रह्मक्रतुः स ब्राह्ममैश्वर्यमासीदेदिति श्लिष्यते 'तं यथा यथोपासते तदेव भवति' इति श्रुतेः । न तु प्रतीकेषु ब्रह्मक्रतुत्वमस्ति प्रतीकप्रधानत्वादुपासनस्य । नन्वब्रह्मक्रतुरपि ब्रह्म गच्छतीति श्रूयते यथा पञ्चाग्निविद्यायां 'स एनान्ब्रह्म गमयति [छा॰ ५. १०. २] इति । भवतु यत्रैवमाहत्यवाद उपलभ्यते तदभावे त्वौत्सर्गिकेण तत्क्रतुन्यायेन ब्रह्मक्रतूनामेव तत्प्राप्तिर्नेतरेषामिति गम्यते". I subjoin Dr. Thibaut's rendering, with a few additions of my own in parentheses. "The words, 'and the meditation on that,' state the reason for this twofold relation [*viz.* of those who meditate on Brahman with qualities, and those who worship by means of symbols or images]. For he whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation, 'In whatever form they meditate on him, that they become themselves.' In the case of symbols, on the other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the symbol being the chief element in the meditation.—But scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed on Brahman go to it; so in the knowledge [rather, the *doctrine* (vidyâ)] of the five fires, 'He leads them to

Brahman.'—This may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration. We only mean to say that, where there is no such declaration, the general rule is that those only whose purpose is Brahman [*i. e.* whose mind is fixed on B.] go to it, not any others." This is a noteworthy passage. It practically condemns the use of symbols, or images, in worship, by declaring that the mind of the upâsaka is directed to the *pratîka*, and not to Brahman (or Îs'vara). The s'ruti, "तं यथा यथोपासते &c.," which is quoted also in 3. 4. 52, may mean much more than S'ankara sees in it; for it is an undoubted fact that, *in the present life*, the worshipper becomes assimilated to the object of his worship; that the characteristics of that object, as conceived by him, become his own characteristics; and that a man never rises above the moral or spiritual level of that which he worships. This was clearly set before the Jewish nation in the teaching of Psalms CXV and CXXXV, where, with reference to the making and worshipping of images, we read "They that make them shall be like them, every one that trusteth in them" (Revised version).

The तत्क्रतुन्याय, which, in its full form seems to be तत्क्रतुस्तद्भवति (as in Ânandagiri on the closing part of 4. 3. 15), is constantly quoted in the *Vedântakalpataruparimala*. It will be found on pages 229 (three times), 230 (line 9), 235 (line 11), 246 (line 6), 478 (line 1), 591 (line 4 from bottom), 669 (line 10), and 730 (lines 9 and 15).

तत्प्रख्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the existence of another scriptural passage] *declaratory of it.* This is the name given to Jaimini's sûtra 1. 4. 4 (तत्प्रख्यं चान्यशास्त्रम्), and the above is Dr. Thibaut's rendering of the nyâya in the following passage from Laugâksibhâskara's *Arthasangraha*, page 4:—"कर्मस्वरूपमात्रबोधको विधिरुत्पत्तिविधिः। यथाग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति। ...ननु यागस्य द्वे रूपे द्रव्यं देवता च। तथा रूपाश्रवणेऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति कथमुत्पत्तिविधिः। अग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य तु तत्प्रख्यन्यायेन नामधेयत्वादिति चेन्न। रूपाश्रवणेऽप्यस्योत्पत्तिविधित्वात्" ॥

"That injunction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called *originative injunction*, as for instance the passage 'he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation.'...... But, it may be objected, the two forms (aspects) of a sacrifice are the material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage 'he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation,' in which neither of these two forms is mentioned, be considered an originative injunction, the word 'agnihotra' (which seemingly indicates the divinity of the sacrifice, namely agni) being merely a name (and not indicating the divinity) according to the principle of (the existence of another scriptural passage) declaratory of it." Page 7.

The following is M. M. Kunte's note on sûtra 1. 4. 4:—

"The principle enunciated in this sûtra is known among the Mîmâmsakas as *Tatprakhyanyâya*—a name which can be best rendered in English by *the principle of conventionality.* A description elsewhere given shows that a sacrifice is known by a particular name, that is, the conventional name is wellknown. For instance, 'He who wishes for happiness sacrifices an Agnihotra-sacrifice.' Another independent Vaidika text determines the word Agnihotra in the above Vaidika text to be the name of a sacrifice."

The nyâya is found in *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 150, line 7.

तत्स्थानापन्न तद्धर्मलाभः ॥

One who takes the place of somebody else takes upon himself also the functions of the latter. This is Professor Kielhorn's rendering of the maxim as found in Nâgojîbhaṭṭa's comment on *paribhâṣâ* CXVI. Can this be regarded as the equivalent of *Noblesse oblige?*

तदन्तापकर्षन्यायः ॥

This nyâya, which is found in *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 581, line 9, and again in line 8 of the next page, is taken

from the तदादितदन्तन्याय of Jaimini 5. 1. 23, 24, the अनुयाजाद्युत्कर्ष-प्रयाजान्तापकर्षाधिकरण, which Kunte renders "The subject of the forward transference of acts which follow the Anuyâja-offerings, and the backward transference of acts which precede Prayâja-offerings together with the offerings themselves." Regarding the तदादितदन्तन्याय he says:—"*Tadâdi* signifies *the first part of that;* the *Tadanta* signifies *the last part of that.* These are Bahuvrîhi compounds, and therefore signify that of which the first part is taken, and that of which the last part is taken. When forward transference is to be made, the Tadâdi is taken, and when backward transference is to be made, the Tadanta is taken. The following illustration will explain this. When the Anuyâja-offerings are to be transferred in point of time, the Sûktavâka and the Shanyuvâka which follow it, are to be transferred along with it, because the Anuyâja is the first part. Again, when Prayâja-offerings are to be transferred in point of time, the Âghâra and the Sâmidheni which precede it, are to be transferred along with it, because the Prayâja is the last part."

तद्व्यपदेशन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [a name indicating] *resemblance to something.* The principle of giving a person or thing the name of some other thing because of his or its resemblance to the latter; for example, likening a man to a lion because of his courage and strength. The nyâya is the subject of Jaimini 1. 4. 5, where the sentences "अथैष श्येनेनाभिचरन्यजेत", "अथैष सन्दंशेनाभिचरन्यजेत" and "अथैष गवाभिचरन्यजेत" are discussed; and it is decided that *s'yena, sandams'a,* and *go* are not the *material* of the various sacrifices, but are merely their names. This is well put in Colebrooke's Essay on the Mîmâmsâ:—"It is a question whether the hawk-sacrifice (*s'yena-yâga*) which is attended with imprecations on a hated foe, be performed by the actual immolation of a bird of that kind. The case is determined by a maxim, that 'a term intimating resemblance is denominative'.

Hawk, then, is the name of that incantation: 'it pounces on the foe *as* a falcon on his prey'. So *tongs* is a name for a similar incantation, 'which seizes the enemy from afar *as* with a pair of tongs'; and *cow*, for a sacrifice to avert such imprecations." Laugâkṣibhâskara (on page 20) gives उपमान as the equivalent of व्यपदेश, whilst Kumârila employs सादृश्य.

तप्तं तप्तेन संबध्यते ॥

Hot goes with hot. Like loves like. This is found in the following passage of *Bhâmati* 3. 3. 25 (page 620):— "न च सन्निधानमपि संबन्धकारणम् । अयमेति पुत्रो राज्ञः पुरुषोऽपसार्यतामित्यत्र राज्ञ इत्यस्य पुत्रपुरुषपदसन्निधानाविशेषान्मा भूदविनिगमना । तस्मादाकांक्षा निश्चयहेतुर्वक्तव्या । ......सत्यपि सन्निधाने आकांक्षाभावादसंबन्धः । तथा चाभाणकः । तप्तं तप्तेन संबध्यत इति । तथा चाकांक्षितमपि न यावत्सन्निधाप्यते तावन्न संबध्यते" ॥ It might be used as the equivalent of "Birds of a feather flock together"?

तमःप्रकाशन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the co-existence of] *light and darkness.* The use made of this by writers on Vedânta will be seen from the following passage from *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, pages 9 and 10:—"ननु सूत्रसूचितोऽप्यध्यासो न युक्तिसहः । तथा हि । आत्मानात्मानावितरेतरतादात्म्याध्यासरहितौ क्वापीतरेतरभावरहितत्वात्तमःप्रकाशवत् । ...कथं तर्हि तमःप्रकाशयोर्दृष्टान्तत्वं तयोः सहावस्थानसामर्थ्याभावलक्षणविरोधस्य प्रसिद्धत्वादिति चेन्नैवम् । मन्दप्रदीपे वेश्मनि तमसो दीपेन सहावस्थानात्" ॥ See also *Vivaraṇopanyâsa*, page 9.

तैलकलुषितशालिबीजादङ्कुरानुदयनियमः ॥

The certainty of the non-appearance of shoots from grains of rice spoilt by [contact with] *oil.* It occurs in *Vedântakalpataru*, page 545, line 17:—"क्रियाभोगशक्त्योः सत्योरपि तत्प्रतिबन्धात्कार्यानुदयः संभवति तैलकलुषितशालिबीजादङ्कुरानुदयनियमवत्". In

S'ânkarabhâṣya 2. 3. 31, we read:—"यथा लोके पुंस्त्वादीनि बीजात्मना विद्यमानान्येव बाल्यादिष्वनुपलभ्यमानान्यविद्यमानवदभिप्रेयमाणानि यौवनादिष्वाविर्भवन्ति नाविद्यमानान्युत्पद्यन्ते षण्ढादीनामपि तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्." Of the आदि in षण्ढादीनाम् Ânandagiri says:—"तैलकलुषितबीजादिग्रहार्थमादिपदम्." This nyâya resembles the मूषिकभक्षितबीजादावङ्कुरादिजननप्रार्थना, in Second Handful. See Addenda.

दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः ॥

Curds and cucumber are fever personified! This is found in Patanjali's *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 1. 59 (vârtika 6), and 6. 1. 32 (vârt. 6), as follows:—"दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः । ज्वरनिमित्तमिति गम्यते । नड्वलोदकं पादरोगः । पादरोगनिमित्तमिति गम्यते । आयुर्घृतम् । आयुषो निमित्तमिति गम्यते"॥ This closely resembles Raghunâtha's दधिपयसी प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः which I have not yet met with anywhere. See आयुर्घृतं and लाङ्गलं जीवनम् in Second Handful.

दवदाहस्य वेत्रबीजविनाशकत्वं रूपान्तरजनकत्वं च ॥

The forest-fire which destroys the seeds of the Ratan is also [by that means] *the promoter of the growth of another form* [namely, the plantain]. This is found in *Citsukhî* i. 15, as follows:—"यथा च दवदाहस्य वेत्रबीजविनाशकत्वं रूपान्तरजनकत्वं च तथा दोषाणामपि यथार्थज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वमयथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वं च किं न स्यात्." The same idea, with the express mention of the plantain tree, is found under i. 14, and also in the following passage of the *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyatîkâ*, page 57:—"दृष्टं च दुष्टानामपि कारणानामौत्सर्गिककार्यप्रतिबन्धेन कार्यान्तरोत्पादकत्वम् । तद्यथा वेत्रबीजानां दावाग्निदग्धानां कदलीप्रकाण्डजनकत्वं भस्मकदुष्टस्य चौदर्यस्य तेजसो बहुतरान्नपानपात्रकत्वम्." Perhaps the Indian farmer could tell us whether the ashes of cane-seeds promote the growth of the plantain-tree? Citsukha Muni informs us, under i. 14, that the growth of rice is aided by the seed having been smelt by mice! For the above, see also Nyâyamakaranda, p. 75.

दूरस्थवनस्पतिन्यायः ॥

This is taken from the large work *Laukikanyâyaratnâkara*, page 219 *a*, where it forms maxim 62 of the second part. Maxim 60 is the **क्षीरनीरन्याय** with which Raghunâtha seems to connect it. He says:—"**अस्मिन्विषये दूरस्थवनस्पतिन्यायोऽपि प्रवर्तते स्वरूपेणावभासमानानेकविवेकाग्रहस्यात्रापि सत्त्वात्.**" I hope this sentence may convey more meaning to others than it does to me; but this is all the light that the author throws on it. I conjecture that the nyâya is based on a verse quoted (or composed) by S'abara in his bhâṣya on Jaimini 4. 3. 11 which forms part of the **विश्वजिदधिकरण.** The gist of the argument is that though no reward is directly connected with that sacrifice, yet a man *must use his intelligence* in inferring one from elsewhere; just as, for example, a man must do in order to grasp the sense of a verse like the following in which the words are scattered about disconnectedly:—

"**इतः पश्यसि धावन्तं दूरे जातं वनस्पतिम् ।**
त्वां ब्रवीमि विशालाक्षि या पिनक्षि जरद्गवम्" ॥

The context preceding and following this verse is absolutely necessary to make it intelligible, and I must refer the reader to S'abara himself. If I am right in connecting Raghunâtha's nyâya with this verse and with the **क्षीरनीरन्याय**, then the idea must be that the verse is a mixture of vocables almost as inseparable as that of milk and water!

देवदत्तशौर्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *Devadatta's bravery.* Equivalent to Horace's "Cælum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt." The illustration is used by S'ankara in his bhâṣya on *Brahma-sûtra* 3. 3. 10:—"**एकस्यामपि शाखायां श्रुता गुणाः श्रुता एव सर्वत्र भवन्ति गुणवतो भेदाभावात् । न हि देवदत्तः शौर्यादिगुणत्वेन स्वदेशे प्रसिद्धो देशान्तरं गतस्तद्देश्यैरविभावितशौर्यादिगुणोऽप्यतद्गुणो भवति । यथा च तत्र परिचयविशेषाद्देशान्तरेऽपि देवदत्तगुणा विभाव्यन्ते**" ॥ The **देवदत्तशौर्यनिदर्शन** is

mentioned again in the bhâṣya on the next sûtra. Compare with this the following from *Tantravârtika*, 3. 6. 41 (page 1108):—"यथैव देवदत्तस्य स्थानोपवेशनगमनशयनाद्यवस्थाभेदेऽपि देवदत्तत्वं नापैति &c."

देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the slaying of the murderer of Devadatta* The point is that the death of the murderer does not bring his victim to life again. It is applied by Raghunâtha as follows:—"नन्वज्ञानबाधके ज्ञाने विनष्टे पुनरज्ञानोदयेन बन्धप्रसङ्ग इति शंकायां देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्यायावतारः। यथा देवदत्तहन्तरि हतेऽपि न देवदत्तस्य जीवनं तथा प्रकृतेऽपि." He probably took it from Nâgojîbhaṭṭa's comment on *paribhâṣâ* LXIV [उपसंजनिष्यमाणनिमित्तः &c., which see above] where it reads thus:—"अत्र देवदत्तस्य हन्तरि हते देवदत्तस्योन्मज्जनं नेति न्यायस्य विषय एव नास्ति। हते देवदत्त उन्मज्जनं न। देवदत्तहननोद्यतस्य तु हनने भवत्येवोन्मज्जनम्" ॥ Nâgojî, on the other hand, derived it from the *Mahâbhâṣya*, where (in 1. 1. 57, vârtika 4) it appears as "न हि देवदत्तस्य हन्तरि हते देवदत्तस्य प्रादुर्भावो भवति." So, too, in 6. 1. 86 (vârt. 3).

धारावाहिकबुद्धिः ॥

A persistent state of cognition. This is Mr. Arthur Venis' rendering of the expression as it occurs in *Vedântaparibhâṣâ* (The Paṇḍit, vol. iv., page 105), and he elucidates it in a footnote as follows:—"It may be described as a series of states throughout which the same object is presented in consciousness. Each state of conciousness lasts only for a moment, a *kshaṇa* or unit of appreciable time, and perishes. A second state then succeeds and is lost, and so on." We find the expression (in the plural) in the *Prakaraṇapancikâ*, page 127, and as धारावाहिकज्ञानानि on page 40; whilst, on page 56, the author refers to it as the धारावाहिकन्याय. I have met with it elsewhere also. Yet, strange to say, the Vâcaspatyam is the only Sanskrit

dictionary that contains it. The term धारावाहिन् (with °वाहिक also) is there defined as "सन्तत्या पातुके क्रमेणाविच्छेदेन जायमाने च," and then follows a quotation from Vedântaparibhâṣâ which immediately succeeds that referred to above:—"किञ्च सिद्धान्ते धारावाहिकबुद्धिस्थले न ज्ञानभेदः [किन्तु यावद्धटस्फुरणं तावद्धटाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिरेकैव न तु नाना"]. "Moreover, according to (Vedântic) tenet, there is no variation of knowledge in the case of a persistent cognition; but as long as there is a presentation of the jar so long the modification of the internal organ in the form of the jar is one and the same and not various" (Venis). As found in Marâṭhî, it has the meaning "Closeness or intentness of thought; undiverted and unintermitting prosecution (of any subject of meditation or study)" (Molesworth). Strictly speaking, I ought not to include this expression in my pages; but as Böhtlingk, Monier-Williams, and Apṭe have ignored it, I admit it in the hope that it may assist some perplexed student of Indian philosophy. And let me add that readers of Mr. Venis' excellent translations will find there many valuable explanations of technicalities, which they will search for in vain elsewhere.

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ॥

Acts which impel others to action are not always of the same kind. This is the first line of a verse in Kumârila's *S'loka-vârtika* (page 710), the context of which is as follows:—

"न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ।
चलनेन ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुंक्ते छेदनं प्रति ॥
सेनापतिस्तु वाचैव भृत्यानां विनियोजकः ।
राजा सन्निधिमात्रेण विनियुंक्ते कदाचन" ॥

A remark of S'ankarâchârya's in his comment on *Muṇḍaka-Upanishad* 3. 1. 1, closely resembles this. He says:—"स त्वनश्नन्न्योऽभिचाकशीति पश्यत्येव केवलम् । दर्शनमात्रेण हि तस्य प्रेरयितृत्वं राजवत्."

नड्वलोदकं पादरोगः ॥

Water in a bed of reeds is disease of the feet. That is, it causes disease in the feet. See under दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः ।

नर्तकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a dancer*. *One* dancer gives pleasure to *many* spectators, just as one lamp gives light to many persons. It occurs in *Jaiminîyanyâyamâlâvistara* 11. 1. 10 as follows:—

"प्रत्यङ्गि कार्याण्यङ्गानि तत्रैणेताङ्गिनो यतः ।
एकैकस्योपकारत्वं तस्मात्प्रत्यंग्यनुष्ठितिः ॥
विधानवदनुष्ठानं सकृदेवोपकारकम् ।
तद्देशकालकर्तॄणामेकत्वान्नर्तकादिवत्" ॥

The last pâda is thus explained:—यथा बहूनां पुरतो नृत्यन्नर्तकः सर्वेषां सुखं युगपन्निर्वर्तयति तद्वत् ।

Of the same kind, apparently, is the following expression of the *Nyâyavârtika* i. 10 (page 70):—"कृतसंकेतानां वृद्धानामेकस्मिन्नर्तकीभ्रूक्षेपे युगपदनेकप्रत्ययवत्", which is reproduced in the *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 354 (line 9 from bottom) in these words:—"उक्तमेतद् यथा नर्तकीभ्रूलताभङ्गे एकस्मिन्बहूनां प्रतिसन्धानमिति."

न हि करकंकणदर्शनायादर्शापेक्षा ॥

One does not need a looking-glass in order to look at a bracelet on the wrist. The nearest approach to this that I have met with is in the *Karpûramanjarî*, page 17, line 2:—"अहवा हत्थकंकणं किं दप्पणेण पेक्खीअदि," which is, in Sanskrit, "अथवा हस्तकंकणं किं दर्पणेन दृश्यते."

न हि काकिन्यां नष्टायां तदन्वेषणं कार्षापणेन क्रियते ॥

If a man has lost a cowrie he does not spend a kârshâpaṇa

in the search for it. That would be like expending a sovereign in order to recover a farthing! It occurs in the following portion of S'abara's bhâshya 4. 3. 39:—"न हि कपाले नष्टे तदन्वेषणार्था इष्टिर्युक्ता। नहि काकिन्यां नष्टायां तदन्वेषणं कार्षापणेन क्रियते" ॥

नहि क्वचिदश्रवणमन्यत्र श्रुतं निवारयितुमुत्सहते ॥

A thing's not being heard in one place does not get rid of the fact of its being heard elsewhere. This is applied by S'ankara in *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 4. 1 (page 681) as follows:—"ननु केषुचित्प्रदेशेषु न प्राणानामुत्पत्तिः श्रूयत इत्युक्तं तदयुक्तं प्रदेशान्तरेषु श्रवणात्। न हि क्वचिदश्रवणमन्यत्र श्रुतं निवारयितुमुत्सहते." It is quoted as a nyâya in *Vaiyâsikanyâyamâlâ* 2. 3. 2 (sûtra 8). Compare with it *S'lokavârtika* iv. 161:—"न क्वचित्संकराभावात्सर्वत्रैव निवर्तते। क्वचिच्च संकरं दृष्ट्वा संकरोऽन्यत्र कल्प्यते." In explaining the previous verse, Pârthasârathi says, "न हि यदेकत्र दृष्टं तदन्यत्रादृष्टमपि भवति."

नहि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति ॥

An Iquana creeping along does not on that account become a snake. This is found in *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 1. 23 (4) as follows:—"न खल्वप्यन्यत्प्रकृतमनुवर्तनादन्यद्भवति नहि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति। ......यदप्युच्यते न खल्वन्यत्प्रकृतमनुवर्तनादन्यद्भवति नहि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति भवेद्द्रव्येष्वेतदेवं स्यात्। शब्दस्तु खलु येन येन विशेषणाभिसंबध्यते तस्य तस्य विशेषको भवति." The same passage reappears in 1. 3. 12 (5), and in 6. 1. 50.

न हि ग्रामस्थः कदा ग्रामं प्राप्नुयामित्यरण्यस्थ इवाशास्ते ॥

A man who is already in a village dose not express a longing to get there, such as a man might who was out in the jungle! This is found in *Bṛihadâraṇyakabhâṣya* 2. 3. 28, page 87:—"नहि प्राणात्मन्युत्पन्नात्माभिमानस्य तत्प्राप्त्याशंसनं सम्भवति। नहि ग्रामस्थः कदा ग्रामं प्राप्नुयामित्यरण्यस्थ इवाशास्ते। असंनिकृष्टविषये ह्यनात्मन्याशंसनं न तत्स्वात्मनि सम्भवति."

न हि त्रिपुत्रो द्विपुत्र इति कथ्यते ॥

A man who has three sons could not be designated as a man with two sons. Therefore, if an order were given to bring the father of two sons, it would not do to bring one who had three! This nyâya of Raghunâthavarman's, taken from the *Kâs'ikâvṛitti* (with the substitution of कथ्यते for व्यपदिश्यते), is based on the words "न हि द्विपुत्र आनीयतामित्युक्ते त्रिपुत्र आनीयते," which form part of Patanjali's comment on Pâṇini's sûtra 6. 4. 96 (छादेर्घेऽद्व्युपसर्गस्य). The meaning of that sûtra is that when the affix घ (*i. e.* the kṛit-affix अ) follows, the root (technically described as) छादि is shortened to छद् when there are *not two* upasargas. So we say प्रच्छद, and दन्तच्छद; but समुपच्छाद because there *are two* upasargas. But would the root vowel be shortened if there were *more than two* upasargas? No; for we say समुपाभिच्छाद. Yet the sûtra seems to make no provision for this. Patanjali comments on it as follows:—"अद्विप्रभृत्युपसर्गस्येति वक्तव्यम् । इहापि यथा स्यात् । समुपाभिच्छाद इति । तत्तर्हि वक्तव्यम् । न वक्तव्यम् । यत्र त्रिप्रभृतयः सन्ति द्वावपि तत्र स्तस्तत्राद्व्युपसर्गस्येत्येव सिद्धम् । न वा एष लोके सम्प्रत्ययः । न हि द्विपुत्र आनीयतामित्युक्ते त्रिपुत्र आनीयते । तस्मादद्विप्रभृत्युपसर्गस्येति वक्तव्यम् " ॥

Patanjali was fond of this kind of illustration. The following one is employed again and again in various parts of the bhâṣya, and always in connection with the *paribhâṣâ* नञिवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे तथा ह्यर्थगतिः । It reads thus:—" अब्राह्मणमानयेत्युक्ते ब्राह्मणसदृश आनीयते नासौ लोष्टमानीय कृती भवति." It occurs in 3. 1. 12 (vârt. 4); 3. 3. 19; 6. 1. 45; 6. 1. 71 (vârt. 7); 6. 1. 135 (vârt. 12); 6. 3. 34 (vârt. 7); 7. 1. 37 (vârt. 7). The words अब्राह्मणमानय appear also in 2. 2. 6. The paribhâṣâ just quoted is rendered by Prof. Kielhorn thus:—" (An expression) formed by the addition of the negative नञ् or (of the particle of comparison) इव (to some word or other) denotes something which is different from and yet similar to (what is denoted by the

latter), because it is so that (such expressions) are (generally) understood (in ordinary life)." With the paribhâṣâ, Nâgojî has also taken the illustration.

न हि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनोऽप्रसिद्धगोश्रवणात्ककुदादिमदर्थप्रतिपत्तिर्भवति ॥

From hearing the unfamiliar word 'cow,' an inhabitant of Cocoanut Island would gain no perception of an object possessed of a hump &c. This sentence is found in the *Nyâya-vârtika* on sûtra 3. 1. 67. Again, in Pras'astapâda's *Vais'esika-bhâṣya*, page 182, we read :—"अनुमानविषयेऽपि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनः सास्नामात्रदर्शनात्को नु खल्वयं प्राणी स्यादित्यनध्यवसायो भवति." The commentator, S'rîdhara, remarks on this :—"नारिकेलद्वीपे गवामभावात्तत्रत्यो लोकोऽप्रसिद्धगोजातीयः."

With some hesitation I have admitted the above into my collection of 'inferences from familiar instances,' on account of the reference to the unfamiliar Cocoanut Island, and its cow-less condition! The following passage from Professor Beal's translation of Hiuen Thsang's work (Vol. ii. page 252) is supposed to refer to this island:—"The people of this island are small of stature, about three feet high; their bodies are those of men, but they have the beaks of birds; they grow no grain, but live only on cocoa-nuts." The editor and translator of Itsing's Record thinks that the island in question is one described by that pilgrim as lying to the north of Sumatra, and therefore probably one of the Nicobar group. See page xxxviii of that work.

Jayant Bhaṭṭa refers more than once to the ignorance of these islanders. See *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 118, line 5; page 121, line 23; and page 391. Also *Tâtparyaṭikâ*, p. 66.

न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हति॥

It is not likely that a man who could flee on his feet would crawl on his knees. This is a part of S'ankara's argument on

Brahmasûtra 3. 1. 10:—"तस्मात्कर्मैव शीलोपलक्षितमनुशयभूतं योन्यापत्तौ कारणमिति कार्ष्णाजिनेर्मतम्। न हि कर्मणि संभवति शीलाद्योन्यापत्तिर्युक्ता। न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हतीति." "It is, therefore, the opinion of Kârsṇâjini that the remainder of works only—which is connoted by the term 'conduct'—is the cause of the soul's entering on new births. For as work may be the cause of new births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause. If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will surely not creep on his knees." This is Dr. Thibaut's rendering.

नहि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदृतौ धृतम् ॥

Even cow's milk would cease to be pure if placed in a vessel made of dogskin. This nyâya of Raghunâtha's is found in the following passage of *Jaiminîyanyâyamâlâvistara*, 1. 3. 4:—

"शाक्योक्ताहिंसनं धर्मो न वा धर्मः श्रुतत्वतः।
न धर्मो न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदृतौ धृतम् ॥

ब्रह्मचर्यमहिंसां चापरिग्रहं च सत्यं च यत्नेन रक्षेदिति श्रुतावहिंसादिर्धर्मत्वेनोक्तः। स एव धर्मः शाक्येनाप्युक्तः। तस्माच्छाक्यस्मृतिर्धर्मे प्रमाणमिति चेत्। न। स्वरूपेण धर्मस्यापि गोक्षीरन्यायेन शाक्यसंबन्धे सत्यधर्मत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तदीयग्रन्थेनाहिंसादिर्नावगन्तव्यः। तस्मान्न सा स्मृतिर्धर्मे प्रमाणम्" ॥

Mâdhava, no doubt, took it from Kumârila's vârtika on sûtra 7 of the same adhikaraṇa, where he speaks of the moral teaching of S'âkyas and others as "श्वदृतिनिक्षिप्तक्षीरवदनुपयोग्यविस्रंभणीयं च." The simile in this form is found, too, in Yâmunâcârya's *Âgamaprâmâṇya*, page 11, line 8, in a context of the same import. Colebrooke's excellent summary of the teaching of this part of the Mîmâṁsâdars'ana, given in his *Essays* (i. 337), may be usefully quoted here:—" Besides the evidence of precept from an extant revelation or recorded hearing (*s'ruti*) of it, another source of evidence is founded on the recollections (*smṛiti*) of ancient sages. They possess authority as grounded

on the Veda, being composed by holy personages conversant with its contents....The *S'âkyas* (or *Bauddhas*) and *Jainas* (or *Ârhatas*), as Kumârila acknowledges, are considered to be Kshatriyas. It is not to be concluded, he says, that their *recollections* were founded upon a Veda which is now lost. There can be no inference of a foundation in *revelation* for unauthentic recollections of persons who deny its authenticity. Even when they do concur with it, as recommending charitable gifts and enjoining veracity, chastity, and innocence, the books of the S'âkyas are of no authority for the virtues which they inculcate. Duties are not taken from them: the association would suggest a surmise of vice, tainting what else is virtuous." Raghunâtha uses the nyâya as a warning to a *guru* to be careful in the selection of his disciples; for "असत्पात्रे सदुपदेशोऽप्यपवित्रतां याति."

न हि भिक्षुको भिक्षुकान्तरं याचितुमर्हति सत्यन्यस्मिन्नभिक्षुके ॥

A beggar ought not to ask alms of another beggar, so long as there is any one [to beg from] *who is not a beggar!* The saying appears in this form in *S'âstradîpikâ* 8. 3. 5; but S'abara, in the same adhikarana (sûtra 11), puts it thus:—"न च भिक्षुका भिक्षुकादाकांक्षन्ति सत्यन्यस्मिन्प्रसवसमर्थेऽभिक्षुके." See, also, the *Nyâyamâlâvistara* on the same portion. The following, from *Ivanhoe* (Chap. xi), runs parallel with the nyâya:—" He is too like ourselves for us to make booty of him, since *dogs should not worry dogs where wolves and foxes are to be found.*"

न हि भूमावम्भोरुहं सदिति दुष्टाक्षस्यापि नभसि तदवभासते ॥

Not even to a man whose sight is defective does a lotus on the ground appear to be in the sky! It appears in *Citsukhî* i. 17 (Pandit, vol. iv, page 594):—"न च देशान्तरे सत्त्वादत्रासत्त्वाच्च

ख्यातिबाधयोरन्यथाप्युपपत्तिः । अन्यत्र सत्ताया इह प्रतीत्यहेतुत्वात् । न हि भूमावम्भोरुहं सदिति दृष्टाक्षस्यापि नभसि तदवभासते."

न हि यद्देवदत्तस्य युध्यमानस्य स्थानमवगतं तदेव भुञ्जानस्यापि भवति ॥

The position occupied by Devadatta when eating is not that which he occupies when fighting! The force of this *dṛṣṭânta* is best seen from the *dârṣṭântika* in *Tantravârtika*, p. 575:—

"एकत्वेऽपि हि शब्दस्य शक्तिभेदः प्रयोजने ।
तत्र कार्यान्तरस्थानं न स्यात्कार्यान्तरेष्वपि ॥

न शब्दैकत्वेन यत्किञ्चित्कार्ये स्थानं दृष्टसामर्थ्यं तदेवान्यत्रापीति शक्यते वक्तुम् । न हि यद्देवदत्तस्य युध्यमानस्य स्थानमवगतं तदेव भुञ्जानस्यापि भवतीति गम्यते । कार्यप्रयुक्ता हि स्थानविशेषादयो न स्वरूपप्रयुक्ताः" ॥

न हि विधिशतेनापि तथा पुरुषः प्रवर्तते यथा लोभेन ॥

Not even a hundred injunctions could move a man to action as readily as the desire for gain does. This is found in *Tantra-vârtika* 3. 4. 34 (page 999):—

"ऋत्विग्भ्यो दक्षिणां दद्यादिति दानं विधीयते ।
लोभादेवार्जनाङ्गत्वात्प्राप्तस्तेषां प्रतिग्रहः ॥

न हि दद्यादित्यस्य प्रतिगृह्णीयादित्ययमर्थो भवति । भवेदपि सामर्थ्याद्यदि तदाक्षेपमन्तरेण दानविधिर्नोपपद्यते । स तु लोभप्राप्तप्रतिग्रहबलेनोपपद्यमानो न शक्नोत्याक्षेप्तुम् । न हि विधिशतेनापि तथा पुरुषः प्रवर्तते यथा लोभेन" ॥

न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यते ॥

If a power is not of itself present [in a person or thing], *it cannot be supplied by another.* In *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 1. 24 we have part of a discussion as to Brahman's ability to produce the world without extraneous aid. It is urged that he

has this power in himself, just as the power to produce curds resides in milk. The objection is then raised that since curds are not produced without the action of heat, milk is not independent of other agencies, and so the argument breaks down. The reply is as follows:—"यदि स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यान्नैवौष्ण्यादिनापि बलाद्दधिभावमापद्यत । नहि वायुराकाशो वौष्ण्यादिना बलाद्दधिभावमापद्यते । साधनसामग्र्या च तस्य पूर्णता संपाद्यते." On this last clause Ânandagiri says:—"साधनेति । नहि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यत इति न्यायाद्विद्यमानैव क्षीरादिशक्तिः साधनसामग्र्योपचीयत इत्यर्थः" The nyâya is taken from *S'lokavârtika* ii. 47 (page 59), of which verse it forms the second line. The first line is "स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गम्यताम्." Mr. Gangânâth Jhâ's rendering of the verse is as follows:—"You must understand that authoritativeness is inherent in all means of right notion. For a faculty, by itself non-existing, cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency." Compare with the above maxim the following from *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 2. 29:—"नहि यो यस्य स्वतो धर्मो न संभवति सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात्तस्य संभविष्यति."

नह्यन्धस्याज्यावेक्षणोपेते कर्मण्यधिकारोऽस्ति ॥

A blind man is not qualified for work involving the examination of butter. This is found in *Vaiyâsikanyâyamâlâ* 3. 4. 2 (sûtras 18–20), where it is followed by "नापि पङ्गोर्विष्णुक्रमाद्युपेते कर्मण्यधिकारः.". It was doubtless taken from *Tantravârtika* 1. 4. 24 (page 332), where we read:—नन्वनेनैव न्यायेन यथा शक्त्यादिति वाक्यशेषादन्धादीनामाज्यावेक्षणादिरहितः कर्माधिकारः स्यात्." This sûtra 24 is Jaimini's sûtra 30, under which we have S'abara's "आख्यातशब्दानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी" which see above.

नह्यन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति ॥

The falseness of one person does not prove somebody else to be false. This is from S'abara 1. 1. 2 (page 5, line 6):—"ननु

सामान्यतोदृष्टं पौरुषेयं वचनं वितथमुपलभ्य वचनसाम्यादिदमपि वितथमवगम्यते। न अन्यत्वात्। नह्यन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति। अन्यत्वादेव। नहि देवदत्तस्य श्यामत्वे यज्ञदत्तस्यापि श्यामत्वं भवितुमर्हति"॥ See the same in verse in *S'lokavârtika*, page 100; on which Pârthasârathi says:—"नह्यनाप्तवाक्यस्य वैतथ्ये सत्याप्तवाक्यस्यापि वैतथ्यम्." That Kumârila, however, had a poor opinion of human veracity in general, is shown from the following verse on page 88:—"सर्वदा चापि पुरुषाः प्रायेणानृतवादिनः। यथाद्यत्वे न विस्रंभस्तथातीतार्थकीर्तने." Again, on page 178:—"न च पुंवचनं सर्वं सत्यत्वेनावगम्यते। वागिह श्रूयते यस्मात्प्रायादनृतवादिनी." Compare with this nyâya "नहि खदिरगोचरे परशौ पलाशे द्वैधीभावो भवति," and "अन्यवेश्मस्थिताद्धूमान्न वेश्मान्तरमग्निमत्."

न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यति॥

It is not the fault of the post that a blind man cannot see it. Vâcaspatimis'ra quotes this on page 87 of his *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, prefacing it with the words "यथाहुर्निरुक्तकाराः." It will be found on page 112 of the second volume of the *Nirukta.* We meet with it again in the opening sentence of *Kusumânjali* v.:—"नन्वीश्वरे प्रमाणोपपत्तौ सत्यां सर्वमेतदेवं स्यात्तदेव तु न पश्याम इति चेत्। न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यति."

नागृहीते विशेषणे विशिष्टबुद्धिरुदेति॥

Particular [or, distinguishing] *knowledge does not arise until that which particularizes* [or defines, the object in question] *has been grasped.* It is in this form that the nyâya is found in *Kusumânjali* iii. 21 (page 527), but that it is much older than Udayana is clear from its use by Kumârila (in *Tantravârtika*, page 258) in the contracted form "नागृहीतविशेषणेतिन्यायेन," whilst, on page 287, he gives it in full as "अगृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिर्न दृष्टा." In Mâdhava's *Nyâyamâlâvistara* 3. 1. 6, it is quoted as "नागृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिः," and

in *Saptapadârthî*, page 2, line 6, as "नागृहीतविशेषणा विशेष्य-बुद्धिः." In his commentary on *Târkikarakṣâ*, Mallinâtha twice (namely, on pages 47 and 107) cites the maxim in the contracted form adopted by Kumârila, whilst Raghunâthavarman's version of it is "नाज्ञातविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिर्विशेष्यं संक्रामति."

In Sir Monier Monier-Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary विशिष्टबुद्धि is defined as "differenced or distinguishing knowledge (*e. g.* the knowledge of 'a man carrying a staff' which distinguishes him from an ordinary man)"; whilst Molesworth explains विशिष्टज्ञान as "knowledge of an object distinguished or characterized by something (whether a property or an accident) standing out in some speciality (inherent or attached)."

Identical in meaning with the above, though differing somewhat in form, is S'abara's "नह्यप्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्टं केचन प्रत्येतु-मर्हन्ति" (1. 3. 33, page 82). See Addenda.

नासिकाग्रेण कर्णमूलकर्षणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *pulling the root of the ear with the tip of one's nose!* It occurs in Sures'vara's *Brihadâraṇyakavârtika* 4. 3. 1184, as follows :—

"समस्तव्यस्ततामेवं सति व्याचक्षतेऽत्र ये ।
कर्षन्ति नासिकाग्रेण कर्णमूलं सुखेन ते" ॥

On which Ânandagiri remarks:—"असंभावितार्थवादिनां भ्रान्तत्वं दृष्टान्तेनाह कर्षन्तीति." It may be compared with the acrobat's sitting on his own shoulders, and with the edge of a sword's cutting itself.

निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविदा ॥

What need has a healthy man of one skilled in the science of medicine? "They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." In the *Prabandhacintâmaṇi* (pages 106–7) there is a story about the poet Bâṇa and his brother-in-

law the poet Mayûra, who were favourites of the king Bhoja. The former, owing to the curse pronounced by his sister (the wife of the latter), was attacked by leprosy; but being healed by the intervention of the Sun, he appeared at court—to quote from Mr. Tawney's translation—"with his body anointed with golden sandal-wood, and clothed in a magnificent white garment. When the king saw the healthy condition of his body, Mayûra represented that it was all due to the favour of the Sun-god. Then Bâṇa pierced him in a vital spot with an arrow-like speech. 'If the propitiating of a god is an easy matter then do you also display some wonderful performance in this line." Mayûra replied as follows:—"निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविदा तथापि तव वचः सत्यापयितुं निजपादौ पाणी च छुर्यां विदार्य त्वया षष्ठे काव्ये सूर्यः परितोषितोऽहं तु पूर्वस्य काव्यस्य षष्ठेऽक्षरे भवानीं परितोषयामीति प्रतिश्रुत्य सुखासनमासीनश्चण्डिकाप्रासादपश्चाद्भागे निविष्टो 'मा भांक्षीर्विभ्रमम्' इति षष्ठेऽक्षरे प्रत्यक्षीकृतचण्डिकाप्रसादात्प्रत्यग्रप्रथमानवपुःपल्लवः स्वसंन्मुखं च तत्प्रसादमालोक्याभिमुखागतैर्नृपतिप्रमुखराजलोकैः कृतजयजयारवो महता महेन पुरं प्राविक्षत्."

निषादस्थपतिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a king who is a Niṣâda by caste.* This forms the subject of Jaimini 6. 1. 51, 52, and is thus expounded by Kunte (in Saḍdars'anacintanikâ, page 1788):—"The term *Nishâdasthapati* occurs in the Veda. The question is—how is it to be interpreted? Is the term *Nishâdasthapati* a Karmadhâraya compound or Tatpuruṣa compound? The Karmadhâraya overrules the Tatpuruṣa; because, in the latter, a case not directly seen has to be understood, and because metonymy is thus involved. A direct statement is always to be preferred to metonymy. The Karmadhâraya makes a direct statement and therefore does not involve metonymy. He who is a Niṣâda is a Sthapati; and therefore a superior Nisâda is entitled to perform the Raudra sacrifice." In other words, the compound when dissolved is not निषादानां स्थपतिः but निषाद एव स्थपतिः.

In explaining the term ब्रह्मलोक in S'ankara's bhâṣya on *Vedântasûtra* 1. 3. 15, Vâcaspatimis'ra says (on page 213, line 3 from bottom):—"अत्र तावन्निषादस्थपतिन्यायेन षष्ठीसमासात्कर्मधारयो बलीयानिति स्थितमेव तथापीह षष्ठीसमासनिराकरणेन कर्मधारयस्थापनाय लिङ्गमप्यधिकमस्तीति तदप्युक्तं सूत्रकारेण"। This nyâya is also explained in full in *Vedântakalpataru* on this passage, and again in *Vedântakalpatarauparimala*. It is quoted by Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 3. 3. 24. For the origin of the Niṣâda, see Manu x. 8.

पञ्जरमुक्तपक्षिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a bird let loose from its cage.* Used to illustrate the upward flight of the soul when released from the body. It occurs in *Vedântakalpatarauparimala*, page 443, as follows:—"ऊर्ध्वगमनं जीवस्य स्वभावः। देहे स्थितिस्तत्प्रतिबन्धककर्माधीनेति मतमाश्रित्योक्तम्। केचित्तु चिरकालशरीरावस्थितप्रयुक्तबन्धमुक्तावूर्ध्वगमनं मन्यन्ते। ते खल्वेवमाहुः। बन्धमुक्तस्योर्ध्वगमनं दृष्टं यथा पञ्जरमुक्तशुकस्य यथा वा वारिनिर्भिन्नपरिणतैरण्डबीजस्य यथा वा दृढपंकलिप्तजलनिमज्जनप्रक्षीणपंकलेपशुष्कालाबूफलस्य." It will be noticed that there are three illustrations in the last clause,—the third being really the जलतुंबिकान्याय, which see above.

पदार्थानुसमयन्यायः ॥

Sir M. Monier-Williams defines it thus:—"The performance of one ritual act for all objects in orderly succession before performing another act for all objects in the same order." When it is not a matter of sacrificial ritual, but merely of the bestowal of gifts, the definition given by Captain Molesworth is more suitable; namely—"The order or method (when a set or number of things is to be given to each individual of a multitude) of giving first one article of the set to each person all round; going round again with another article; and again with a third; and thus, until all the articles composing the set

shall have been received by each person." The nyâya summarizes the teaching of Jaimini 5. 2. 1, 2. See काण्डानुसमयन्याय, and Karkâcârya on Kâtyâyana's *S'rautasûtra* i. 114.

परतन्त्रं बहिर्मनः ॥

As to externals, mind is dependent on others. This is used as a nyâya by Citsukha Muni in his vṛitti on kârikâ i. 12 (Paṇḍit vol. iv. page 513), so I include it here. He says:— "न च मनसो बहिरर्थैः संबन्धः परतन्त्रं बहिर्मन इति न्यायात्." This is doubtless derived from a verse half of which is quoted in the first chapter of *Sarvadarsanas'angraha,* namely, "चक्षुराद्युक्तविषयं परतन्त्रं बहिर्मन इति." Professor Cowell rendered it thus:— "The eye &c. have their objects as described, but mind externally is dependent on the others."

परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः ॥

This is the first line of *Kusumânjali* iii. 8, the second being "नैकतापि विरुद्धानामुक्तिमात्रविरोधतः" ॥ The following is Professor Cowell's translation of the verse and of a portion of Haridâsa's explanatory comment:—"In the case of contradictories, there can be no middle course; nor can you assume the two contradictories to be identical, because the fact of their contradiction is directly asserted." "'There can be no middle course,' *i. e.* you cannot make some third supposition different from either, from the very fact that they *are* contradictories [and therefore the one or the other must be true]; nor can you assume them to be identical." Raghunâtha's explanation of the first line, in his larger work, coincides with this. He says:— "न प्रकारान्तरस्य ताभ्यामन्यस्य प्रकारस्य स्थितिः किन्तु तदन्यतरस्येत्यर्थः" ॥ The nyâya is quoted in the last sentence of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya* iii (page 561), and the whole verse in the commentary on Udayana's *Lakṣaṇâvali*, page 47, and in the second chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha.*

पर्जन्यवत् ॥

Like the rain [which falls on all places alike]. It is found in the following passage of *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 2. 9 and 6. 1. 127:—"कृतकारि खल्वपि शास्त्रं पर्जन्यवत् । तद्यथा । पर्जन्यो यावदूनं पूर्णं च सर्वमभिवर्षति"। This is quoted by Nâgojîbhaṭṭa under paribhâṣâ cxi—"पर्जन्यवल्लक्षणप्रवृत्तिः," which Professor Kielhorn translates thus:—"The rules of grammar are like the rain [in this that they are] applied [both where they produce a change and where they do not; just as the rain falls upon that which already is full of water as well as upon that which is empty]."

There is another example of this in the Pâṇini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"प्रकृत्यादिविभागकल्पनावत्सु लक्ष्येषु सामान्यविशेषरूपाणां लक्षणानां पर्जन्यवत्सकृदेव प्रवृत्तौ बहूनां शब्दानामनुशासनोपलंभाच्च." "And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots &c., (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words." The translation is Prof. Cowell's. We meet with it again in a most interesting passage of *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 3. 42, where S'ankara tells us that just as the rain causes the production of barley, rice, shrubs, &c., by its action on the seeds, so God, making use of men's previous works, impels them to either good or evil! There can be little doubt that the mischievous saying, "कर्ता आणि करविता ईश्वर आहे," current among the Marâṭhâs, was derived from this source.

The use of the illustration of the rain was not confined to India. Here is an example of it from Palestine:—"As the rain cometh down, and the snow, from heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it bring forth and bud, that it may give seed to the sower, and bread to the eater; so shall My word be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall not return unto Me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it."

पलालकूटस्य सादृश्यं कुञ्जरादिना ॥

Seeing resemblance to an elephant in a heap of straw. An illustration of mere semblance of resemblance (सादृश्याभासता). A real likeness is said to be that which stands the test of a close examination. The figure is contained in Kumârila's *S'lokavârtika*, page 446.

"यत्र त्वसदृशादेव कल्पयित्वोपजायते ।
सादृश्यप्रत्ययस्तत्र तदाभासत्वकल्पना ॥ ४० ॥
बाधकप्रत्ययाच्चैषा सादृश्याभासता मता ।
यथा पलालकूटस्य सादृश्यं कुञ्जरादिना ॥ ४१ ॥
समीपस्थोऽपि जानाति सादृश्यं नेति तत्र हि ।
न बाध्यते समीपादौ यत्तु सादृश्यमेव तत्" ॥ ४२ ॥

Mr. Gangânâth Jhâ renders the passage thus:—

"40. In a case where a notion of similarity is brought about by means of objects that are not really similar, we have only a (false) semblance of similarity.

41–42. This is said to be a false semblance of similarity, because it is subsequently set aside by an idea to the contrary, *e. g.* the similarity of an elephant in a stack of hay; in which case when one is sufficiently near the stack, he realizes that there is no real similarity between the stack and the elephant. That notion of similarity which is not set aside even on close proximity to the object, is a case of real similarity."

पश्यस्यद्रौ ज्वलदग्निं न पुनः पादयोरधः ॥

Thou seest the fire burning on the mountain, but not that which is under thy very feet! "Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thy own eye?" The above is the first line of Hemacandra's *Parisiṣṭaparvan* i. 382, the second line being "यत्परं शिक्षयस्येवं न स्वं शिक्षयसि स्वयम्." The next verse continues the rebuke:—"का हि पुंगणना तेषां येऽन्यशिक्षाविचक्षणाः । ये स्वं शिक्षयितुं

दक्षास्तेषां पुंगणना नृणाम्." The teaching here is akin to that of the भूलिङ्गन्याय, namely "Practise what you preach."

पाटनमन्तरेण विषव्रणानां नोपशान्तिः ॥

Poisoned wounds will not heal without the use of the lancet. This is found in *Jaiminîyanyâyamâlâvistara* 3. 8. 4, as follows:—"न हि दुःखरूपं तपो विना दुःखप्रदं पापं नश्यति । यथा लोके पाटनमन्तरेण विषव्रणानां नोपशान्तिः"॥ This is, perhaps, the source of Raghunâtha's व्रणं शिशमयिषोः शस्त्रग्रहणन्यायः which he makes use of thus:—"निरन्तरं दुःखमयसंसारपरिवृत्तिश्रान्तानां जीवानां कंचित्कालं विक्षेपविगमसमुल्लसदात्मानन्दानुभवेन विश्रान्तिं संपादयितुकामस्य तस्य संहाराय तमोग्रहणस्य दुश्चिकित्स्यव्रणपीडितानां व्रणं शिशमयिषोः शस्त्रग्रहणन्यायेन

'निदानज्ञस्य भिषजो रुग्णहिंसां प्रयुञ्जतः ।
न किंचिदपि नैर्घृण्यं घृणैवात्र प्रयोजिका' ॥

इति शिवपुराणे व्याख्यातेन निरतिशयकरुणाम्बुधित्वलिङ्गात्"॥ To understand this very involved sentence, it is necessary to bear in mind that संपादयितुकामस्य refers to S'iva, whose benevolent intentions towards humanity are the subject of the immediate context. Contrast with the above the following saying of Sures'vara's (in *Bṛhadâraṇyakavârtika* 4. 3. 176), "न दाहज्वरनुत्त्यर्थमग्निना स्याद्विषक्क्रिया."

पाठक्रमन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *textual sequence.* It forms the subject of Jaimini 5. 1. 4–7. According to the Mîmâṁsâ, there are six kinds of sequence; namely, (1) *S'rutikrama*, or 'direct sequence,' which is treated of in the first sûtra of this chapter. It is known as the श्रुतिबलीयस्त्वन्याय, and is regarded as the strongest of the six. Then (2) *Arthakrama*, or 'logical sequence,' which is discussed in sûtra 2, and in which the sequence is determined by the sense rather than by the order of the text. For example, take the sentence "अग्निहोत्रं जुहोत्योदनं पचति," where

the boiling of the rice must necessarily precede the offering of the agnihotra, although the former is mentioned first. Again, when we read "जाते वरं ददाति, जातमञ्जलिना गृह्णाति, जातमभिप्राणिति," the logical sequence, as S'abara shows, is in the reverse order of the textual. Then comes (3) *Pâṭhakrama*, as above, which S'abara illustrates by the following Vedic passage:—"समिधो यजति तनूनपातं यजति इडो यजति बर्हिर्यजति स्वाहाकारं यजति इति." To quote Kunte:—"These are what are called the five Prayâja oblations; and the sequence in which these texts occur shows the order in which they are to be offered. This is the application of what is called Pâṭhakrama, or textual sequence." The next is (4) *Pravṛittikrama*, which forms the subject of sûtras 8–12. Kunte calls it 'practical sequence.' "In a series of acts to be performed upon a series of objects, a beginning is made from some one object; then, in performing all the acts, the same object is acted upon first. This sequence is called Pravṛittikrama, which signifies sequence determined by the conduct of the individual." It is known as the प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्याय. The remaining two varieties are the स्थानक्रम and मुख्यक्रम.

Kunte's notes on this portion are well worth a reference; and much help, too, is to be had from Dr. Thibaut's translation of the *Arthasangraha*, where (on pages 11–15) the six forms of *krama* are explained under प्रयोगविधि.

The use of these technical terms is not confined to the Mîmâṁsakas, but is very common amongst writers on Vedânta also. Four of the above varieties of *krama* are mentioned in *Bhâmatî* 1. 1. 1, pages 47–49, beginning with the words "मा भूदग्निहोत्रयवागूपाकवदार्थः क्रमः &c.," and enlarged upon in *Vedântakalpataru*, pages 32–34; then, in *Bhâmatî* 4. 3. 6, we read "पाठक्रमादर्थक्रमो बलवानिति यथार्थक्रमं पठ्यन्ते सूत्राणि," and so sûtra 12 is next explained, and afterwards sûtra 7. For the *pâṭhakrama* only, see Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 3. 15 (page 620).

पुरस्तादपवादा अनन्तरान्विधीन्बाधन्ते नोत्तरान् ॥

This grammatical nyâya is *paribhâṣâ* LIX in Nâgojîbhaṭṭa's treatise, and is taken from *Mahâbhâṣya* 6. 1. 89 (under vârtika 2). Professor Kielhorn translates as follows:—"*Apavâdas* that precede [the rules which teach operations that have to be superseded by the Apavâda-operations] supersede only those rules that stand nearest to them, not the subsequent rules." It is found also in Patanjali 1. 1. 28; 3. 2. 1 (6); 3. 3. 95; 3. 4. 85; 4. 1. 55 (4); 4. 3. 132 (6); 4. 3. 156 (7); 6. 1. 102 (6); 6. 4. 163 (2); and 8. 3. 112. In not one of these examples, however, do the words "नोत्तरान्" appear.

पूर्वं ह्यपवादा अभिनिविशन्ते पश्चादुत्सर्गाः ॥

Special rules are taken into consideration first, and afterwards general rules. "The meaning is this that he who is guided solely by the rules (of grammar) first looks about to find out where the *Apavâda* applies, and having thus ascertained that a particular form does not fall under that (Apavâda), he employs for its formation the general rule." See Dr. Kielhorn's translation of Nâgojî's *paribhâṣâ* 62. It is found in *Mahâbhâṣya* 2. 4. 85 (vârt. 11); 3. 1. 3 (vârt. 10); 3. 2. 124 (vârt. 10); 4. 1. 89 (vârt. 2); 6. 1. 5 (vârt. 2); 6. 1. 161 and 186.

प्रकल्प्य वापवादविषयं तत उत्सर्गोऽभिनिविशते ॥

This is another of Raghunâtha's samples of grammatical rules, and is closely connected with पूर्वं ह्यपवादाः &c., to which it forms an alternative. Dr. Keilhorn's translation of it, in the *Paribhâṣendus'ekhara*, is as follows:—"Or (we may say that) first all forms which fall under the *Apavâda* are set aside, and that subsequently the general rule is employed (in the formation of the remaining forms)." It is found in *Mahâbhâṣya* 2. 4. 85 (vârt. 11); 3. 1. 3 (vârt. 10); 3. 2. 124 (vârt. 10); 6.

1. 5 (vârt. 2); 6. 1. 161; and 6. 1. 186. In each case it is immediately preceded by the paribhâṣâ पूर्वं ह्यपवादाः &c., the latter standing alone only in 4. 1. 89 (vârt. 2).

प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः ॥

The base and the suffix jointly convey the meaning which is recognized [or arrived at]. The sense of the term प्रत्ययार्थं here is a real difficulty; and I am indebted to Dr. Kielhorn for the explanation that it is regarded as equivalent to प्रतीयमानार्थं. The nyâya (for it is quoted as such) is taken from Patanjali 3. 1. 67, vârtika 2, and is reproduced in the same form in S'abara on Jaimini 3. 4. 13 (page 320), and 10. 8. 24 (page 677); also in *Tantravârtika* 3. 1. 12 (page 686). It is quoted, however, with a slight addition in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 4, line 14, where we read "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः प्राधान्येनेति न्यायेन"; and, almost identically, in the Râmânuja chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 69 of Jîvânanda's edn.) we have "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं प्राधान्येन सह ब्रूतः", which Prof. Gough renders "The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly, and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead." It is not clear how the latter part of this rendering was arrived at; but the missing link is supplied by Mâdhava in *Nyâyamâlâvistara* 3. 4. 8, where we read "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतस्तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येनेति शाब्दिकैरुद्घोषणात्". Here we have, perhaps, a hit at the grammarians and also a hint of the difference which exists between them and Mîmâṁsakas in regard to the means by which the sense of a word is arrived at. In a note on Jaimini 3. 4. 13, Kunte says:—"The grammarians state that both the material part (*dhâtu*) and the determinative part (*pratyaya*) of a verb convey notions of their own. The notions of the agent of an action, of its object, of its being performed by one or many, that is, its singular and plural numbers, are conveyed by the *pratyaya* of a verb. The *dhâtu* of a verb has invariably one sense which it

retains in all its modifications." With the Mîmâmsaka, on the other hand, "the complete verb—the enunciated (*âkhyâta*)—conveys the notion of a mere action and not of its means, such as its agent, its object, or its instrument." In view of this we can understand Mâdhava's statement that the grammarians lay especial stress on the suffix. I feel sure, however, that the presence of the word *prâdhânya* in the nyâya, is due to the influence of the following verse of Kumârila's in *Tantravârtika* 2. 1. 1 (page 348), which forms part of a lengthy disquisition on that difficult word भावना. It stands thus:—"शास्त्रे तु सर्वत्र प्रत्ययार्थो भावनेति व्यवहारः । तत्रायमभिप्रायः ।

प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सदा ।
प्राधान्याद्भावना तेन प्रत्ययार्थोऽवधार्यते" ॥

Then, further on, he again says "तस्मात्प्रत्ययार्थो भावनेत्युपपन्नम्". Does प्रत्ययार्थ in this verse mean प्रतीयमानार्थ ?

प्रत्यक्षे किमनुमानेन ॥

When there is sense-perception, what is the use of inference? As Kumârila says in *Tantravârtika*, page 87:—"वेदवाक्यानुमानं हि तावदेव प्रवर्तते । तदर्थविषयं यावत्प्रत्यक्षं नोपलभ्यते ॥ प्रत्यक्षे श्रूयमाणे तु न विद्येतानुमानिकम् । नहि हस्तिनि दृष्टेऽपि तत्पदेनानुमिष्यते" ॥ Amalânanda, too, in *Vedântakalpataru*, page 368:—"प्रत्यक्षे च यागविधावानुमानिकविधिकल्पनाऽनुपपन्ना".

In S'abara 3. 1. 12 (page 216) we read प्रत्यक्षमनुमानाद्बलीयः, but Patanjali points out (in *Mahâbhâṣya* 3. 2. 124) that this is not always the case. He says:—"भवति वै प्रत्यक्षादप्यनुमानबलीयस्त्वम् । तद्यथा । अलातचक्रं प्रत्यक्षं दृश्यतेऽनुमानाच्च गम्यते नैतदस्तीति". There are two references to this in *Nyâyamanjari*. On page 461 (line 7 from bottom) we read:—"यद्यपि च नैष नियमः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्षं बलीय इति त्वरिततरपरिभ्रमितचक्रीभवदलातग्राहिणः प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानबाधितत्वदर्शनादिति &c.". And on page 609 (line 6 from bottom):—"अथ मनुषे नियम एवैष प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्ष-

मेव बलीय इति तदेवानुमानस्य बाधकमुचितं नानुमानान्तरमिति। तदसत्। अलातचक्रादौ प्रत्यक्षमप्यनुमानेनानन्यथासिद्धेन बाध्यत एव। ननु भ्रमणविरतौ परिमितपरिमाणोल्मुकग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमेव तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकं नानुमानमिति। मैवम्। अनवरतपरिभ्रमणसमुद्भूतचक्रावभाससमय एवानुमानेन तद्भ्रान्ततानिश्चयात्" ॥ For अलातचक्र see also *Nyâyasûtra*, 3. 2. 59; *Bhâmatî*, page 373, line 15; and *S'âlikâ*, page 36.

प्रपानकरसन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *sherbet.* Used to illustrate the production of some new thing by the union of others, just as sherbet is the result of the commingling of various ingredients. It appears in *Sâhityadarpaṇa*, 46, as follows:—"प्रतीयमानः प्रथमं प्रत्येकं हेतुरुच्यते। ततः संवलितः सर्वो विभावादिः सचेतसाम्। प्रपानकरसन्यायाच्चर्व्यमाणो रसो भवेत् ॥ यथा खण्डमरिचादीनां सम्मेलनादपूर्व इव कश्चिदास्वादः प्रपानकरसे सञ्जायते विभावादिसम्मेलनादिहापि तथेत्यर्थः". This is meant to show how Flavour is single, though spoken of as resulting from a composition of causes. Dr. Ballantyne translates thus:—"First each reason is mentioned separately as being perceived; and [then we say] let all this commingled—the Excitants and the rest—constitute, like the [composite] flavour of sherbet, the Flavour tasted by the intelligent. As from the commingling of sugar, pepper &c., a certain unprecedented relish is produced in the shape of the flavour of the sherbet, so is it here also, from the commingling of the Excitants &c., such is the meaning."

The same illustration is found in *Nyâyamanjarî* (page 372) with पानक instead of प्रपानक. "पदार्थेभ्योऽन्य एव वाक्यार्थः पानकादिवत्। यथा पानकं शर्करानागकेशरमरिचादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव यथा च सिन्दूरहरिताललाक्षादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव चित्रं...तथा पदेभ्यो वाक्यं पदार्थेभ्यो वाक्यार्थः" ॥ Also *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 219, line 26.

प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ॥

Even a stupid person does not adopt a course of action

without a motive. This is the first line of a verse in *S'loka-vârtika,* page 653, the second being "एवमेव प्रवृत्तिश्चेच्चैतन्येनास्य किं भवेत्". In *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 2. 1, we read:—"तत्रिगुणं प्रधानं मृद्वदचेतनं चेतनस्य पुरुषस्यार्थं साधयितुं स्वभावेनैव विचित्रेण विकारात्मना विवर्तत इति". On which Ânandagiri remarks:—"चेतनस्येति । अर्थशब्दो भोगापवर्गार्थः । अचेतनस्य प्रयोजनपरिज्ञानाभावादप्रवृत्तिः । प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तत इति न्यायादित्याशंक्याह स्वभावेनेति".

We find the following in *Nyâyamanjarî* (page 191) in connection with the discussion on Is'vara as creator:—

"किं किमपि प्रयोजनमनुसन्धाय जगत्सर्गे प्रवर्तते प्रजापतिरेवमेव वा । निष्प्रयोजनायां प्रवृत्तावप्रेक्षापूर्वकारित्वादुन्मत्ततुल्योऽसौ भवेत्".

प्रस्तरप्रहरणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the throwing into the sacrificial fire of a handful of Darbha grass.* Kunte says:—"The Prastarapraharaṇanyâya is well known among the Mîmâṁsakas. Prastara is a handful of Darbha-grass ready for use before a sacrifice is begun. It is spread on the sacrificial ground (Vedi) and serves as a seat for the sacrificial vessels. When a sacrifice is finished it is thrown into the sacrificial fire as an offering. A Vaidika text states.—'The handful of grass is to be thrown into the fire with the Sûktavâka.'" The nyâya forms the subject of Jaimini 3. 2. 11-14 which is otherwise termed "सूक्तवाकस्य प्रस्तरप्रहरणाङ्गताधिकरणम्." The question which has to be decided is thus put by the author of the *S'âstradîpikâ*:—"दर्शपूर्णमासयोः श्रूयते सूक्तवाकेन प्रस्तरं प्रहरतीति । तत्र संशयः । किं प्रस्तरप्रहरणस्य सूक्तवाकस्य च कालार्थः संयोगोऽथवाङ्गाङ्गिभावः" । The decision is that the Sûktavâka mantra is subordinate to the act of offering up the grass, whilst the latter serves the double purpose of a resting-place for the vessels and an offering to the gods.

The term प्रतिपत्ति which is found in sûtra 14 is thus explained by Kunte:—"The rule is that all things connected with a

sacrifice are somehow or other to be used in performing the same; nothing is to be thrown away, nothing is to be preserved. The final disposal of sacrificial things for the sake of getting rid of them is called Pratipatti."

प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्यायः ॥

See this explained under पाठक्रमन्याय.

फलवत्सहकारन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a fruitful mango-tree.* Such a tree not only produces luscious fruit, but also affords shade and shelter for the weary traveller in the hot season. Some of us know from experience how charming a camping-ground a mango-grove is! Raghunâtha's explanation of the nyâya is as follows:—" एकफलाकांक्षायां तदाराधनमन्यदपि फलं प्रयच्छतीति विवक्षायां तु फलवत्सहकारन्यायः। यथा सहकार 'आम्रश्चूतो रसालोऽसौ सहकारोऽतिसौरभ' इत्यभिधानादतिसौरभ आम्रवृक्षोऽतिमधुरपक्कफलनमितशाखः स्वमुपसन्नाय छायार्थिने जनाय फलं परिमलं चाप्रार्थितमपि ददाति तथा प्रकृतेऽपीत्यर्थः॥ The quotation here is from *Amarakoṣa*·IV. 33 (page 87). The thought expressed in the above seems to be present in *Yogavâsiṣtha* 5. 43. 32, as explained by the commentator:—" नित्याभ्यासविवेकाभ्यां चित्तमाशु प्रसीदति। आम्र एव दशामेति साहकारीं शनैः शनैः" ॥ ३२ ॥ " आशुग्रहणं प्रसादावश्यंभावद्योतनार्थम्। सहकारः पुष्पफलाद्यतिसौरभस्तद्भावलक्षणां दशाम्."

बर्हिन्र्यायः ॥

The maxim of *Kus'a grass.* This is based on the sentence " बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामि," "I cut grass as a seat for the gods," which forms the subject of Jaimini 3. 2. 1, 2. The question is whether the word बर्हिस् is to be taken in its primary sense or in a secondary one; and the conclusion is " मुख्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्रत्ययः," which see above in the form गौणमुख्ययोः &c.

बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेतः ॥

The mind of even those who are highly educated is distrustful of itself. This is the second line of the second verse in *S'akuntalânâṭak.* In *Târkikarakṣâ* (page 208), in an exposition of वाद, we find the following:—"वादे तु दैवादागताः सदस्या वादिप्रतिवादिभ्यां संप्रतिपत्त्या प्रामादिककथाभासशंकाव्यावर्तनायाङ्गीक्रियन्ते न जल्पवितण्डयोरिव प्रमेयादिव्यवस्थापनार्थमङ्गत्वेनोपादीयन्ते" ॥ On which, Mallinâtha comments as follows:—"वादे विशेषमाह वादे त्विति । दैवादागतायां वा किं प्रयोजनमत आह प्रामादिकेति । बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेत इति न्यायादिति भावः" ॥

For the benefit of any who may consult the original, I may add that the quotation from the *Nyâyavârtika* which immediately follows in Varadarâja's text, is found on page 161 of that work; and that from Vâcaspatimis'ra's ṭikâ, on page 224.

बहूनामनुग्रहो न्याय्यः ॥

It is good policy for several to combine in a friendly way. Raghunâthavarman quotes *Pancatantra* i. 331 by way of illustration:—"बहूनामप्यसाराणां मेलनं कार्यसाधकम् । तृणैः संपाद्यते रज्जुस्तया नागोऽपि बध्यते" ॥ For the many variants of this verse see *Indische Sprüche* 4425, and Peterson's *Subhâshitâvali* 2742. The maxim is found in *Jaiminîyanyâyamâlâvistara* 7. 1. 5.

बालस्य प्रदीपकलिकाक्रीडयैव नगरदाहः ॥

The burning of a city just by a child's playing with the wick of a lamp. "Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth." I assume that कलिका means the bud-like charred excresence which often forms on the top of a wick in an open oil-light. The saying is found in *Kusumânjali* v. 3, page 89:—"ननु तस्य सर्वदा सर्वत्राविशेषे कार्यस्य सर्वदोत्पत्तिप्रसंग इति निरपेक्षेश्वरपक्षे

दोषः, सापेक्षे उपेक्षणीय एवास्त्विति बालस्य प्रदीपकलिकाक्रीडयैव नगरदाहः परन्तु तत्र स्थेमभाजो जगत एवाकारणत्वप्रसङ्गात्."

Udayana seems to use the phrase ironically, but I do not quite grasp the drift of this.

बुभुक्षितस्य किं निमन्त्रणाग्रह उत्कण्ठितस्य किं केकारवश्रावणम् ॥

What need has a hungry man of a pressing invitation [to eat]; *why direct the attention of a longing one to the cry of the peacock?* In the Kumârapâla chapter of *Prabandhacintâmaṇi*, page 212, we are told that that king having given Hemacandra (a Jain) a pressing invitation to join him in a pilgrimage to the temple of Somanâtha (dedicated to S'iva), the hermit replied as follows:—"बुभुक्षितस्य किं निमन्त्रणाग्रह उत्कण्ठितस्य किं केकारवश्रावणमिति लोकरूढेस्तपस्विनामधिकृततीर्थाधिकाराणां को नाम नृपतेरत्र निर्बन्धः" ॥ "What need is there to show much zeal about inviting one who is hungry? Why make one who is longing, listen to the cry of the peacock? So runs the popular proverb, and, in accordance with it, I ask, why does your Majesty exert yourself to press hermits, whose very profession is the visiting of sacred places?" This is Mr. Tawney's rendering, on page 130 of his translation. Indian writers often tell us that the cries of the peacock intensify the longings of separated lovers! For example, *Raghuvaṁs'a* xiii 27:—"स्निग्धाश्च केकाः शिखिनां बभूवुर्यस्मिन्नसह्यानि विना त्वया मे."

ब्राह्मणग्रामन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a village in which Brâhmans abound.* In *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 188, a distinction is drawn between the expression प्रचुरब्राह्मणो ग्रामः and ब्राह्मणप्रचुरो ग्रामः, the meaning, in the former case, being a village in which Brâhmans are more numerous than in some other village, and, in the latter, a village in which the Brâhmans outnumber the other castes.

The passage is as follows:—"प्राचुर्यस्य धर्मिविशेषणत्वेन निर्देश एव व्यधिकरणसजातीयाल्पत्वस्य निरूपकत्वं दृष्टम्। यथा प्रचुरब्राह्मणो ग्राम इत्यत्र प्राचुर्यस्य ग्रामान्तरगतब्राह्मणाल्पत्वं निरूपकं दृष्टमिति। तस्य स्वधर्मिविशेष्यत्वे तु समानाधिकरणविजातीयाल्पत्वमेव निरूपकमत एव ब्राह्मणप्रचुरो ग्राम इति प्रयोगे तद्ग्रामगतशूद्राल्पत्वापेक्षं प्राचुर्यं प्रतीयते." See also *Tantravârtika*, p. 1066 line 2. Akin to this is the मल्लग्रामन्याय.

भस्मन्याज्याहुतिः ॥

Offering clarified butter on ashes [instead of on the sacrificial fire]. An illustration of wasted, or misdirected, effort. *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, page 240:—"अकार्यवारणोद्युक्तो मूढे यः परिखिद्यते। वाग्विस्तरो वृथा तस्य भस्मन्याज्याहुतिर्यथा॥ नोपदेशशतेनापि मूढोऽकार्यान्निवर्त्यते। शीतांशुग्रसनात्केन राहुर्वाक्यैर्निवारितः"॥ There is another instance in Hemacandra's *Paris'istaparvan* i. 58:—"दध्यौ चैवं स राजर्षिरहो तेषां कुमन्त्रिणाम्। सन्मानो यो मयाकारि स भस्मनि हुतं ध्रुवम्."

भाण्डानुसारिस्नेहवत् ॥

The simile of [a remnant of] *oil adhering to* [the sides of] *a vessel* [out of which oil has been poured]. In the bhâṣya on *Brahmasûtra* 3. 1. 8, there is a lengthy and important discussion as to whether, on returning to earth, in some new birth, after a residence in the moon, a man brings with him a remnant of the works which took him there,—this remnant being technically styled *anus'aya*. S'ankara affirms that he does, and says:—"कः पुनरनुशयो नामेति। केचित्तावदाहुः। स्वर्गार्थस्य कर्मणो भुक्तफलस्यावशेषः कश्चिदनुशयो नाम भाण्डानुसारिस्नेहवत्। यथा हि स्नेहभाण्डं रिच्यमानं न सर्वात्मना रिच्यते भाण्डानुसार्येव कश्चित्स्नेहशेषोऽवतिष्ठते तथानुशयोऽपीति"॥ The question is then asked, why does he not remain in that blissful region until the whole of his merit is exhausted? The answer is, that, just as a servant who has long served in a king's household, finds his wardrobe at last reduced to the

slender proportions of a pair of shoes and an umbrella, and is therefore unfit to continue in that exalted position, so, too, a man is unworthy of a residence in the moon who has only a small balance of merit remaining to his credit! Here is this unique reply in S'ankara's own words:—"ननु निरवशेषकर्मफलोपभोगाय चन्द्रमण्डलमारूढाः। बाढम्। तथापि स्वल्पकर्मावशेषमात्रेण तत्रावस्थातुं न लभ्यते। यथा किल कश्चित्सेवकः सकलैः सेवोपकरणै राजकुलमुपसृप्तश्चिरप्रवासात्परिक्षीणबहूपकरणश्छत्रपादुकादिमात्रावशेषो न राजकुलेऽवस्थातुं शक्नोति। एवमनुशयमात्रपरिग्रहो न चन्द्रमण्डलेऽवस्थातुं शक्नोतीति."

This is a portion of the system which is regarded as the highest flight of the Indian mind, and to which some restless folk in Europe and America are betaking themselves, in order to find rest for their souls! There are not a few in India to-day, however, who have found that rest by turning from these gropings in the dark, to the midday light afforded by an accredited revelation.

भूमिरथिकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the man who* [in order to become proficient] *makes drawings of a war-chariot on the ground.* This nyâya is found in S'abara's bhâshya on Jaimini 7. 2. 15, and again (in conjunction with शुष्केष्टिन्याय) in 9. 2. 13. The latter passage is as follows:—"यत्तावदुपाध्यायः शिष्यसन्निधावधीते तद्ग्रहणार्थम्। यच्छिष्यस्तद्धारणार्थम्। ग्रहणधारणे प्रयोगार्थे भूमिरथिकवत् शुष्केष्टिवद्वा। तद्यथा भूमिरथिको भूमौ रथमालिख्य शिक्षां करोति संग्रामे प्राशुभावो भवितेति यथा च छात्रः शुष्केष्टीः प्रयुंक्ते प्रयोगे प्राशुकर्मा भवितास्मीति एवमेतद्द्रष्टव्यम्" ॥

In his *Laukikanyâyaratnâkara* (page 186*b* of India Office MS. 582) Raghunâthavarman applies these two nyâyas and the शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्याय as follows:—"परमतनिराकरणं च शिष्याणामभ्यासदार्ढ्येनासंभावनादिसमुच्छेदाय न तु परद्वेषेणेति विवक्षायां भूमिरथिकन्यायः शुष्केष्टिन्यायः शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्यायश्च प्रवर्तते" ॥ His explanations of the three are taken from *Jaiminîyanyâyamâlâvistara* 9. 1. 6 and 9. 2. 2.

भ्रष्टावसरन्यायः ॥

The maxim that [something does not take place] *when the occasion* [for its taking place] *has once gone.* This is Professor Kielhorn's rendering of the nyâya as it occurs in Nâgojîbhaṭṭa's *paribhâṣâ* lxiv. The sentence is as follows—"अत एव निर्देशाद्भ्रष्टावसरन्यायस्यात्र शास्त्रे नाश्रयणम् । ध्वनितं चेदमिको गुण इति सूत्रे भाष्य इति भाष्यप्रदीपोद्द्योते निरूपितम्" ॥

There is an instance of it in *Tantravârtika,* 3. 5. 46 (page 1060):—"यदपि यजमानस्य भ्रष्टावसरं क्रियमाणं विगुणं भवतीति तदपि गुणलोपे मुख्यस्येत्यनेन विरुद्धम्." The nyâya is expressive of *a lost opportunity.*

मक्षिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the bees.* Used to illustrate the many following their leader, as bees follow their queen (in Sanskrit, *king*). The oldest example of the simile is found in *Pras'na Upanishad* ii. 4:—"तद्यथा मक्षिका मधुकरराजानमुत्क्रामन्तं सर्वा एवोत्क्रामन्ते तस्मिंश्च प्रतिष्ठमाने सर्वा एव प्रातिष्ठन्त एवं वाङ्मनश्चक्षुःश्रोत्रं च ते प्रीताः प्राणं स्तुन्वन्ति." I have met with it also in the last part of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"यदा चित्तं निरुध्यते तदा चक्षुरादीनां निरोधे प्रयत्नान्तरं नापेक्षणीयम् । यथा मधुकरराजं मधुमक्षिका अनुवर्तन्ते तथेन्द्रियाणि चित्तमिति."

Raghunâtha includes this nyâya in both his works, but, so far as I can discover, does not explain it.

मज्जनोन्मज्जनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the sinking and rising* [of one who has fallen into deep water]. Applied to the pitiable condition of one who, in the ocean of existences, is without the knowledge of Brahman. It occurs in *Yogavâsiṣṭha* 6. 6. 46–7 :—

"जरामरणमभ्येति मूढस्यैव पुनः पुनः।
जगज्जीर्णारघट्टेऽस्मिन्नज्ज्वा संसृतिरूपया ॥

मज्जनोन्मज्जनैरज्ञो यन्त्रे कलशतां गतः ।
यदेव गोष्पदापूरं ज्ञधियः पेलवं जगत् ॥

The comment on the above is the following:—"आरघट्टे यन्त्रे घटीयन्त्रे । गोष्पदमापूरयतीति गोष्पदापूरम् अल्पजलप्रायमित्यर्थः" ॥ Here, the man who is ignorant of Brahman is likened to the pots attached to a water-wheel, which alternately rise and fall in the water of a well!

मदशक्तिवत् ॥

The simile of *the power of an intoxicant.* It is employed by S'ankara in his bhâṣya on *Brahmasûtra* 3. 3. 53:—"अत्रैके देहमात्रात्मदर्शिनो लोकायतिका देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽभावं मन्यमानाः समस्तव्यस्तेषु बाह्येषु पृथिव्यादिष्वदृष्टमपि चैतन्यं शरीराकारपरिणतेषु भूतेषु स्यादिति संभावयन्तस्तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं मदशक्तिवद्विज्ञानं चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुष इति चाहुः" ॥ Ânandagiri comments on the latter part thus:—"मदेति। यथैकैकस्मात्ताम्बूलादेरदृष्टापि मदशक्तिः संघाते दृश्यते तथेदं ज्ञानमेकैकस्मिन्नदृष्टमपि देहाकारपरिणतभूतेषु संहतेषु भवतीति चाहुरिति योजना."

The illustration is found also in *Nyâyamanjarî* (page 439, line 4 from bottom):—"यत्तु मदशक्तिवदित्युक्तं तत्र मदशक्तेर्दृष्टत्वादभ्युपगमो न तु ज्ञानस्य तत्र दर्शनम्."

मधु पश्यसि दुर्बुद्धे प्रपातं नानुपश्यसि ॥

O foolish one! thou seest the honey but dost not see the precipice. This is the second line of *S'ântiparva* cccxi. 7. (cccx Bombay edn.), the first being "स्वादुकामुककामानां वैतृष्ण्यं किं न गच्छसि." Ânandabodhâcârya quotes it in his *Nyâyamakaranda* (page 77) as "मधु पश्यसि दुर्बुद्धे प्रपातं किं न पश्यसि." The editor of that work was apparently unaware of the existence of the passage in the Mokṣadharma, for he considered the आभाणक to be based on the following verse of the *Devîbhâgavata*:—"मधु पश्यति मूढात्मा प्रपातं नैव पश्यति । करोति निन्दितं कर्म नरकान्न बिभेति च."

Thanks to the St. Petersburg Lexicon, we can refer to five other passages of the Mahâbhârat where the same illustration is found. In *Vanaparva* ccxxxv. 21 (Calc.), we read:—"मधु प्रपश्यन्ति न तु प्रपातं यद्द्यूतमालंब्य हरन्ति राज्यम्." In *Udyoga-parva* L. 27:—"विषमं नावमन्यन्ते प्रपातं मधुदर्शिनः । संयुगं ये गमिष्यन्ति नररूपेण मृत्युना." In *Droṇaparva* LI. 11:—"न लुब्धो बुध्यते दोषान्मोहाल्लोभात्प्रवर्तते । मधुलिप्सुर्हि नापश्यं प्रपातमहमीदृशम्." Again in cxxxiii. 10:—"धनं धनेश्वरस्येव हृत्वा पार्थस्य मे सुतः । मधुप्रेप्सुरिवाबुद्धिः प्रपातं नावबुध्यते." Lastly, in *Strîparva* i. 37:—"मधु यः केवलं दृष्ट्वा प्रपातं नानुपश्यति । स भ्रष्टो मधुलोभेन शोचत्येवं यथा भवान्." We, in this enlightened age, may well ponder these wise sayings; for infatuated humanity still rushes headlong after evil disguised as good. "There is a way that seemeth right to a man, but the end thereof is . . death."

मध्येऽपवादाः पूर्वान्विधीन्बाधन्ते नोत्तरान् ॥

In the *Paribhâṣendus'ekhara*, this paribhâṣâ stands between पुरस्तादपवादाः &c., and अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा &c., which see above. Professor Kielhorn's translation of the present one is as follows:—"*Apavâdas* that are surrounded (by rules which teach operations that have to be superseded by the *Apavâda*-operations), supersede only those rules that precede, not those that follow, them." "The reason for (the validity of) this Paribhâṣâ is this that (an *Apavâda*, when it has become effective) by superseding the rule which presents itself first, no longer wants (to supersede something else)." It appears in *Mahâbhâṣya* 3. 2. 1. (vârt. 6); 4. 1. 55 (vârt. 4); 4. 1. 114 (vârt. 4. and 6); 4. 3. 132 (vârt. 6); 4. 3. 156 (vârt. 7); 6. 1. 102 (vârt, 6); 6. 1. 166; 6. 3. 68 (vârt. 5); 6. 4. 148 (vârt. 5); and 7. 2. 44 (vârt. 4). In no case, however, are the words नोत्तरान् found in the paribhâṣâ.

मन्दविषन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a slow-poison*. It forms maxim 150 of the pûrvabhâga of *Laukikanyâyaratnâkara*, and is used in opposition to तीव्रविषन्याय as follows:—"एवं हि संशयादिनिवृत्तिर्मन्दविषन्यायेन सुकरा। बोधादार्ढ्यं प्रतिवाद्यापादितं तु संशयादि तीव्रविषन्यायेन दुष्परिहरं स्यात्। सद्योभुक्तं विषं मन्दमन्यथा तीव्रम्." It occurs in *Sâstradîpikâ* 1. 3. 4 (page 148, line 2 from bottom):—"इत्थं च संभवति प्रामाण्ये नाप्रामाण्यं युक्तमिति भवति केषांचिदाकांक्षा सापि मन्दविषन्यायेन निराकर्तव्येत्येवमर्थमिदमधिकरणम्."

महतापि प्रयत्नेन तमिस्रायां परामृशन्। कृष्णशुक्लविवेकं हि न कश्चिदधिगच्छति ॥

Not even by the most thorough examination, could one distinguish between black and white, in intense darkness. The verse is Kumârila's, and is used by him (in *Tantravârtika* 1. 3. 1) to illustrate the impossibility of tracing the sources from which Manu and other Smṛiti-authors derived their laws. Just before the s'loka he says:—"न च तद्विज्ञायते कीदृशाद्वाक्यादिदं मन्वादिभिः प्रतिपन्नं किं विधिपरादुतार्थवादरूपादिति." Then, immediately after the verse:—"न च मन्वादिवचनाद्वेदमूलत्वं निश्चिनुमः." This latter clause, as the *Nyâyasudhâ* points out, is with reference to Manu's own statement, in chapter ii. 7, to the effect that every precept of his was deduced from the Veda.

य एव करोति स एव भुङ्क्ते ॥

He who performs an action will himself reap the fruit thereof [whether in the form of reward or retribution]. This doctrine, common to all the orthodox schools, is found in *Nyâyavârtika* 3. 1. 4, and is directed against the belief that the body is the soul, and that when the body is cremated, the man, with all his deeds, ceases to exist. The emphasis, therefore, here is not so much on the fact that *whatsoever* a man soweth that shall he also reap, as that *whosoever* soweth the same shall also

reap. This, of course, implies that the reaper will be *conscious* of the fact that he was the sower, for otherwise the precept would be of no moral value. It is difficult to see how any one can hold with the above, and at the same time be a believer in the doctrine of transmigration; the advocates of which are compelled to admit that the subjects of those repeated births have absolutely *no consciousness* of previous existences. I am not unmindful of the fact that the followers of the Yoga system [sûtra iii. 16] profess to attain to a knowledge of the past and the future by means of संयम (that is, by धारणा, ध्यान, and समाधि collectively); but, even if that were so, would it affect as many as one out of every quarter-million of the population?

यत्करभस्य पृष्ठे न माति तत्कण्ठे निबध्यते ॥

That for which there is no room on a camel's back is tied to his neck! Illustrates the piling up of misfortunes almost beyond endurance. Perhaps akin to our "It is the last straw which breaks the camel's back." It occurs in *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, page 394:—"मया चिन्तितम् । अहो हता दैवेन वयं मन्दभाग्याः । तदिदमाभाणकमायातम् । यदुत यत्करभस्य पृष्ठे न माति तत्कण्ठे निबध्यत इति । तथाहि वैश्वानरपापमित्रयोगेणैव कुमारस्य गाढमुद्वेजिता वयं यावतेयमपरा कृत्येवास्य भार्या सम्पन्नेति." Kṛityâ is a female deity who is invoked for evil purposes.

यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणाः ॥

Where there is a good outward appearance, there also are good qualities. This is found in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* iii. 233:—"अस्याकृत्यनुसारेण गुणानपि हि निश्चिनु । यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणा इति लोकेऽपि गीयते." It is contained also in verse 5076 of *Indische Sprüche*, but whether as a quotation or not, I cannot say:—"यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणा वसन्ति नैतद्धि सम्यक्कविभिः प्रणीतम् । येनातिचार्वङ्ग्यपि मे हृदिस्था दुनोति गात्रं विरहे प्रियासौ." Professor Böhtlingk took it from Kosegarten's edition of the *Pancatantra* (i. 208), but I cannot find it in the Bombay edition. Some work on शृङ्गाररस is a much more probable source.

यद्ग्रहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुस्तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षते ॥

That on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence. This is Professor Cowell's rendering of the nyâya as it appears in the Aulukya chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 126, Jîvânanda's edn.):—"न चालोकाभावस्य घटाद्यभाववद्रूपवदभावत्वेनालोकसापेक्षचक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं स्यादित्येषितव्यं । यद्ग्रहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुस्तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षत इति न्यायेनालोकग्रहे आलोकापेक्षाया अभावेन तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षाया अभावात्." "And you need not assert that this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an object possessing colour [*i. e.* light possesses colour, and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark], as we see in the case of a jar's absence; because, by the very rule on which you rely, namely, that on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence."

यववराहाधिकरणन्यायः ॥

In Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 3. 45 we read:—"यववराहाधिकरणन्यायेन लोकप्रसिद्धिः शास्त्रीयप्रसिद्ध्या बाध्येत्याह." There is no adhikaraṇa of this name in Mîmâṁsâ or Vedânta, but the reference is probably to the शास्त्रप्रसिद्धार्थप्रामाण्याधिकरण, otherwise styled the आर्यम्लेच्छाधिकरण, which comprises Jaimini's sûtras 1. 3. 8 and 9, where the words यव, वराह, and others having a double meaning, are discussed. These two sûtras are quoted by S'ankara on *Brahmasûtra* 3. 4. 42, and explained by Ânandagiri. The matter is well put in Colebrooke's *Essay on Mîmâṁsâ* (page 339):—"A very curious disquisition occurs in this part of the Mîmâṁsâ, on the acceptation of words in correct language and barbaric dialects, and on the use of terms taken from either. Instances alleged are *yava*, signifying in

Sanskrit, barley, but in the barbaric tongue, the plant named *priyangu; varâha,* in the one a hog, and in the other a cow [or, rather, a crow]; *pîlu,* a certain tree, but among barbarians an elephant; *vetasa,* a rattan cane and a citron [or, rose-apple, *jambu*]. The Mîmâṁsâ concludes, that in such instances of words having two acceptations, that in which it is received by the civilized (*Âryas*), or which is countenanced by use in sacred books, is to be preferred to the practice of barbarians (*Mlechha*), who are apt to confound words or their meanings." The above is of importance to students of Vedânta; for, in addition to the passages named above, it is discussed in *Bhâmatî* 3. 3. 52, and enlarged upon in *Vedântakalpataru,* pages 461, 462. The brief allusion, too, to the same thing, in *Bhâmatî* 1. 3. 22, in the words:—"न हि गावो वराहमनुधावन्तीति कृष्णविहङ्गानुधावनमुपपद्यते गवामपि तु तादृशसूकरानुधावनम्," is quite unintelligible alone. See, too, *Nyâyamanjarî,* page 288, line 26.

यश्चोभयोः समो दोषो न तेनैकश्चोद्यो भवति ॥

When the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone. This is Professor Cowell's rendering of the nyâya as it occurs in the Pâṇini chapter of *Sarvadar'sanasangraha* (page 142, Bib. Ind., and 161 Jîvânanda). The real origin of the nyâya must be the words "यश्चोभयोर्दोषो नासावेकस्य वाच्यः," which are found in S'abara's bhâṣya 8. 3. 14; but Mâdhava may have deduced it immediately from the well-known verse:—"यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि तादृशः। नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे." It appears in this form in Aniruddha's comment on *Sânkhyasûtra* i. 6; but in *Tarkabhâṣâ.* page 88, and in *Laukikanyâyasangraha,* page 64 (Benares edition), the reading of the second pâda is "परिहारोऽपि वा समः". The first part of the verse is quoted in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya,* page 531, and ascribed to Bhaṭṭa. This is doubtless Kumârila, but I have not found the verse in the *S'lokavârtika,* or in the published portion of the *Tantravârtika.* I was in hopes that it might be discovered in the vârtika on Book eight;

but on examining a manuscript in the India Office Library, I failed to find it there. The nearest approach to it is the second line of a verse on page 947 of *Tantravârtika*, namely "न चोभयाश्रयं दोषमेकश्चोद्यो विचारयेत्." See, too, *Nyâyamanjarî* 95.

यस्य नास्ति पुत्रो न तस्य पुत्रस्य क्रीडनकानि क्रियन्ते ॥

Toys are not made for the son of a man who has no son! This is used by S'abara to illustrate Jaimini's sûtra 10. 3. 5—"न चाङ्गविधिरनङ्गे स्यात्." He says:—"नह्यनङ्गे कर्मण्यङ्गस्य विशेषविधिः स्यात् । भवति च विशेषविधिः 'आश्वबालः प्रस्तर' इति । न ह्यसति प्रस्तरे प्रस्तरविशेषः शिष्येत यथा यस्य नास्ति पुत्रो न तस्य क्रीडनकानि क्रियन्ते."

यस्योन्मूलनाय यस्य प्रसक्तिर्भवति ततस्तस्य बलवत्त्वम् ॥

He who is bent on destroying another must be stronger than he. This is contained in an extract (given by Prof. Kielhorn) from Bhairavamis'ra's comment on Nâgojî Bhaṭṭa's paribhâṣâ cxii, namely निषेधाश्च बलीयांसः (=प्रतिषेधाश्च बलीयांसो भवन्ति of Patanjali 1. 1. 63, vârtika 6), which runs thus:—"इयं च परिभाषा लोकसिद्धन्यायमूलिकेत्याह । विध्युन्मूलनायेति । प्राप्तस्य विधेर्निवर्तनायेत्यर्थः । एतेन येन नाप्राप्तन्यायेन विधिशास्त्रस्य निषेधशास्त्रेण बाध इति दर्शितम् । लोकेऽपि यस्योन्मूलनाय यस्य प्रसक्तिर्भवति ततस्तस्य बलवत्त्वं कंसात्कृष्णस्येव." The example given here, of one of superior might overcoming a less mighty one, is that of Kṛishṇa and the demon Kaṁsa. The death of the latter is described in Vishṇu-Purâṇa, Book V, chapter xx. Those who are familiar with the English Bible will call to mind the words "When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcôme him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils." The 'strong man,' here, is the Prince of this world—"that old Serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world"—his 'goods' are human

souls and bodies; the 'stronger than he' is Christ, the Prince of Peace,—to whom has been given the commission "*to bring out the prisoners from the prison.*"

येन नाप्राप्ते यो विधिरारभ्यते स तस्य बाधको भवति ॥

Here is another of Raghunâtha's grammatical nyâyas. It forms paribhâṣâ 57 in Nâgojîbhaṭṭa's work, and is rendered by Professor Kielhorn as follows:—"A rule which is given (in reference to a particular case or particular cases) to which another (rule) *cannot but apply* (or, in other words, which all fall already under some other rule), supersedes the latter." "The meaning of the words येन नाप्राप्ते is 'while another rule is *necessarily* applying,' for the two negatives (न and अ) import more force to the word (प्राप्ते, than this word would possess without them)." The Professor adds the following in a footnote:—"This paribhâṣâ teaches us the meaning of the term *apavâda*, and in doing so tells us the reason why an *apavâda* possesses greater force than *antaranga* and other rules. An *apavâda* is a *special* rule; it is given in reference to particular cases which all fall under some *general* rule (*utsarga*); as it is not applicable in any case which does *not* fall under the general rule, it must necessarily supersede the latter, because it would otherwise not serve any purpose whatever." Under this paribhâṣâ Nâgojî introduces and discusses the तक्रकौण्डिन्यन्याय, namely "ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय." The paribhâṣâ is found in the following passages of the *Mahâbhâṣya*:—1. 1. 6. (vârt. 1.); 1. 1. 28; 3. 4. 85 (vârt. 2); 6. 1. 2 (vârt. 4), where the तक्रकौण्डिन्यन्याय is brought in; 6. 1. 166; 6. 3. 68 (vârt. 5); 6. 4. 163 (vârt. 2), with तक्रकौण्डिन्य again; 7. 2. 44 (vârt. 4); 7. 2. 117 (vârt. 2), with तक्रकौण्डिन्य; 8. 2. 23 (vârt. 5); 8. 2. 72; and 8. 3. 112.

रथकारन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the Rathakâra.* There is a Vedic text which says, "In the rainy season a Rathakâra ought to establish a

sacred fire." The question then arises, what is meant by the word Rathakâra? Does it mean a chariot-maker, or a member of the mixed caste produced by the marriage of a Mâhiṣya (the offspring of a Kshatriya and a Vais'ya-woman) with a Karaṇi (the offspring of a Vais'ya and a S'ûdra-woman), which is called Rathakâra? The question is discussed in Jaimini 6. 1. 44–50, and is decided in favor of the latter. The discussion is thus summarized in *Jaiminîyanyâyamâlâvistara*:—"आधाने श्रूयते । वर्षासु रथकार आदधीतेति । तत्र रथं करोतीति व्युत्पत्त्या त्रैवर्णिको रथकार इति चेत् । नैवम् । संस्कीर्णजातिविशेषे रूढत्वात् । वैश्यायां क्षत्रियादुत्पन्नो माहिष्यः । शूद्रायां वैश्यादुत्पन्ना करणी । तस्यां करण्यां माहिष्यादुत्पन्नो रथकारः । तथा च याज्ञवल्क्यः । 'माहिष्येण करण्यां तु रथकारः प्रजायत' इति । तस्य च रथकारस्याधानकालो वर्षर्तुः" ॥

The nyâya is quoted by Nâgojîbhaṭṭa in his *vritti* on the ninety-eighth paribhâṣâ (अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी), which Prof. Kielhorn renders thus:—"The (conventional) meaning which a word conveys when taken as a whole, is stronger than the (etymological) meaning derived from (a division of the word into) its parts." In other words, रूढिर्योगमपहरति, which Raghunâtha exemplifies by this word Rathakâra. The vidhi on which this is based is quoted in full in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 140, line 3.

रात्रिसत्रन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a night-sacrifice.* This is the topic of Jaimini 4. 3. 17–19, and is largely used by writers on Vedânta as a type of scripture-passage conveying no direct promise of reward, and therefore dependent on an arthavâda-passage for such promise. Though S'ankara does not mention this nyâya in his bhâṣya on *Brahmasûtra* 3. 3. 38, it is evident that he has it in view, and Ânandagiri, and Amalânanda (in the *Kalpataru*), expressly connect his remarks with it. So also the *Kalpataruparimala.* The last-mentioned work quotes the maxim again on page 255 (in connection with *Brahmasûtra* 1. 2. 24):—"तथा सर्वपापप्रदाहोऽपि

ब्रह्मलिङ्गप्रश्नोत्तराभ्यां प्राधान्येन प्रतिपिपादयिषिततयोपक्रान्तस्योपासनस्य फलाकांक्षया रात्रिसत्रन्यायेनार्थवादिकफलविपरिणामे कर्तव्ये प्रधानार्थवाद इवाङ्गार्थवादे श्रुतस्यापि फलस्य ग्रहणौचित्यात्."

The nyâya in found also in *Pancapâdikâvivaraṇa*, page 122, line 8 from bottom, and again on page 134, line 9 from the bottom. The latter passage is as follows:—"ननु रात्रिसत्रन्यायेनार्थवादगतमेव मोक्षं ब्रह्मज्ञानं वा प्रयोजनं साध्यत्वेन परिणमय्य मोक्षकामो ब्रह्मज्ञानकामो वा विचारयेत् &c." See, too, *S'âlikâ*, p. 7 and 157.

राधा वेधोपमा ॥

The simile of *piercing the central figure of a target.* That is, hitting the bull's eye. It is used of something difficult of accomplishment, and requiring great skill. "In Prâkrit the *râdhâ* is generally called *puttaliyâ*, literally 'a little figure', as apparently a little human figure was painted in the middle of the butt." This note, contributed by Professor Leumann to Mr. Tawney's translation of Merutunga's work, is probably a correct explanation of the word राधा, rather than the dictionary meaning, "an attitude in shooting." The illustration appears on pages 412, 420, and 434 of *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, as follows:—"सा चेयती भवेत्कस्य सामग्रीयं सुदुर्लभा। राधावेधोपमानेन धर्मप्राप्तिः प्रकीर्तिता" ॥ "एनं संसारविस्तारं विलंघ्य कथमप्यदः। मानुष्यं प्राप्य दुष्प्रापं राधावेधोपमं जनः" ॥ "भो भव्याः प्रविहाय मोहललितं युष्माभिराकर्ण्यतामेकान्तेन हितं मदीयवचनं कृत्वा विशुद्धं मनः। राधावेधसमं कथंचिदतुलं लब्ध्वापि मानुष्यकं हिंसाक्रोधवशानुगैरिदमहो जीवैः पुरा हारितम्."

The above meaning of *râdhâ* fully explains the epithet *râdhâbhedin* as applied to the renowned archer Arjuna.

रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसम्पदः सम्पन्नाः ॥

On acquiring the mountain Rohaṇa [Adam's Peak] *one acquires the wealth of gems contained in it.* This occurs in the Pratyabhijnâ-section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, page 106

(of Jîvânanda's edn.):—"परमेश्वरतालाभे हि सर्वाः सम्पदस्तन्निष्यन्द्मय्यः सम्पन्ना एव रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसंपद इव । एवं परमेश्वरतालाभे किमन्यत्प्रार्थनीयम् । तदुक्तमुत्पलाचार्यैः । 'भक्तिलक्ष्मीसमृद्धानां किमन्यदुपयाचितम् । एतया वा दरिद्राणां किमन्यदुपयाचितमिति.' " Professor Gough renders it thus:—" For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken; as if a man acquired the mountain Rohaṇa (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpalâcârya says—' What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?' "

This is noble sentiment, and should awaken a responsive echo in the heart of a follower of Christ; for, in receiving Him, he has received one in whom are " all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden,"—in whom " dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily."

वटे यक्षन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a Yakṣa in a Banyan tree.* The popular belief, based solely on the tradition of the fathers, that a Yakṣa, or goblin, lives in every Banyan tree. It is used as an illustration of ऐतिह्य ('tradition'), which some regard as a pramâṇa, but which Gautama rejects as such. See *Nyâyasûtra* 2. 2. 1. The *Nyâyasûtravivaraṇa* expounds the term thus:— "ऐतिह्यमिह वृक्षे यक्षः प्रतिवसतीति लोकप्रसिद्धिः । तत्र मूलवक्तृनिर्देशेनाप्तोक्तत्वानिश्चयेन तादृशनिश्चयस्य शाब्दबोधहेतुतया नास्य शब्दप्रमाणेऽन्तर्भावः" ॥ This is the position of the objector who maintains that tradition *is* a distinct pramâṇa; the refutation is contained in sûtra 2. In Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of Nyâya Philosophy*, Book ii, page 66, we have the following rendering of a portion of the *Nyâyasûtravṛitti*:—" A rumour (*aitihya*) is what is expressed in this way—' thus indeed people say' &c. for it is an assertion which has come from one to another, without any first assertor being indicated;—for example, 'In every Bengal fig-tree there is a

goblin,' and the like." In a foot-note to page 329 of Colebrooke's *Essays*, vol i, Professor Cowell gives to *aitihya* the meaning of "fallible testimony (as opposed to infallible *s'ruti*)", whilst Colebrooke himself, on page 427, renders it by 'tradition.' In *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 194, the nyâya is applied in the following way by the disbeliever in the existence of God:—"न च प्रसिद्धिमात्रेण युक्तमेतस्य कल्पनम् । निर्मूलत्वात्तथा चोक्तं प्रसिद्धिर्वटयक्षवत्." And, at the top of page 64, there is the following, forming the second half of a verse:—

"ऐतिह्यं तु न सत्यमत्र हि वटे यक्षोऽस्ति वा नेति वा
को जानाति कदा च केन कलितं यक्षस्य कीदृग्वपुः" ॥

In *S'lokavârtika* (page 492) we read "जगति बहु न तथ्यं नित्यमैतिह्यमुक्तं भवति तु यदि सत्यं नागमाद्भिद्यते तत्" which Mr. Gangânâtha Jhâ renders by "Much of what is known in the world as 'Tradition' is not always true; and whatever happens to be true that does not differ from 'Valid Testimony.'" Pârthasârathi's comment on this is—"पुरुषवचनपरंपरा ऐतिह्यं वटे वटे वैश्रवण इत्यादि । तच्चानिर्णायकत्वादप्रमाणमेव न भवति । तद्भावेऽप्यागमान्तर्भावात्." See, too, *Târkikarakṣâ*. page 117.

वर्चोन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *glory* [or splendour]. This forms the topic of Jaimini 3. 8. 25–27. The point discussed is whether in using the mantra "ममाग्ने वर्चो विहवेष्वस्तु," "Fire! let there be glory for me in the offerings", the officiating priest (at the new and full moon sacrifices) is to enjoy the fruit, or whether it falls to the sacrificer. The pûrvapakṣin holds the former view, but the decision is that it goes to the latter. In this adhikaraṇa there is mention of *karaṇa-mantras*, but the term is not explained. Kunte says that a karaṇa-mantra is that which regulates sacrificial operations; and that one which is merely chanted in the course of a sacrificial operation is called *akarma-karaṇa-mantra*.

विभक्तधनेषु भ्रातृषु विभक्ता भ्रातरः ॥

When brothers divide wealth they themselves become divided. This is assumed as a matter of course,—as something which goes without saying! The *Vedântakalpataru* explains as follows a passage in *Bhâmatî* 3. 3. 26:—"अवधूत इत्यादौ त्यागे धुनोतेः प्रयोगदर्शनादित्यर्थः । अश्वो यथा जीर्णानि रोमाणि विधुनुते त्यजत्येवं पापं विधूय यथा चन्द्रो राहोर्मुखात्प्रमुच्य भास्वरो भवत्येवं धूत्वा शरीरं स्वच्छो भूत्वा ब्रह्मलोकमभिसंभवामि प्राप्नोमीत्यन्वयः" ॥ On this, the *Vedânta-kalpataruparimala* (page 589) comments thus:—"अवधूतेति । लोके त्यक्तसकलकर्माणमवधूतमाहुस्तत्र धूननस्य त्यागार्थत्वं प्रसिद्धमित्यर्थः । यद्यप्यवधूतशब्दस्योक्तार्थपरतायामवधूतकर्मेति प्रयोक्तव्यं तथापि विभक्तधनेषु भ्रातृषु विभक्ता भ्रातर इतिवद्गम्यमानत्वादुत्तरपदस्याप्रयोगः" ॥

विलूननासिकस्यादर्शदर्शनम् ॥

Showing a looking-glass to a man whose nose has been cut off! An incitement to wrath! It occurs in *Prabandhacintâmaṇi*, page 291, as follows:—"प्रायः सम्प्रतिकोपाय सन्मार्गस्योपदेशनम् । विलूननासिकस्येव यद्वदादर्शदर्शनम्." "As a general rule, pointing out the right way leads to immediate wrath, as the showing of a mirror to one whose nose has been cut off." This is Mr. Tawney's rendering, and I have adopted the reading of his manuscripts in the first line. In the second line, the Mss. read विशुद्धादर्शदर्शनम्.

विश्वजिन्न्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the Vis'vajit-sacrifice.* It forms part of the great sacrifice called *Gavâm ayana* which lasts for a year; for a description of which see Dr. Eggeling's translation of *S'ata-patha-Brâhmaṇa,* vol. 2, page 427. The Vis'vajit is discussed in Jaimini 4. 3. 10-16, and 6. 7. 1-20. In the former, the question is raised of the reward which is to follow the offering of the sacrifice, since none is mentioned in the scripture prescrib-

ing it; and the decision is that in this, and in all similar cases, heaven is to be understood to be the reward. This is somewhat quaintly put by S'abara under sûtra 16:—"अनादिष्टफले कर्मणि स्वर्गः फलम्। इति प्रत्ययो लोके। एवमुच्यते। आरामकृद्देवदत्तो नियतोऽस्य स्वर्गः। तडागकृद्देवदत्तो नियतोऽस्य स्वर्ग इति। इत्थमनेन न्यायेन स्वर्गे संप्रत्ययो भवति यस्मात्स्वर्गफलेषु कर्मसु कर्तव्येषु फलवचनं नैवोच्चारयन्ति गम्यत एवेति। तस्मादप्यवगच्छाम एवंजातीयकेषु स्वर्गः फलमिति." The offerer of the Vis'vajit is required to surrender all his property to the sacrificing priests, a point which gives rise to a very curious discussion in the Sixth Book. Is he then to give away his father and mother; or, if a reigning monarch, is he to part with all the lands of his kingdom? These and many other interesting points are fully argued out by S'abara; and, for some of them, the English reader may with advantage refer to Colebrooke's Essay on the Mîmâmsâ, vol. i., page 345.

This nyâya is very frequently quoted by writers on Vedânta and Nyâya. The following are examples. *Bhâmatî*, page 86:—"न च ब्रह्मभूयादन्यदमृतत्वमार्थवादिकं किञ्चिदस्ति येन तत्काम उपासनायामधिक्रियेत, विश्वजिन्न्यायेन तु स्वर्गकल्पनायां तस्य सातिशयत्वं क्षयित्वं चेति न नित्यफलत्वमुपासनायाः"। *Vedântakalpataru*, page 430:—"सन्निहितकरणोपकारे संभवति न विश्वजिन्न्यायेन स्वर्गकल्पना नापि दर्शपूर्णमासफलस्वर्गस्यानुषङ्गः"। See, too, *Pancapâdikâvivaraṇa*, pages 134 (line 9), 137 (line 13), and 164 (line 6 from bottom). *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 524, line 13 from bottom:—"परप्रकरणपरिपठनविरहाच्च नास्य संपदादिविधिवत्प्रधानाधिकारनिवेशित्वमतो विश्वजिदधिकरणन्यायेन स्वर्गकाममधिकारिणमिह यावदुपात्तमध्यवसामस्तावदेव च न पुनरावर्तते &c." There is another good example of it in the early part of the Jaimini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*.

विषकुम्भं पयोमुखम् ॥

A bowl of poison with milk on the surface. A wolf in sheep's clothing. The illustration is found in Merutunga's work

the *Prabandhacintâmaṇi*, page 153:—"परोक्षे कार्यहन्तारं प्रत्यक्षे प्रियवादिनम् । वर्जयेत्तादृशं मित्रं विषकुंभं पयोमुखम्." "The friend who behind one's back tries to impede one's business, but in one's presence speaks kindly, such a friend one should avoid, a bowl of poison with milk on the surface." This is Mr. Tawney's rendering (on page 92), and he points out in a footnote that the verse is quoted in Böhtlingk's *Indische Sprüche*, and ascribed by him to Câṇakya.

व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिः ॥

This highly technical nyâya is found in both of Raghunâthavarman's works. I have taken it from a passage in the Bauddha section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 11 in Jîvânanda's edition), and subjoin Professor Gough's rendering (italicizing the words which represent the maxim):—"तत्र क्षणिकत्वं नीलादिक्षणानां सत्त्वेनानुमातव्यम् । यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं यथा जलधरपटलम् । सन्तश्चामी भावा इति । न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षणस्य सत्त्वस्य नीलादिक्षणानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिन्यायेन व्यापकक्रमाक्रमव्यावृत्तावक्षणिकात्सत्त्वव्यावृत्तेः सिद्धत्वाच्च."

"Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue and so forth, is to be inferred from their existence; thus, whatever *is* is momentary (or fluxional) like a bank of clouds, and all these things *are*. Nor may any one object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that *exclusion of the continent is exclusion of the contained.*" In *S'âlikâ* page 119, line 14, we find the nyâya as "व्यापकनिवृत्तिर्हि व्याप्यनिवृत्त्या व्याप्ता", and, on page 67, line 2 "व्यापकाभावे व्याप्यं नास्ति."

शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of, *the movements of a bird-catcher.* It is found in S'abara on Jaimini 9. 1. 22, as follows:—"यथा शकुनिग्राहकस्य शकुनिं जिघृक्षतश्छद्मना गतिर्भवति शनैः पदन्यासो दृष्टिप्रणिधानमशब्दकरणञ्च कथमनवबुद्धः शकुनिर्गृह्येतेति एवमिहाप्यनवबुद्धमिव ग्रहीतुं यज्ञं प्रच्छन्नगतिरुपांशुत्वं नाम। यथा शकुनिग्राहकस्य यस्मिन्देशे शनैः पदन्यासो न स तद्देशार्थोऽपि तु तद्देशाभिगतस्य शकुनेरर्थेन क्रियत एवमिहाप्युपांशुत्वं न तद्देशानां पदार्थानामर्थेन क्रियते तद्देशाभिगतस्य यज्ञस्यार्थेन गम्यते" ॥ See also भूमिरथिकन्याय.

शंखन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the time for sounding] *the conch-shell.* An offering called उपांशुयाज, or 'low-voiced offering', is performed *between* the cake-oblation to Agni and that to Agni-Soma at the full-moon, and *between* the cake-oblation to Agni and that to Indra-Agni at the new-moon (Dr. Eggeling's trans: of S'atapatha-Brâhmaṇa, vol. i. page 192). Sometimes, however, the second oblation is omitted; and then the question arises how is the Upâṁs'uyâja to be offered, since that comes *between* the two? The subject is discussed in Jaimini 10. 8. 62-70, and the above question is answered by S'abara as follows:—"यो हि द्वयोः पुरोडाशयोर्मध्य इति कालोऽवगम्यते स एव पूर्वस्मादुत्तर इति। एवं चेद्यद्यप्येकपुरोडाशायां द्वौ पुरोडाशौ न स्तस्तथापि स पूर्व आग्नेयोऽस्ति तस्मादुत्तरः स एव कालो योऽसावन्तरालेन लक्षितः। यथा 'नागवेलायामागन्तव्यं,' 'शंखवेलायामागन्तव्यं,' 'पटहवेलायामागन्तव्यं' इति यस्मिन् ग्रामे न नागा न शंखा न पटहस्तस्मिन्नपि स एव कालस्तत्र ह्यागमनं क्रियते। एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम्। तस्मादेकपुरोडाशायामुपांशुयाजः कर्तव्य इति."

The maxim might well be called शंखध्वनिवेलान्याय, but I have adopted the name given in the Nyâyamâlâvistara on this *adhikaraṇa,* which also explains it more fully:—"शंखन्यायेनोपलक्षकस्याग्नीषोमीयपुरोडाशस्यैवाभावेऽप्युपलक्ष्ये काले यागोऽस्ति। यथा शंखध्वनिवेलायां राजसेवार्थं प्रतिदिनमागन्तव्यमित्युक्ते कस्मिंश्चिद्दिने तं शंखं धमतः

पुरुषस्याभावेनोपलक्षकस्य ध्वनेरभावेऽप्युपलक्षिते तस्मिन्काले सेवकाः समागच्छन्ति तथात्रापि द्रष्टव्यम्."

This is very clear, but what is the meaning of नागवेला? To be in harmony with the rest of the sentence it ought to indicate something which, like the sounding of the *s'ankha* or the beating of the *paṭaha*, takes place regularly every day; but how can any such sense be got out of *nâga*? The S'âstradîpikâ, Nyâyamâlâvistara, and Jaiminîyasûtravṛitti ignore the expression altogether.

In Appai Dîkṣita's *Vidhirasâyaṇa*, page 22, we have an instance of the शंखन्याय as follows:— "उपलक्षणापायेऽप्युपलक्ष्यानपायस्य प्रतिदिनं शंखवेलायामागन्तव्यमित्यादौ प्रसिद्धत्वात्। न हि कालविशेषोपलक्षणतयोपात्ते शंखध्वनौ क्वचिद्दिवसे दैवादकृते सति तदुपलक्षितः कालो नास्तीति नावगम्यते."

शलभन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the moth.* The destruction of the silly moth by flying into a lighted lamp is a figure often met with in Sanskrit works; as for example in *S'is'upâlavadha* ii. 117, *Kumârasambhava* iv. 40, *Râjataranginî* vii. 375. According to Merutunga, however, the poor moth is moved with envy at the brilliance of the light, and so seeks to diminish it! He says (on page 211, at the bottom):—"उज्ज्वलगुणमभ्युदितं क्षुद्रो द्रष्टुं न कथमपि क्षमते। दग्ध्वा तनुमपि शलभो दीप्रं दीपार्चिषं हरति." "The mean man cannot anyhow endure to behold the exaltation of the man of radiant merit; the moth even burns its own body to extinguish the bright flame of the candle." (Tawney's translation, page 130).

शान्ते कर्मणि वेतालोदयः ॥

When the [prescribed] *ritual* [for the removal or prevention of evil] *is at an end, up comes a goblin!* This implies ultimate failure in spite of effort. It occurs in Citsukha Muni's

comment on *Nyâyamakaranda*, page 16, as follows:— "ननु सोऽयं शान्ते कर्मणि वेतालोदयोऽभेदं साधयितुं प्रवृत्तेन भेदश्रुतेरुदाहृतत्वात्." In *Bhâmatî*, page 93, line 17, the nyâya is quoted as "शान्तिकर्मणि वेतालोदयः", which makes the goblin appear *during the performance* of the शान्ति, the rite to avert evil. The purport, however, is the same as in the other case. In Âs'valâyana's *Gṛihyasûtra* 4. 6. 1, शान्तिकर्म is prescribed when a *guru* dies, or on the loss of a son or of cattle.

शाब्द्याकांक्षा शब्देनैव पूर्यते ॥

Verbal expectancy is satisfied [or fulfilled] *by words only.* This nyâya of Raghunâtha's is very frequently met with. It occurs in the last chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 157 of Bib. Ind. and 177 of Jîvânanda's edn.) with पूर्या as the last word; in *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 680, line 7; in Vaidyanâtha's comment on *Kâvyapradîpa*, page 232 (in the erroneous form शाब्दा साकांक्षा); in Haridâsa's vṛitti on *Kusumânjali* iii. 15 (page 35), also in Rucidatta's commentary on the same portion (page 478); and, finally, in *Sâhityadarpaṇa* ii. 18 (with प्रपूर्यते).

In paragraph 70 of the *Tarkasangraha* we are told that there are three requisites to the intelligibility of a sentence, namely, expectancy (*âkânkṣâ*), compatibility (*yogyatâ*), and juxtaposition (*sannidhi*). In para. 71, the first of these is thus explained:— "Expectancy means a word's incapacity to convey a complete meaning, this being occasioned by the absence of another word [which, when it comes as expected, will complete the construction and the sense]." Then, in para. 72, we read:— "A collection of words devoid of expectancy &c, is no instrument of right knowledge; for example, 'cow, horse, man, elephant,' gives no information, from the absence of expectancy; [the words having no reference one to another, and not looking out for one another]." This is Dr. Ballantyne's translation, accompanying the text; and the same subject is explained by him in his lucid rendering of *Sâhityadarpaṇa* i. 6.

शाल्यादिविषयस्य मुशलादेः करणस्य श्यामाकेऽभिहतिर्भवति ॥

A blow with a pestle, directed towards the rice, falls instead on the s'yâmâka grain. Aiming at a pigeon and killing a crow. It occurs in *Nyâyavârtika*, page 46:—कथं पुनरन्यविषयं करणमन्यविषयां क्रियां करोति । शाल्यादिविषयस्य मुशलादेः करणस्य श्यामाकेऽभिहतिर्भवति । नानियमादिति यद्विषयं करणं तद्विषया क्रियेति न नियमोऽस्ति । दृष्टा हि वृक्षादिविषयस्य छेदनस्यावयवक्रियेति । वृक्षश्छिद्यतेऽवयवे क्रियेति" ॥

शिबिकोद्यच्छन्नरवत् ॥

The simile of *men carrying a palanquin.* Used by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa to show how all the words in a sentence *unitedly* convey the sense of the latter. It occurs in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 397, line 12:—यथा हि बाह्यानि करणानि काष्ठादीनि पाके व्याप्रियन्ते यथा च शिबिकाया उद्यन्तारः सर्वे शिबिकामुद्यच्छन्ति यथा त्रयोऽपि ग्रावाण उखां बिभ्रति तथा सर्वाण्येव पदानि वाक्यार्थमवबोधयन्ति." Again, on page 400, line 11 from bottom:— "शिबिकोद्यच्छन्नरवत्सर्वाणि पदानि कार्यं संहत्य व्याप्रियन्ते इत्येतदपि सत्यमेव." Cf. *S'lokavârtika*, p. 529, verse 73.

शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत् ॥

The simile of *the shining-forth of a thousand lamps standing in the midst of solid rock!* It occurs in *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 2. 28, near the end:—" किंचान्यत्प्रदीपवद्विज्ञानमवभासकान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वयमेव प्रथत इति ब्रुवताप्रमाणगम्यं विज्ञानमनवगन्तृकमित्युक्तं स्यात् । शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत्." Dr. Thibaut renders it thus:—"Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to

assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves."

शुष्केष्टिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a sham-sacrifice.* That is, the performance of sacrificial ceremonies, by a pupil, with a view to his becoming proficient in them, without the offering of a real sacrifice. This is classed with भूमिरथिक in S'abara's bhâshya on Jaimini 9. 2. 13, and an extract from the passage will be found under that nyâya. The term शुष्केष्टि, as adopted in Marâṭhî, is thus explained by Molesworth:—"Dry exercise or blank practising; performance or doing, antecedently to the occasion, of a work or matter in which the performer is ignorant or inexpert (in order that the necessary knowledge or ability may be acquired in provision for occasions anticipated)."

श्रुतिबलीयस्त्वन्यायः ॥

See this explained under पाठक्रमन्याय.

श्वः कार्यमद्य कुर्वीत ॥

One should do to-day that which one intends to do tomorrow. Procrastination is dangerous. The verse containing this nyâya of Raghunâtha's occurs three times in *S'ântiparva,* namely in chapters CLXXV, CCLXXVIII, and CCCXXIII of Calcutta edition. It reads as follows:—

श्वः कार्यमद्य कुर्वीत पूर्वाह्णे चापराह्णिकम् ।
न हि प्रतीक्षते मृत्युः कृतं वास्य न वा कृतम् ॥

It is quoted in the *Prabandhacintâmaṇi,* page 111, and Mr. Tawney (on page 68 of his translation) renders it thus:—"One should do to-day the duty of tomorrow, and in the forenoon the duty of the afternoon, for death will not consider whether one has done one's work or not."

श्वपुच्छोन्नामनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the straightening of a dog's tail.* An illustration of wasted effort. It occurs in the following verse of the *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, page 448:—

न चैष शक्यते कर्तुं नम्रो यत्नशतैरपि ।
को हि स्वेदशतेनापि श्वपुच्छं नामयिष्यति ॥

See also under अरण्यरोदनन्याय in the second Handful.

श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥

Like butter that has been licked by a dog. Used of something which has become impure and therefore unacceptable. It is found in the following verse of the last chapter of the *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"फलाभिसन्धेरुपघातकत्वमभिहितं भगवद्भिर्नीलकण्ठभारतीश्रीचरणैः ।

अपि प्रयत्नसम्पन्नं कामेनोपहतं तपः ।
न तुष्टये महेशस्य श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥

Compare with this the nyâya "न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदृतौ धृतम्."

श्वा कर्णे वा पुच्छे वा छिन्ने श्वैव भवति नाश्वो न गर्दभः॥

A dog, when an ear or its tail has been cut of, is still a dog, not a horse or a donkey! This is Patanjali's illustration of the vârtika एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत्, which see above. Compare also Nâgojîbhaṭṭa's paribhâṣâ XXXVII. Akin to this illustration is Kumârila's "न हि गोर्गडुनि जाते विषाणे वा भग्ने गोत्वं तिरोधीयते," which is found in *Tantravârtika* 2. I. 34, page 418; and "न हि कवलभोजी देवदत्तोऽन्यैः सह पंक्त्यां भुञ्जानोऽन्यत्वं प्रपद्यते," on page 617.

षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the use or omission of the Ṣoḍas'istotra* [at the Atirâtra-sacrifice]. In very common use as an indication of option being allowable in regard to something. From the introduction to the third volume of Dr. Eggeling's translation of

the S'atapatha Brâhmaṇa, we learn that "the distinctive feature of the Atirâtra-sacrifice, as the name itself indicates, is an 'overnight' performance of chants and recitation...At the end of each round, libations are offered, followed by the inevitable potations of Soma-liquor...and the performance partook largely of the character of a regular nocturnal carousal." Then, as to the Ṣ'oḍas'in, he says (page XVIII)—"As regards the ceremonies preceding the night-performance, there is a difference of opinion among ritualists as to whether the Ṣ'oḍas'i-stotra is or is not a necessary element of the Atirâtra...Âs'valâyana (5. 11. 1) refers incidentally to the Ṣ'oḍas'in, as part of the Atirâtra, though it is not quite clear from the text of the sûtra whether it is meant to be a necessary or only an optional feature of that sacrifice." There can be no doubt, however, that the learned writers who use the nyâya, do certainly regard the use of that stotra as optional. For example, as illustrations of option in action, S'ankara, in his bhâṣya on sûtra 1. 1. 2 (page 37), and again on sûtra 2. 1. 27 (page 471), quotes the Vedic sentences "अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति" "नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति." Then at the close of 1. 4. 13, he says:— "अपेक्षाभेदाच्च समानेऽपि मन्त्रे ज्योतिषो ग्रहणाग्रहणे । यथा समानेऽप्यतिरात्रे वचनभेदात्षोडशिनो ग्रहणाग्रहणे तद्वत्"; and in 3. 3. 2, "न हि षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणयोरतिरात्रो भिद्यते." In his comment on 3. 3. 26 (page 893, line 5 from bottom), Ânandagiri makes use of the expression "षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणवद्विकल्पे प्राप्ते," and repeats it three lines lower down. In *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 539 (line 7 from bottom), we read "षोडशिग्रहणन्यायेन विकल्पो भविष्यति," and on page 656 (line 4), "षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणन्यायसञ्चारणे तथैव विरोधपरिहाराय विकल्पोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः." The optional character of this stotra is made use of by Laugâkṣibhâskar also, in *Arthasangraha*, page 24, from line 14.

सकृद्गतिन्यायः ॥

This is Nâgojîbhaṭṭa's shortened form of the paribhâṣâ सकृद्गतौ विप्रतिषेधे यद्बाधितं तद्बाधितमेव, which Professor Kielhorn rend-

ers thus:—"When (two rules), while they apply (simultaneously), mutually prohibit each other, that which is once superseded is superseded altogether." This is illustrated by the following from ordinary life:—"यथा तुल्यबलयोरेकः प्रेष्यो भवति स तयोः पर्यायेण कार्यं करोति यदा तमुभौ युगपत्प्रेषयतो नानादिक्षु च कार्ये तदोभयोर्न करोति यौगपद्यासंभवात्" ॥ The paribhâṣâ is found in *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 1. 56 (vârt. 25, 26, 27); 1. 4. 2 (vârt. 7); 6. 3. 42 (vârt. 5); 6. 3. 139; 6. 4. 62 (vârt. 2); 7. 1. 26; 7. 1. 54; and 7. 1. 73. The illustration is met with in 1. 4. 2 (vârt. 5), and 6. 1. 85 (vârt. 3).

सत्रन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a sacrificial session.* For this kind of sacrifice, lasting several days, not less than seventeen sacrificers are absolutely necessary. But what if one of them should leave or die before the completion of the ceremony? In such a case he *must* be replaced by a substitute, or the whole thing becomes null and void. This, however, cannot be done when there is only one sacrificer engaged in a sacrifice. This nyâya is the subject of Jaimini 6. 3. 22. In sûtras 23 to 26 it is laid down that the substitute does not reap the benefit of the sacrifice,—but that it goes to the man whose place he has taken. It is very clear, from the above, that the mention of the सत्रन्याय on page 430, line 5 of *Vedântakalpataru,* is wrong, and that the reference is really to the रात्रिसत्रन्याय which see above.

संदिग्धस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णयः ॥

The meaning of an ambiguous expression is to be determined from the context. In *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 1. 3. 14 there is a discussion as to the meaning of the 'small ether' of Chhândogya Upaniṣad 8. 1. 1, and Ânandagiri makes the following comment on the closing part of it:—"समुच्चयेति । संदिग्धस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णय इति न्यायादादौ तस्मिन्यदन्तरिति तच्छब्दोऽनन्तरमप्याकाशमभिलंघ्य हृत्पुण्डरीकं परामृशति तत्र यदन्तराकाशं तदन्वेष्टव्यं विजिज्ञासितव्यं चेत्युपसंहरति." The nyâya is quoted again in his ṭikâ on 3. 3. 52. It is taken

from Jaimini's sûtra 1. 4. 29, "संदिग्धेषु वाक्यशेषात्," which is quoted and applied by the author of the *S'âstradîpikâ*, in his discussion, under 1. 3. 8, of such words as यव, वराह, पीलु and others, to which the Âryas attach one meaning and the Mlecchas another. We find it, too, in Kumârila's lengthy exposition of the same portion, in the words:—"संदिग्धेषु च सर्वेषु वाक्यशेषेण निर्णयम्" (page 148); and again under 3. 4. 36 (page 1003):—"संदिग्धं वाक्यशेषेण निर्णयमवधारितम् । विध्युद्देशेन निर्णीते किं तु शेषः करिष्यति." See also *Bhâmatî* 3. 3. 34 (page 641).

समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः ॥

For this paribhâṣâ, see under गर्गशतदण्डनन्याय.

संभवत्येकवाक्यत्वे वाक्यभेदश्च नेष्यते ॥

When a sentence can suitably be regarded as one, it is not right to divide it. This oft-quoted line of Kumârila's was directed against an older writer, named Bhavadâsa (so Pârthasârathi tells us), who proposed to divide Jaimini's sûtra 1. 1. 4 into two parts. The line is found in *S'lokavârtika*, page 135. It is quoted in *Bhâmatî* 1. 1. 28 (page 159), 1. 3. 13 (page 206), 1. 4. 3 (page 286), 1. 4. 16 (page 308), 3. 3. 57 (page 668), and 3. 4. 20 (page 678). In Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtrâbhâṣya* 1. 2. 15, we read—"वक्तृभेदेऽप्येकवाक्यता साकांक्षत्वात्पूर्वोत्तरवाक्ययोरेकार्थत्वं वाक्यैक्यसंभवे तद्भेदस्यायोगादित्यर्थः", and, in the latter part of the bhâṣya on 1. 4. 3, S'ankara himself has a good deal to say on एकवाक्यता. Then Ânandagiri quotes the nyâya in his comment on 2. 3. 2 and 3. 3. 14.

सर्वं बलवतः पथ्यम् ॥

Everything is suitable [or proper] *for the strong.* "Might is right." The idea seems to be that the strong may be lawless with impunity! This doctrine is clearly laid down in *Bhâgavata Purâṇa* x. 33. 30, 31:—"धर्मव्यतिक्रमो दृष्ट ईश्वराणां च साहसम् ।

तेजीयसां न दोषाय वह्नेः सर्वभुजो यथा ॥ नैतत्समाचरेज्जातु मनसापि ह्यनीश्वरः । विनश्यत्याचरन्मौढ्याद्यथारुद्रोऽब्धिजं विषम्." Kumârila employs the saying in *Tantravârtika,* page 134, as follows:—"तेन विश्वामित्रस्यापि यद्रागद्वेषपूर्वकमपि तपोबलारूढस्य चरितं तत्सर्वं बलवतः पथ्यमित्यनेन न्यायेन महान्ति च तपांसि कृत्वा तानि क्षयं नयत उत्तरकालं वा पापविशुद्धिं प्रायश्चित्तैः प्रतिकुर्वाणस्य जीर्यत्यपि मन्दतपसां गजैरिव महावटकाष्ठादिभक्षणमात्मविनाशायैव स्यात्."

सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययमेकं कर्म ॥

All the different schools of a Veda acknowledge one and the same sacrificial action. The followers of the Mîmâmsâ evidently regard this as an important point, for Jaimini devotes 25 sûtras, viz. 2. 4. 8–32, to the discussion of it. Kunte's remarks on the bearings of the question, in his *Saddars'anacintanikâ,* are worthy of perusal. The nyâya is frequently quoted in the philosophical works. Instances of it will be found in *Tantravârtika,* page 84, line 7; in *Pancapâdikâvivarana,* page 167, line 3 from bottom; in *Nyâyamanjarî,* page 256, line 16; in *Vivaranaprameyasangraha,* page 169, line 17; and in *Srîbhâsya* 3. 3. 53. Raghunâthavarman makes use of the nyâya but does not include it in his numbered list.

साकमेधीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim *relating to the Sâkamedha offerings.* This is the topic of Jaimini 5. 1. 19-22. The group of offerings called *Sâkam-edhâh* form the third of the three seasonal, or four-monthly (câturmâsya), sacrifices which are performed at the *parvans* (or commencement of the spring, rainy, and autumn seasons), and which, in this case, last for two days; three of the group (consisting of seven) being offered on the first day, and the remainder on the second day. An objector urges that two days are required for each of the group, but this is set aside, and the ruling is as above. For a full description of these four-monthly sacrifices, see Dr. Eggeling's translation of the *S'atapatha-Brâhmana,* vol i. pages 383 and 408.

साक्षः पुरुषः परेण चेन्नीयते नूनमक्षिभ्यां न पश्यति ॥

If a man with eyes is led by somebody else, it is clear that he does not see with his eyes! This is found in S'abara on Jaimini 1. 2. 31, and is used by an objector to illustrate his argument that it is not necessary to understand the meaning of Vedic sentences employed in sacrificial rites, since the way in which they are to be used is clearly laid down in works prepared for the purpose. The illustration is quoted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 286, line 12.

सामान्यविधिरस्पष्टः ॥

An injunction in general terms is indefinite. This appears as a maxim in the second part of the *Laukikanyâyaratnâkara* (I. O. MS, page 319 *a*), where Raghunâtha applies it thus:— "लोके कंचिद्देशं जिगमिषुं प्रति तत्रत्यानि वस्तून्यानेयानीति सामान्यतो विधायेदमानेयमिदमानेयमिति स्पष्टीक्रियते." It is doubtless derived from the following verse in *Tantravârtika* 3. 4. 47 (page 1020):—

"सामान्यविधिरस्पष्टः संह्रियेत विशेषतः ।
स्पष्टस्य तु विधेर्नान्यैरुपसंहारसंभवः" ॥

This verse is found in *Vedântakalpataruparimala* (page 253), where the second line reads "स्पष्टस्य तु विधेर्नैवमुपसंहार इष्यते," and the first line is quoted by the author of the *Nyâyasudhâ* in his comment on *Tantravârtika* 1. 2. 42 which defines the term परिसंख्या ('limitation', or 'exclusive specification', as Dr. Thibaut and M. M. Kunte respectively render it).

The lack of definiteness in general statements is alluded to by S'abara, also, on Jaimini 10. 8. 16, where he says "न हि सामान्यवाची शब्दो विशेषानभिवदति," but Kumârila points out (on page 1027) that the विशेष requires the सामान्य. He says:— "न तु निःसामान्यः कश्चिद्विशेष उपपद्यते । ततश्च वृक्षमानयेत्युक्ते शिंशपामित्यविरोधात्पश्चादुच्यमानं न विरुध्यते."

सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशो बलीयान् ॥

That [injunction] *which leaves no room* [for others] *is stronger than one which does.* For example, an injunction directing animal sacrifice, and which leaves no room for option, overpowers the more general one forbidding the taking of life. In this way one Smṛiti may prevail over another. The nyâya is found in Raghunâtha's list, and is applied by him as follows:—"न चानुभवेन श्रुतेर्बाधः शक्यः श्रुतेर्निरवकाशत्वात् । निरवकाशस्य च सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशो बलीयानिति न्यायाद्बाधकत्वोपपत्तेः" ॥ A reference to *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 1. 1 will fully explain the two terms of this expression. In his comment on it Ânandagiri quotes the nyâya twice, and again under 2. 1. 4, 6, and 13. In immediate connection with the first of the five, Ânandagiri quotes also the nyâya "सापेक्षनिरपेक्षयोर्निरपेक्षस्य बलवत्त्वम्", and the two occur together in the following verses of Yâmunâcârya's *Âgamaprâmâṇya*, page 63:—"सापेक्षनिरपेक्षत्वे न हि बाधस्य कारणम् । शुक्तौ रजतबोधस्य निरपेक्षस्य बाधकम् ॥ नेदं रजतविज्ञानं तत्सापेक्षमपीष्यते । सेयं ज्वालेति संवित्तेस्तैलवर्तिविनाशजा ॥ अनुमा बाधिका दृष्टा सापेक्षाप्यक्षजन्मनः । अतो निरवकाशेन सावकाशं निषिध्यते" ॥

सिंहस्यैकपदं यथा ॥

Like a lion's first step. This obscure nyâya occurs in Merutunga's work, page 278:—"विचार्याविचार्य वा कृतप्रयाणोऽयं महानरेन्द्रश्चालितः । सिंहस्यैकपदं यथेति न्यायाच्चलित एव राजते." Mr. Tawney renders it thus (on page 174):—"Whether with due consideration or not, this great king has been set in motion, and has started on his expedition; on the principle of the lion's first step, he cuts a good figure on the march." Does the illustration mean that a lion in motion presents a finer appearance than one at rest?

सिकताकूपवत् ॥

The simile of *a well* [dug] *in sandy soil* [the sides of which

are incessantly falling in]. Used of an argument that will not hold water. It is found in *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 2. 32:—"किं बहुना सर्वप्रकारेण यथा यथायं वैनाशिकसमय उपपत्तिमत्त्वाय परीक्ष्यते तथा तथा सिकताकूपवद्विदीर्यत एव। न कांचिदत्रोपपत्तिं पश्यामः"॥

सिकतातैलन्यायः॥

The maxim of *oil from sand.* A non-entity like a hare's horn. The following is from Bhartṛihari's *Nîtis'ataka* (verse 5):—

"लभेत सिकतासु तैलमपि यत्नतः पीडयन्
पिबेच्च मृगतृष्णिकासु सलिलं पिपासार्दितः।
कदाचिदपि पर्यटञ्छशविषाणमासादये-
न्न तु प्रतिनिविष्टमूर्खजनचित्तमाराधयेत्" ॥

In *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 1. 16, we read:—"यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्तते न तत्तत उत्पद्यते यथा सिकताभ्यस्तैलम्." Compare with this, *Yogavâsiṣṭha* 2. 5. 23, "न यत्नेनापि महता प्राप्यते रत्नमश्मतः", where तैलमश्मतः is given as a variant. American rock-oil was not known in those days! There are two good examples of this illustration in *Nyâyamanjarî*. On page 493, line 1:—तैलार्थी हि तिलसर्षपानुपादत्ते न सिकताः। असत्त्वे च तैलस्य को विशेषः सर्षपाणां सिकताभ्यः" ॥ On page 494:—"तैलार्थी सिकताः कश्चिदाददानो न दृश्यते। अदृष्ट्वा चाद्य नान्योऽपि तदर्थी तासु धावति."

सूक्तवाकन्यायः॥

The maxim of *the Sûktavâka* [or song of praise]. This is the topic of Jaimini 3. 2. 15-18, and immediately follows the *Prastara-praharaṇanyâya* with which it is closely connected. Both form a part of the New and Full Moon sacrifices in connection with which there is the direction "सूक्तवाकेन प्रस्तरं प्रहरति." The question then arises as to whether the whole of the mantras which comprise the Sûktavâka are to be repeated on each of the two occasions, or only a part. S'abara's argument is thus paraphrased by Kunte:—"Though the Veda mentions positively

that certain mantras are to be used in certain sacrifices, yet they are not to be so used blindly. The mantra which serves some purpose of a sacrifice is to be used. Though the Veda prescribes the use of the whole mantra, yet it is not to be obstinately maintained that the whole is to be recited. A whole mantra like the Sûktavâka, or a part only, is to be recited according as it is necessary. This is to be ascertained by the sacrificer himself. Hence it cannot be said that the whole Sûktavâka is to be recited on the occasion either of the new or of the full moon day." Again:—"That portion of the Sûktavâka which is recited at the new or full moon sacrifice is the whole of it in reference to the sacrifice itself; because the Veda never prescribes a certain text as constituting the Sûktavâka, and because the Veda simply states that the Sûktavâka is to be recited... The Sûktavâka is not one text only, but is composed of different texts. The principal god connected with a sacrifice is mentioned in the middle of the Sûktavâka, while something connected with the sacrifice to be performed is described at its beginning and end......All that is sought is the accomplishment of the new or full moon sacrifice. Hence there is no necessity for discussing whether the whole Sûktavâka or a portion of it is to be recited; because whatever mantras are sufficient to accomplish a sacrifice constitute the whole Sûktavâka so far as the sacrifice is concerned."

सूत्रशाटिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the thread* [about to be woven into a] *garment* [and already regarded as a garment]. Raghunâtha explains it thus:—"यत्र तु भाविसंज्ञया निर्देशो यथा नारुद्रो वसेत्काश्यामित्यत्र तत्र सूत्रशाटिकान्यायावतारः । सूत्रस्य शाटिकां वापयतीत्यत्र यथा सूत्रावस्थायां भाविन्या शाटिकेतिसंज्ञया निर्देशस्तथा दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपीति बोध्यम्."

It is no doubt derived from the following passage in the *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 3. 12 (vârtika 2):—"आत्मनेपदेषु चापि नेतरेतराश्रयं भवति । कथम् । भाविनी संज्ञा विज्ञास्यते सूत्रशाटकवत् । तद्यथा । कश्चित्कंचित्तन्तुवायमाह अस्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वयेति । स पश्यति यदि शाटको न वात-

व्योऽथ वातव्यो न शाटकः शाटको वातव्यश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । भाविनी खल्वस्य संज्ञाभिप्रेता स मन्ये वातव्यो यस्मिन्नुते शाटक इत्येतद्भवतीति." This is repeated in 2. 1. 51 (vârtika 4). Kumârila employs the illustration in *Tantravârtika* 3. 7. 33 (page 1145):—"यथैवास्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वयेत्युक्ते वानेन शाटकः क्रियत इति हि भाविसंज्ञाविज्ञानादविरोधो विज्ञायते तथैवात्र प्रत्येतव्यम्." See Addenda.

सोपानत्के पादे द्वितीयामुपानहमशक्यत्वान्नोपादत्ते ॥

A man does not [attempt to] *put a second shoe on a foot already shod, for it would be an impossibility.* This is found in the bhâṣya on Jaimini 1. 2. 33, where the *pûrvapakshin* objects to certain Vedic texts as unnecessarily setting forth things already known.

स्थावरजङ्गमविषन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *vegetable* [or mineral] *poison and animal poison* [जङ्गमविष]. An illustration of one thing being counteracted by another. In his smaller work Raghunâthavarman places this amongst the purely grammatical nyâyas, immediately after the पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वन्याय, and describes it as follows:—"स्थावरजङ्गमविषन्यायश्चेह बोध्यः । रजतादिज्ञानतद्बाधज्ञानयोः सर्पवत्सनाभादिरूपजङ्गमस्थावरविषयोश्चोत्तरेण पूर्वबाधः प्रसिद्धो यथा तथा प्रकृतेऽपि." ॥ In the larger work, it stands amongst miscellaneous maxims, near the end of the *uttarabhâga*, and is numbered 242. I extract from it the following:—"स्थावरेण वत्सनाभादिविषेण जङ्गमस्य सर्पविषादेर्बाधो जङ्गमेन च स्थावरस्येति प्रसिद्धम् । सामान्येन परस्परबाध्यबाधकभावविवक्षायां सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायविषयेऽस्य प्रवृत्तिः । पूर्वं निवर्त्यान्यस्य स्वयमेव निवृत्तौ विवक्षितायां दग्धेन्धनवह्निन्यायविषयेऽस्यावतरणम् । परेण पूर्वबाधमात्रविवक्षायां पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वन्यायस्येति बोध्यम् । अपच्छेदन्यायस्त्वस्पष्टमुदाहरणमुभयत्रानियतपूर्वापरीभावेनानियतबाध्यबाधकभावात्" ॥

An example of animal poison proving an antidote to the other kind is found in *Âdiparva*, chap. CXXVIII (Calc.). The wicked Duryodhana mixed some *kâlakûṭaka* in Bhîma's food,

and, when he had eaten it and become unconscious, threw him into the water. The story then continues thus:—"स निःसंज्ञो जलस्यान्तमथ वै पाण्डवोऽविशत्। आक्रामन्नागभवने तदा नागकुमारकान्॥ ततः समेत्य बहुभिस्तदा नागैर्महाविषैः। अदश्यत भृशं भीमो महादंष्ट्रैर्विषोल्बणैः॥ ततोऽस्य दश्यमानस्य तद्विषं कालकूटकम्। हतं सर्पविषेणैव स्थावरं जङ्गमेन तु" ॥

स्वाङ्गुलिज्वालया परं दिधक्षुः स परं दहेद्वा न वा स्वाङ्गुलिदाहमनुभवति ॥

A man who tries to burn his enemy by setting fire to his own fingers, may or may not burn the enemy but certainly burns his own fingers! This occurs in *Nyâyavârtika* 2. 1. 12 in reference to a person who denies the validity of Proof. Sûtras 8 and 12, as translated by Dr. Ballantyne, are as follows:—"[Perhaps some one will say] the nature of a Proof does not belong to sense &c, for it cannot be so at any of the three times [into which Time is divided]." "[If there be no such thing as Proof] because [forsooth] nothing can be such at any of the three times, then the objection itself cannot be established." On this the author of the vârtika says:—"यत्खलु त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न साधकं तदसाधनमिति ब्रुवता प्रतिषेधस्यासाधकत्वं स्ववाचैवाभ्युपगतं भवति। यथा कश्चित्स्वाङ्गुलिज्वालया परं दिधक्षुः स च परं दहेद्वा न वा स्वाङ्गुलिदाहमनुभवति."

स्वेदजनिमित्तेन शाटकत्यागन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *throwing away a garment because of a louse in it!* It occurs in *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ* (page 160, line 10):—"यतोऽहमनन्तापत्यापि दुर्जनचक्षुर्दोषभयादविवेकादिभिर्मन्त्रिभिर्वन्ध्येति प्रख्यापिता लोके ममैवापत्यान्यन्यजनापत्यतया गीयन्ते। सोऽयं स्वेदजनिमित्तेन शाटकत्यागन्यायः" ॥

ADDENDA

Containing additions to the foregoing, and several new Nyâyas.

ADDENDA.

अक्षिपात्रन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the eyeball*. An illustration of *extreme sensitiveness*—in persons or things. The following from *Yogabhâṣya* ii. 15 (page 78) is an example of its application to a person:— "एवमिदमनादिदुःखस्रोतो विप्रसृतं योगिनमेव प्रतिकूलात्मकत्वादुद्वेजयति । कस्मात् । अक्षिपात्रकल्पो हि विद्वानिति । यथोर्णातन्तुरक्षिपात्रे न्यस्तः स्पर्शेन दुःखयति न चान्येषु गात्रावयवेष्वेवमेतानि दुःखान्यक्षिपात्रकल्पं योगिनमेव क्लिश्नन्ति नेतरं प्रतिपत्तारम्." This is very well put, also, in the *Maṇîprabhâ* on the same sûtra. See, too, *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 442, line 8. The word अक्षिपात्र is not in any of our dictionaries. In the *Yogavârtika* it is defined thus:—"अक्ष्णः पात्रेणाधारेण गोलकेन तुल्यो विद्वानिति."

अङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैव &c. ॥

The following verse is found in *Prakaraṇapancikâ*, page 63:—

अङ्गुल्यग्रं यथात्मानं नात्मना स्प्रष्टुमर्हति ।
स्वांशेन ज्ञानमप्येवं नात्मानं ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥

See also *Nyâyamakaranda*, pages 131, 183, and *S'rîbhâṣya*, page 169.

अदित्सोर्वणिजः प्रतिदिनं पत्रलिखितश्वस्तनदिनभणनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the merchant who was unwilling to give, and who wrote every day saying that he would give on the morrow!* It occurs in the following passage of Malliṣeṇa's *Syâdvâdamanjarî* (page 128):—"सौगताः किलेत्थं प्रमाणयन्ति सर्वं सत्क्षणिकं यतः सर्वं तावद्घटादिकं वस्तु मुद्गरसन्निधौ नाशं गच्छद्दृश्यते। तत्र येन स्वरूपेणान्त्यावस्थायां

घटादिकं विनश्यति तच्चैतत्स्वरूपमुत्पन्नमात्रस्य विद्यते। तदानीमुत्पादानन्तरमेव तेन नष्टव्यमिति व्यक्तमस्य क्षणिकत्वम्। अथेदृश एव स्वभावस्तस्य हेतुतो जातो यत्कियन्तमपि कालं स्थित्वा विनश्यति। एवं तर्हि मुद्गरादिसन्निधानेऽपि एष एव तस्य स्वभाव इति पुनरप्यनेन तावन्तमेव कालं स्थातव्यमिति नैवं विनश्येदिति सोऽयमदित्सोर्वणिजः प्रतिदिनं पत्रलिखितश्वस्तनदिनभणनन्यायः" ॥ Those who, in an Indian cantonment, have ever undertaken the thankless task of the collection of *promised* subscriptions to a fund, are very familiar with the "*kal âo*", or "*parsoñ ke din âo*", with which their messenger is often greeted, with perhaps stronger language superadded! Human nature is much the same everywhere. Compare *Proverbs* iii. 28.

अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

For an example of the three other kinds of siddhânta, see *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 36, lines 16–27.

अनधीते महाभाष्ये व्यर्था स्यात्पदमञ्जरी। अधीतेऽपि महाभाष्ये व्यर्था सा पदमञ्जरी ॥

The Padamanjarî would be of no use to one who had not read the Mahâbhâṣya, and would be equally useless [because unnecessary] *if the latter had been read!* This is used by Raghunâtha to illustrate the position of the Gâṇapatas who regard the worship of Gaṇapati as essential and all-inclusive. A portion of the argument is as follows:—"अतः श्रेयकामैः सर्वैरपि स एवाराध्यः। तत्पूजां विनान्यपूजाया वैयर्थ्यस्मरणेन फलजनकत्वायोगात्। अवश्यापेक्षितानपेक्षितयोरपेक्षितं स्मरणीयमिति न्यायेन कृताकृतप्रसङ्गी यो विधिः स नित्य इति न्यायेन च तदाराधनस्यावश्यकत्वात्। कृते च तस्मिन्विद्यार्थी लभते विद्यां धनार्थी लभते धनम्। पुत्रार्थी लभते पुत्रान्मोक्षार्थी परमं पदमित्यादिवचनेभ्यः सर्वेष्टलाभसंभवेनानधीते महाभाष्ये व्यर्था स्यात्पदमञ्जरी। अधीतेऽपि महाभाष्ये व्यर्था सा पदमञ्जरीति न्यायेनान्याराधने प्रयोजनाभावात्." The second nyâya quoted here is a slight modification of Nâgojî's *paribhâṣâ* XLII, "कृताकृतप्रसङ्गि नित्यं तद्विपरीतमनित्यम्." Jayanta

Bhaṭṭa has several verses of the same type as that regarding the Padamanjarî. They will be found on pages 29, 39, 55, 61, 182, 447, and 448 of his *Nyâyamanjarî.* I quote that on page 182 as a sample:—

कार्यं चेदवगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ।
कार्यं चेन्नावगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ॥

अनिषिद्धमनुमतम् ॥

That which is not objected to is agreed to. "Silence gives consent." It occurs in *Pari'siṣṭaparvan* vii. 36:—

एतस्याः संप्रदानं च श्रुत्वा संसोढवानसि ।
अनिषिद्धं ह्यनुमतमिति न्यायोऽपि वर्तते ॥

अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

The principle of *an implied axiom* [or, dogmatic corollary]. This is taken from *Nyâyasûtra* 1. 1. 31 which Dr. Ballantyne rendered as follows:—"A 'dogmatic corollary' is the mention of a particular fact in regard to anything, not expressly declared in an aphorism, [our knowledge of the fact coming so immediately] from what *is* recognized [by the maker of the aphorisms, as to render a demonstration superfluous—the fact being thus entitled to rank not as a deduction but as a dogma]." The nyâya is applied by Udayana in *Kiraṇâvalî*, page 20, line 4 from bottom. See also under अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्याय.

अयमपरो गण्डस्योपरि स्फोटः ॥

Here is another boil on the top of a previous one! An illustration of difficulty upon difficulty; trouble upon trouble. It occurs in *Bhâmatî* 2. 2. 37 as follows:—"नहीश्वराधीना जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण कपूयं कर्म कर्तुमर्हन्ति । तदनधिष्ठितं वा कपूयं कर्म फलं प्रसोतुमुत्सहते । तस्मात्स्वतन्त्रोऽपीश्वरः कर्मभिः प्रवर्त्यत इति दृष्टविपरीतं कल्पनीयम् । तथा चायमपरो गण्डस्योपरि स्फोट इतरेतराश्रयः प्रसज्येत कर्मणेश्वरः प्रवर्तनीय ईश्वरेण च कर्मेति." In the same form it is put into the mouth of Râk-

sasa in *Mudrârâkṣasa* v (page 220). The oldest examples, however, are in Prâkṛit. In the opening part of *Sakuntalâ* ii. we find it as "तदो गण्डस्स उवरि पिण्डिआ संवुत्ता" (or, in Dr. Pischel's edtion, "जदो गण्डस्स उवरि विप्फोडओ संवुत्तो"); and, in *Viddhas'âlabhanjikâ* i. (page 12), as "अवरो गण्डस्स उवरि पिण्ठओ संवुत्तो."

अरुणैकहायनीन्यायः ॥

There is a long discussion on this nyâya in Râmânuja's *S'rîbhâṣya* 1. 1. 13, commencing on page 813 of the Benares edition. See Dr. Thibaut's translation, page 222.

अवयवप्रसिद्धेः &c. ॥

I have met with another reference to this paribhâṣâ in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 150, line 12:—"अत्र च घ्राणादिशब्दाः पंकजादिपदवदवयवार्थं निमित्तीकृत्य क्वचित्क्वचित्सामान्यविशेषे वर्तन्ते अवयवार्थस्य प्रतीयमानस्यासति बाधके परित्यागायोगात्। अश्वकर्णादौ वृक्षविशेषवाचके वाजिकर्णायोगेन बाधकेनावयवार्थपरित्यागात्." See also *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 385, line 10; and page 534, line 15.

अश्वारूढाः &c ॥

Kumârila's simile is adopted by S'âlikanâtha in *Prakaraṇapuncikâ*, page 16, verse 41:—"नन्वेवं तुरगारूढस्तुरङ्गं विस्मृतो भवान्। वेदप्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थमुत्थितस्तत्प्रहीणवान्." This is what Mallinâtha quoted, and not directly from Kumârila. He and Varadarâja, between them, quote the *S'âlikâ* (generally by name) ten times. Under sûtra 10. 8. 4. S'abara has a hit at Kâtyâyana, just as Kumârila has here at Patanjali After quoting vârtika 9 of *Mahâbhâṣya* 7. 1. 96, and Pâṇini 2. 1. 11 which contradicts it, he says "सद्वादित्वाच्च पाणिनेर्वचनं प्रमाणमसद्वादित्वान्न कात्यायनस्य। असद्वादी हि विद्यमानमपि अनुपलभ्य ब्रूयात्." On the other hand, Patanjali's opinion of grammarians may be seen from his remarks under 6. 3. 109. The whole passage is worth reading.

अहृदयवचसामहृदयमुत्तरम् ॥

Heartless words get heartless answer. Like receives like. This occurs in *Vedântatattvaviveka*, (The Paṇḍit for May 1903), page 14, line 4 from bottom:—"तत्र चाहृदयवचसामहृदयमुत्तरमिति न्यायेन सदन्यत्वं प्रपञ्चस्योक्तं न तु तत्त्वाभिप्रायेण." In the *Tâtparya-ṭîkâ*, this is combined with "यादृशो यक्षस्तादृशो बलिः", and the passage will be found under that nyâya in the second Handful.

आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां &c. ॥

The verse immediately preceding that quoted from the *Sambandhavârtika* is the following:—"न तु यादृच्छिकी सिद्धिर्वक्तव्येह विपश्चिता । दैवगोचर एवैष न तु मानुषगोचरः" ॥ The two verses are rendered as follows in a translation (by a Vakil of the Madras High Court) now appearing in The Paṇḍit:—"A wise man ought not to speak of success as depending on mere accident. Such a thing would be within the scope, not of human effort, but of destiny. It cannot be said that it is also within the scope of human effort, on the principle that injunction implies endeavour; for there is no injunction (*âkhyâta*) to that effect." According to this, आख्यात=विधि.

आषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठा ।

When a breeze is blowing in the month Âshâḍha, and the lordly elephant is roaming about, the sea is the only refuge for the donkey! Raghunâtha's explanation of this nyâya is as follows:—"याभिर्युक्तिभिरतिप्रबलशुष्कतर्ककर्कशत्वेन प्रसिद्धोऽपि द्वैतसत्यत्ववादी वैशेषिकादिर्जय्यस्ताभिरितरे क्षुद्राश्चार्वाकादयस्तु दूरतो निरस्ता भवन्तीति विवक्षायामाषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठेति न्यायप्रवृत्तिः । चलतीति सप्तम्यन्तं पदं देहलीदीपन्यायेनोभयत्र संबध्यते । चक्रीवान् गर्दभः । स्पष्टमन्यत्" ॥

I shall be glad if any one can give a reference to the nyâya. It has never crossed my path.

इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटी ॥

On one side a tiger, on the other a precipice! A serious dilemma! There is a good example in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* iii. 166:—"कुटुम्बमपि मे प्रेयः प्रेयांस्त्वमपि हे सखे। किं करोमि द्विधाचित्त इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटी." Another is found in *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, page 151:—"अवास्तवत्वग्राहकं प्रमाणं सांवृतमसांवृतं वा स्यात्। यदि सांवृतं कथं तस्मादवास्तवाद्वास्तवस्य शून्यवादस्य सिद्धिः प्राप्ता। तथा च वास्तव एव समस्तोऽपि प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारः। अथ तद्ग्राहकं प्रमाणं स्वयमसांवृतं तर्हि क्षीणाः प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारा वास्तवत्वप्रतिज्ञातेनैव व्यभिचारात्। तदेवं पक्षद्वयेऽपीतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटीति न्यायेन व्यक्त एव परमार्थतः स्वाभिमतसिद्धिविरोधः" ॥ I presume that this is the व्याघ्रदुस्तटीन्याय which Professor Jacobi, the present editor of the *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, tells me that he has met with in a portion of that work not yet published.

उदरे भृते कोशो भृतः ॥

When his stomach is full his coffers are full. Used of a lazy fellow who has no ambition beyond his daily food. "Whose god is his belly." It occurs in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* iii. 113:—"दारिद्र्येण मदीयेन बिभर्ष्युदरमप्यदः। उदरे च भृते कोशो भृत इत्येव मन्यसे."

उभयतःपाशा रज्जुः ॥

A much older instance is found in *Tantravârtika* 3. 6. 42 (page 1113):—"यद्यपि न बाधस्तथापि विकल्पस्तावत्प्राप्नोति न हि तुल्यार्थानां क्वचित्समुच्चयो दृष्टः सेयमुभयतःपाशा रज्जुः" ॥ There is another good example in *Nyâyamanjarî* page 436, line 16; and in *Khaṇḍana*, page 710, we read "उभयतःपाशबन्धः कथं मोचनीयः" ॥

एकसंबन्धिदर्शने &c. ॥

Without mentioning the nyâya, Vâcaspatimis'ra has the fol-

lowing in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 167:—"हस्तिनं दृष्ट्वा तत्संबन्धिनौ स्थूणाहस्तिपकौ स्मरति."

कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम् ॥

The idea that the *kalas'a* is an earthen vessel, would seem to be a mistake. In a footnote to page 73 of his translation of *Prabandhacintâmaṇi*, Mr. Tawney says:—"Dr. Burgess informs me that *kalas'a* is really the finial of the spire, which is shaped like a vase or urn." Then, on page 135, there is the following footnote:—"Mr. Cousens writes in a letter, which Dr. Burgess has kindly shown me, 'I understand that the term *kalas'adaṇḍapratiṣṭhâ* refers solely to the setting up of the *kalas'a* or pot-finial, the *daṇḍa* being the pole or stick which supports the finial and upon which it is set up. With a small *kalas'a* made solid, it would not be required, the neck of the same taking its place, but it is always required with the larger and more complex *kalas'as*, especially those made of hollow metal." Frequent mention is made by Merutunga of the erection of a कलश and ध्वज as the completion of a temple. The two are mentioned on pages 119 and 211, whilst on pages 219 and 222 we have the कलशदण्डप्रतिष्ठा referred to above. On pages 120 and 224, the कलश is mentioned alone. In Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* i. 14, we find कुंभ for कलश:—"तत्र चैत्येषु सौवर्णध्वजकुम्भमरीचयः". For the benefit of the uninitiated I may mention that the finial is defined as "the bunch of foliage &c, at the termination of the pinnacles, gables, spires &c, in Gothic architecture."

काकाधिकरणन्यायः ॥

Another useful example will be found in *Khaṇḍana*, page 502.

काचिन्निषादी पुत्रं प्रसूते कश्चिन्निषादस्तु कषायपायी ॥

A Niṣâdî gives birth to a son, and a Niṣâda drinks the

decoction of herbs [prepared for her]! For the context of this आभाणक see under "मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते."

क्रोष्टः क च नीराजना ॥

What connection has a camel with the lustration of arms? None at all; and the phrase is used to indicate that certain things are not connected. The नीराजनाविधि (as described in chapter 267 of the Agni Purâṇa) was a ceremony performed by kings or generals before going forth to battle, and consisted of the purification of the component parts of the army, including that of the horses, the elephants, and the weapons. The वाजिनीराजनाविधि is mentioned in *Raghuvams'a* iv. 25, on which Mallinâtha remarks:—"वाजिग्रहणं गजादीनामप्युपलक्षणं तेषामपि नीराजनाविधानात्." The illustration appears in *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, page 522:—"नद्यादिवस्तुभेदार्थं कथितं मे कथानकम् । त्वयेदं तत्र मे भाति क्रोष्टो नीराजना क च" ॥

क्षते क्षारमिव ॥

Like salt on a wound. "क्षारं क्षते क्षिप् has become proverbial, and means 'to aggravate the pain which is already unbearable,' 'to make bad worse,' 'to add insult to injury.'" (Âpṭe's Dictionary). He cites *Uttararâmacarita* iv. 7:—"य एव मे जनः पूर्वमासीन्मूर्तो महोत्सवः । क्षते क्षारमिवासह्यं जातं तस्यैव दर्शनम्." Also *Mṛicchakaṭika* V. 18. I have met with it again in *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, page 5, verse 42:—"कथां कामार्थयोस्तस्मान्न कुर्वीत कदाचन । कः क्षते क्षारनिक्षेपं विदधीत विचक्षणः" ॥

गोदोहनन्यायः ॥

For the mantra regarding the use of this pail, see S'abara and *Nyâyamâlâvistara* on Jaimini 4. 1. 2. Other references to the nyâya are *Tantravârtika* 3. 6. 43 (page 1118); and *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 166, line 4, in connection with which a verse is quoted from *S'lokavârtika* (page 63) where reference

is made to the *godohana.* Kunte's long note on the sûtra of Jaimini referred to above will be found useful.

ग्राविणि रेखेव ॥

Like a delineation on stone. Used of something unalterably fixed. "तन्मां वज्रकुमाराय सम्प्रदत्तान्यथा तु मे । मरणं शरणं तात ग्राविणि रेखेव गीरियम्." *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* xii. 275. Compare Job's words (xix. 23):—"Oh that my words were now written ......that with an iron pen and lead they were graven in the rock for ever."

जामातृशुद्धिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the son-in-law's revision* [of a book]. This is the original of the Marâṭhî जांवईशोध which Molesworth defines as "A phrase, founded on a popular story, to express the examination of a piece of composition by a shallow-witted fellow incapable of discerning its merit." The popular story, as given on pages 6–9 of Merutunga's *Prabandhacintâmaṇi,* is to the effect that Vararuci, having been instructed by Vikramâditya to find a suitable husband for his daughter, the princess Priyangumanjarî, he, in revenge for a supposed insult offered him by her when his pupil, palmed off upon her an ignorant cowherd as a man of learning! The king accepted him, and he became his son-in-law. "In accordance with the advice of the paṇḍit, the herdsman preserved unbroken silence; but the princess, wishing to test his cleverness, entreated him to revise a newly-written book. He placed the book in the palm of his hand, and with a nail-parer proceeded to remove from the letters in it the dots and the oblique lines at the top indicating vowels, and thus to isolate them, and then the princess discovered that he was a cowherd. After that 'the son-in-law's revision' became a proverb everywhere." This quotation is from Mr. C. H. Tawney's admirable translation of Merutunga's work; the original being as follows:—"पण्डितो-

पदिष्टं सर्वथा मौनमेवालम्बमानो [महिषीपालः] राजकन्यकया तद्वैदग्ध्य-जिज्ञासया नवलिखितपुस्तकस्य शोधनायोपरुद्धः । करतले पुस्तकं विन्यस्य तदक्षराणि बिन्दुमात्रारहितानि नखच्छेदिन्या केवलान्येव कुर्वन् राजपुत्र्या महिषीपाल एव निर्णीतः। ततः प्रभृति जामातृशुद्धिरिति सर्वतः प्रसिद्धिरभूत्."

डमरुकमणिन्यायः ॥

The डमरुक or डमरु, is a sort of small drum, shaped like an hour-glass, and held in one hand. The मणि is, I suppose, the small piece of wood attached to the string tied round the middle of the drum, which strikes each end alternately as it is shaken in the hand. The gâruḍîs, or conjurors, use a drum of this kind; and Âpṭe's dictionary tells us that the Kâpâlikas carry one. For a description of the latter, see Wilson's *Religion of the Hindus*, Vol. i. pages 21 and 264. The nyâya is found in *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, page 84, where it is used in the sense of the देहलीदीपन्याय as follows:—"अन्यार्थमिति मध्यवर्तिपदं डमरुकमणिन्यायेनोभयत्रापि संबन्धनीयम्." The word अन्यार्थं occurs in the middle of Hemacandra's eleventh kârikâ which Malliṣeṇa is here explaining.

तटादर्शिशकुन्तपोतन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a young bird which* [has got out to sea on a floating log and] *is unable to discover the shore.* Its application is obvious: It occurs in the second line of verse 19 of Hemacandra's *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, as follows:—"ततस्तटादर्शिशकुन्तपोतन्यायात्त्वदुक्तानि परे श्रयन्तु." Malliṣeṇa explains it thus:—"तटं न पश्यतीति तटादर्शी यः शकुन्तपोतः पक्षिशावकस्तस्य न्याय उदाहरणम् । तस्माद्यथा किल कथमप्यपारपारावारान्तःपतितः काकादिशकुनिशावको बहिर्निर्जिगमिषया प्रवहणकूपस्तंभादेस्तटप्राप्तये मुग्धतयोड्डीनः समन्ताजलैकार्णवमेवावलोकयंस्तटमदृष्ट्वैव निर्वेदादावृत्त्य तदेव कूपस्तंभादिस्थानमाश्रयते गत्यन्तराभावादेवं तेऽपि कुतीर्थ्याः प्रागुक्तपक्षत्रयेऽपि वस्तुसिद्धिमनासादयन्तस्त्वदुक्तमेव चतुर्थं भेदाभेदपक्षमनिच्छयापि कक्षीकुर्वाणास्त्वच्छासनमेव प्रतिपद्यन्ताम्."

तृणभक्षणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *taking grass in the mouth* [*lit.* of eating grass], as a token of submission. This interesting illustration is found in *Prabandhacintâmaṇi*, page 93:—"वैरिणोपि हि मुच्यन्ते प्राणान्ते तृणभक्षणात्। तृणाहाराः सदैवैते हन्यन्ते पशवः कथम्." Mr. Tawney renders it thus:—"Since even enemies are let off, when near death, if they take grass in their mouths, how can you slay these harmless beasts [deer &c.] which always feed on grass?" In a note on page 210, it is stated that we have here an allusion to a most ancient custom. There is a reference to it in *Harṣacarita* (Bombay edn. 1892) page 132, line 11, on which, the translators, Cowell and Thomas, remark, "To carry a straw in the mouth was a sign of surrender; compare Acworth's Marâṭhâ Ballads, page 43:—

'And 'twixt the teeth a straw is fit
For curs who arm but to submit.'"

These two lines are deduced from the three words "ध्यावें तोंडांत तृण" of the original.

Merutunga refers to this custom again on page 300:—"नाथो नः परमर्द्दनेन वदनन्यस्तेन संरक्षितः। पृथ्वीराजनराधिपादिति तृणं तत्पत्तने पूज्यते." "Grass is now worshipped in Paramardin's city, because, when taken in the mouth, it preserved our lord Paramardin from Prithvîrâja, the king of men." (Tawney's translation, page 189).

तैलकलुषितशालिबीजात् &c. ॥

The following is from *Nyâyamakaranda*, page 60:—"न खलु शालिबीजं तैलकलुषितमपि सम्पादयति यवांकुरं किन्तु न सम्पादयति शाल्यंकुरम्."

दग्धबीजन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the burnt seed.* An illustration of that which has for ever ceased to be an operative cause. It appears in a verse of *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, page 208:—

15

दग्धे बीजे यथात्यन्तं प्रादुर्भवति नांकुरः।
कर्मबीजे तथा दग्धे न रोहति भवांकुरः ॥

The following is from the *Prabandhacintâmaṇi*, page 206:—

राजप्रतिग्रहदग्धानां ब्राह्मणानां युधिष्ठिर ।
दग्धानामिव बीजानां पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

Merutunga ascribes it to a Purâṇa. Vijnâna Bhikṣu quotes from some Smṛiti another of a like kind, under *Yogavârtika* ii. 3:—

बीजान्यग्न्युपदग्धानि न रोहन्ति यथा पुनः ।
ज्ञानदग्धैस्तथा क्लेशैर्नात्मा सम्पद्यते पुनः ॥

दत्तमेकधा सहस्रगुणमुपलभ्यते ॥

That which is given once is received back a thousand times. This is found in Merutunga's work, page 266, and I append Mr. Tawney's rendering:—"अथ वीरधवलस्यायुःपर्यन्ते प्रतितीर्थं प्रस्थितेन दत्तमेकधा सहस्रगुणमुपलभ्यत इति रूढेः श्रीतेजःपालेन जन्मसुकृतं ददे." "Then, when Vîradhavala's life was approaching its termination, Tejahpâla, who was on his way to a holy place, in accordance with the proverb that what is given once is received back a hundred (?) times, gave him the merits of his last birth." Though the illustration is fable, the principle is true. "Give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom." Among the Turks there is the saying "Who gives alms sows one and reaps one thousand." (Rev. T. Long's *Eastern proverbs and emblems*, page 187).

दत्तर्णाधमर्ण इव स्वप् ॥

To sleep like a debtor whose debt has been paid. To sleep like a top! *Dormir comme un sabot*, as the French say. It occurs in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣtaparvan*, ii. 563:—"इति स्नुषाया दौःशील्यामर्षचिन्तां विहाय सः । सुष्वाप दत्तर्ण इवाधमर्णस्तत्र निर्भरम्."

न हि क्वचिदश्रवणं &c. ॥

Compare a saying of Vâcaspatimis'ra's on *Yogabhâṣya* ii. 22:— 'न हि रूपमन्धेन न दृश्यत इति चक्षुष्मतापि दृश्यमानमभावग्रस्तं भवति."

नहि सर्वः सर्वं जानाति ॥

Everybody does not know everything. Near the end of the *Laukikanyâyasangraha* Raghunâtha describes his effort in the following verse:—

"व्याख्यातं न्यायवृन्दं निजमतिमनतिक्रम्य यावन्मयास्तं
पारं प्राप्तुं तु शक्तो न हि भवति गुरुः कः पुनर्मादृशो ना ।
सर्वः सर्वं न वेत्ति प्रथितमिदमतो नास्ति मेऽत्रापराधः
शिष्टा ज्ञेयाः स्वयं वै सुविमलमतिभिः सम्यगाराधितार्थैः" ॥

He then connects various nyâyas with the pâdas of the above; namely, यावत्तैलं तावद्व्याख्यानम् and यावत्स्नाता तावत्पुण्यम् with the first pâda, and, the maxim which we are now considering, with the third. I think the second of these should read यावत्स्नानं. In the larger work the reading is यावत्स्नातं. Our present nyâya is found in *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, page 501, as follows:—"विमर्शः प्राह नैवात्र कोपः कार्यस्त्वया यतः । सर्वः सर्वं न जानीते सिद्धमेतज्जगत्त्रये" ॥ On the other hand, we have the following query in *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 94:—"तथापि चानुभवकल्पनायां सर्वः सर्वदा सर्वं जानाति न तु निश्चिनोतीति किं न स्यात्."

नहि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः &c. ॥

The whole verse is quoted in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 165.

नागृहीते विशेषणे &c. ॥

In *Nyâyasûtravṛitti* ii. 126 (=2. 2. 58) this is quoted as नागृहीतविशेषणान्याय, and Dr. Ballantyne renders it, "Cognition which does not apprehend the distinction, cannot infer [the nature of] what is to be distinguished." The nyâya occurs five

times in *Nyâyamanjarî*, and each time in a different form! The references are as follows:—page 320, line 19; 433, line 4 from bottom; 449, line 3 from bottom; 538, line 6; and 543, line 7.

निरामयस्य &c. ॥

As pointed out by Mr. Tawney in a footnote, the poem here ascribed to Mayûra is the *Caṇḍîs'ataka* of which Bâṇa was the author. It was published in the Kâvyamâlâ for 1887, and the first verse commences thus:—

"मा भांक्षीर्विभ्रमं भ्रूरधर विधुरता केयमास्यास्य रागं
पाणे प्राण्येव नायं कलयसि कलहश्रद्धया किं त्रिशूलम्" ।

पर्णमयीन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the spoon] *made of the Parṇa wood.* Various spoons are used in the sacrifices, as described in the footnote to Professor Eggeling's translation of *S'atapatha Brâhmaṇa* 1. 3. 1. 1; and, of these, the *juhû* is always made of the wood of the Parṇa (*i. e.* the Palâs'a) tree. This is in accordance with *Taittirîya Saṁhitâ* 3. 5. 7, where the praises of this tree are sung, and blessings promised in connection with the use of the *juhû* made of its wood, as pointed out in S'abara on Jaimini 3. 6. 1–8. The पर्णमयीत्व of the जुहू employed in the sacrifices is therefore used to illustrate something *invariably* present, in contradistinction to that which is so *occasionally*, as in the case of the *godohana.* For a passage containing both of these, see under गोदोहनन्याय. Other examples will be found in *Bhâmatî* 3. 3. 61; *Parimala*, pages 624 to 626; and *S'âlikâ* page 157.

प्रतिनिधिन्यायः ॥

The rule as to *the substitution* [of one material for another, in a sacrifice]. This subject is dealt with in Jaimini 6. 3. 13-

17, the five sûtras being styled "नित्यकर्मणोऽनित्यप्रारब्धकर्मणश्च प्रतिनिधिना समापनाधिकरणम्." Other aspects of प्रतिनिधान are discussed in all the subsequent sûtras of the pâda. Kunte's summary of the teaching of this pâda is well worth reading.

The nyâya occurs in the following passage of S'ankara's bhâṣya on *Brahmasûtra* 3. 3. 40, and I append Dr. Thibaut's translation:—"भोजनलोपेऽप्यद्भिर्वान्येन वा द्रव्येणाविरुद्धेन प्रतिनिधानन्यायेन प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्यानुष्ठानमिति." "Even in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered to the prâṇas has to be performed by means of water or some other not altogether unsuitable material, according to the Mîmâṁsâ principle that in the absence of the prescribed material some other suitable material may be substituted." It must not, however, be supposed that the choice of the "suitable material" was left to the sacrificer; the substitute was as rigidly prescribed as that for which it might be substituted. For instance, the juice of the Pûtîka plant was the only allowable substitute for that of the Soma plant. In Ânandagiri's comment on the bhâṣya, the nyâya is quoted as प्रतिनिधिन्याय.

प्रत्यक्षे किमनुमानेन ॥

With the quotation from Kumârila compare the following from *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 27:—"न हि प्रत्यक्षेण करिणि दृष्टेऽपि चीत्कारेण तमनुमिन्वते प्रेक्षावन्तः" ॥

प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रवाहः केन वार्यते

Who can resist a stream [of argument] *flowing* [steadily on] *because established by proof?* This seems to be the sense of the nyâya as quoted at the beginning of the Ârhata section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*. The passage is as follows:—"अथ मन्येथाः प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रवाहः केन वार्यत इति न्यायेन यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकमित्यादिना प्रमाणेन क्षणिकतायाः प्रमिततया &c." Professor Cowell

renders it thus:—"But the opponent may maintain 'The unbroken stream (of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it? In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, whatever is, is momentary &c.'" In a footnote to page 62 of his translation of this portion of Sarvadars'anasangraha in *Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques*, Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin has recorded Professor Leumann's comment on the above rendering which he considers inaccurate in respect of the nyâya. The criticism is just,—but, unfortunately, the printer has made a mess of the rendering which the critic proposes to substitute for Mr. Cowell's.

प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि ॥

Unseen influences [springing from actions, and eventually causing certain effects], *however numerous, may be assumed* [to be the causes of those effects], *if of established credibility.* This nyâya is the first line of a verse in *Tantravârtika* 2. 1. 5, where the important dogma of the existence of *apûrva* is discussed. The second line is "अदृष्टशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो ह्यप्रमाणकः" ॥ The whole verse is quoted in Sures'vara's *Bṛihadâraṇyakavârtika*, page 1124, and again on page 1797; whilst the first line is found in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 437, as follows:—"न चानेकादृष्टकल्पनाभयान्मुख्यार्थपरित्यागो न्याय्यः प्रमाणसिद्धे नियोगपर्यनुयोगानुपपत्तेः । यथाहुः । श्रुतसिद्ध्यर्थमश्रुतोपलब्धौ यत्नवता भवितव्यं न तु श्रुतशैथिल्यमादरणीयमिति । तथा प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि." There is another example in *Citsukhî* i. 23 (Paṇḍit, vol. v, page 27):—"एतेनोभयपदलक्षणास्वीकारे गौरवदोषो निरस्तो वेदितव्यः । बुभुत्सितार्थप्रतिपादनप्रयोजनतया गौरवस्यैवोचितत्वात्प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपीति न्यायात्." A third will be found in *Khaṇḍana*, page 74, on which the commentator says, "यत्रादृष्टे प्रमाणं प्रवर्तते तददृष्टमपि...प्रामाणिकैरभ्युपगम्यते."

Raghunâthavarman gives the verse in a different form. According to him, the first line is "बालाग्रशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो

निष्प्रमाणकः," whilst "प्रमाणवन्ति &c." is the second. In the numbered part of his larger work it is called the बालाग्रशतभागोऽपि nyâya; but, towards the end of the volume, he quotes (without acknowledgment) the above-cited passage of *Citsukhî* (together with a good deal of the context) which contains the nyâya in its proper form.

It may be well to call attention here to this transcendental power *adṛiṣṭa,* or *apûrva,* invented by the philosophers in order to account for present things without divine intervention. In his article on Mîmâṁsâ (*Essays,* vol. i, page 343), Colebrooke says:—"The subject which most engages attention throughout the *Mîmânsâ,* recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. A *virtue* meantime subsists, unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world, the relative effect. That unseen virtue is termed *apûrva,* being a relation superinduced, *not before* possessed." Goldstücker (s. v. अपूर्व) quotes Kumârila to the effect that Mîmâṁsakas apply that term *exclusively* to the unseen influence which follows a *sacrificial* act; that attending action of other kinds being styled संस्कार. The passage will be found in *Tantravârtika,* page 367. A helpful description of *apûrva* is given also in *Rational Refutation of Hindu Philosophical Systems* (pages 149 and 150), where it is rendered by Fitzedward Hall "requitative efficacy." In K. M. Banerjea's excellent work *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy,* page 140, अदृष्ट is defined as follows:—"Technically, in the usage of philosophers, it means a power or influence inhering in things both animate and inanimate. As inherent in the former it implies an unseen power, both intellectual and active; as inherent in the latter it signifies a material power, perhaps partly the effect of previous combinations and motions......This unseen moving power in men is again the consequence of works done in a previous life, and hence it stands sometimes for *dharma* and *adharma* (virtue and vice) and *karma*

(works)." I imagine that it would tax the ingenuity of even a Mîmâṁsaka to produce *proof* of अदृष्ट and its working; yet they tell us that it is not to be accepted without proof!

भाण्डालेख्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the picture on a jar.* Used, apparently, of something variable at will, and the presence or absence of which in no way affects the structure of a thing, or which is not an essential part of it. It occurs in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 496 (last line), under sûtra 5. 2. 4 which explains प्रतिज्ञाविरोध as one of the twenty-two forms of *nigrahasthâna.* It is found also in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdya*, page 289, and the commentator explains it thus:—"भाण्डालेख्यमिवेति । यथालेख्यं रेखोपरेखादि सर्वभाण्डसाधारणं न भाण्डविशेषलक्षणं तथा पुरुषाधीनविवक्षापि न विशेषिकेत्यर्थः" ॥ In the Calcutta edition of Saṁvat 1905 (=A. D. 1848), by Madanamohana Tarkâlankâra, page 65, the reading is भण्डालेख्यमिव, and in a footnote to the Benares edition we are told that this is the reading preferred by one 'Vidyâsâgara' (is this our old friend Jîvânanda?) who gives the following explanation of it:—"यथा भण्डस्य डिम्भकस्यालेख्यं 'पुत्रो न पुत्री' इति विवक्षावशात्पुत्रपुत्र्युभयपक्षेऽपि योजयितुं शक्यं तथेत्यर्थः" ॥ This meaning of भण्ड is not found in the dictionaries, and may have been evolved from Vidyâsâgara's inner consciousness! I should like more light on this nyâya.

महति दर्पणे महन्मुखं तदेव कनीनिकायामणु ॥

The very same face which looks large [when seen] *in a large mirror, appears small* [when reflected] *in the pupil of the eye.* This illustration is found in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 137 line 16:—"एकमपि व्यञ्जकभेदादुत्कर्षवन्निकर्षवद्दृष्टं यथा महति दर्पणे महन्मुखं तदेव कनीनिकायामण्विति."

महार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवार्पणोपम ॥

This most puzzling simile is found in the commentary on S'ântideva's *Bodhicaryâvatâra* i. 4, the first half of which reads thus:—"क्षणसंपदियं सुदुर्लभा प्रतिलब्धा पुरुषार्थसाधनी." The ṭikâ commences as follows:—"अष्टाक्षणविनिर्मुक्तस्य क्षणस्य संपत्तिः समग्रता । इयं सुदुर्लभा । सुष्टु दुःखेन लभ्यत इति कथंचित्प्राप्या । महार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवार्पणोपमा." In a footnote, the editor tells us that Professor Kern was unable to get any satisfactory meaning out of the nyâya, but proposed the following:—"As the entering of the tortoise's neck into the hole of the yoke formed by the great ocean." The nyâya is clearly meant to indicate something *most difficult of accomplishment*. Can the tortoise be that on which the world is supposed to rest, with the idea of the impossibility of its placing its neck in the opening (*chidra*) between two (*yuga*) of the oceans? This seems r.diculous, but the nyâya itself appears to deserve the same epithet! Can any of our Indian scholars elucidate it for us?

मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते ॥

A sage meditates [on Brahman] *and a fool is emancipated!* An impossible sequence, which we may compare with that of *Ezekiel* xviii. 2. It forms part of an interesting passage on page 37 of *Vedântatattvaviveka*:—"एतेनेदमपास्तं मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यत इत्येतच्छास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरीति न्यायविरुद्धम् ॥ तथा चाभाणकः । काचिन्निषादी तनयं प्रसूते कश्चिन्निषादस्तु कषायपायीति । मुनिकर्तृकश्रवणादिविधिफलस्य साक्षात्कारस्य मूर्खेऽनभ्युपगमात् । तत्फलस्याप्यविद्यानिवृत्तेर्मुनिप्रत्यज्ञात्रगततया तावन्मात्रतया मूर्खनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । दृष्टफलानां यथादर्शनमुपपत्तेश्च." For the nyâya शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि, see below.

यद्गृहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुः &c. ॥

Most probably Mâdhava took this nyâya from Udayana's *Kiraṇâvali* where it stands (on page 18) in a similar context.

वध्यतां वध्यतां बालः ॥

As Raghunâthavarman had the temerity to include this in his list of nyâyas, I introduce it in order to show its origin and its worthlessness. At the bottom of page 53 of the Benares edition of *Laukikanyâyasangraha*, it stands thus:—"तथा च 'वध्यतां वध्यतां बालो नानेनार्थोऽस्ति जीवता । स्वपक्षहानिकर्तृत्वाद्यः कुलाङ्गारतां गत' इति न्यायविषयतां नातिवर्तते." This verse, and the words which follow it, are taken bodily from *Citsukhî* i. 16 (The Paṇdit, vol. iv, page 534); but the real source of the s'loka is *Vishṇu Purâṇa* 1. 17. 31, where it reads "दुरात्मा वध्यतामेषः," the remainder being the same as the above. I got the clue from the *Laukikanyâyaratnâkara*, where Raghunâtha apologetically says:—"इदं विष्णुपुराणे प्रह्लादमुद्दिश्य हिरण्याक्षवचनं पूर्वैर्न्यायत्वेनोदाहृतत्वात्तत्त्वेनोदाहृतम्."

शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि ॥

The fruit promised in Scripture [in connection with a sacrificial or other act] *is for the performer* [of that act]. These are the first words of Jaimini's sûtra 3. 7. 18. They are quoted as a nyâya in a passage of *Vedântatattvaviveka*, for which see "मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते." It is cited by Vâcaspati Mis'ra, also, in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 296, line 6 from bottom, and page 403, line 4, and in his *Bhâmatî*, pages 28 and 492. Also in *S'rîbhâṣya* 2. 3. 33 (p. 1688), and 3. 4. 45 (p. 2028), where Dr. Thibaut renders it, "the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent."

सूत्रशाटिकान्यायः ॥

Light is thrown upon this by the following extract from Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyâya*, ii. 127. The sûtra so numbered is "सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्य &c." "Though its meaning be not so and so, it is figuratively so employed in the case of a Brâhman, a scaffold, a mat......in consideration of association,

place, design......'Though it be not so and so,' *i. e.*, though such be not the direct meaning of the word, it is figuratively employed; for example, the word 'staff' &c., is employed for a Brâhman &c., because of association......In like manner...... from the 'design' (*tâdarthya*), 'He makes a mat' (kaṭa) implies his aiming after a mat; for the mat, inasmuch as it is a thing non-existent [*until* made] can have [at the time when one is spoken of as making it] no maker."

Again, under sûtra 4. 1. 50 [बुद्धिसिद्धं तु तदसत्], the author of the vṛitti says (as interpreted by Dr. Ballantyne):—"The weaver sets himself to work, having considered, that, 'In these threads [*i. e.*, constituted by these threads] there *will be* a web,' but not with the understanding that 'there *is* a web'; for, if *that* were the case, then, the product being supposed extant, there would be no setting one's self to work, because desire [precluded by possession] would be absent." See also a passage in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 254, beginning at line 14.

SUPERADDENDA

Consisting of additional references to Nyâyas in the First and Second Handfuls.

N. B. Those of the Second Handful are distinguished by the addition of the figure (2).

SUPERADDENDA.

अजाकृपाणीयन्यायः ॥

It is very strange that this nyâya is so rarely quoted. Besides the reference to it already given, in the whole course of my reading I have met with only one additional instance, namely in *Khaṇḍanoddhâra*, page 52, line 10. I do not think, as some do, that the nyâya is based on *Sabhâparva* LXVI. 8 (Bombay edn.).

अत्यन्तपराजयाद्वरं संशयोऽपि ॥ (2)

I quoted from *Nyâyamanjarî* a variant of the above in the form एकान्तपराजयात् &c., but have since met with it in the *Tâtparyaṭîkâ* (page 473, line 17) also, from which, doubtless, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa took it. The context is similar in both works.

अन्धदर्पणन्यायः ॥ (2)

The following example is from S'eṣânantâchârya's comment on the *Nyâyasiddhântadîpa*, page 22, line 2 (The Paṇḍit for May 1903):—"ननु नेदानीमध्यक्षा श्रुतिरस्ति या योग्यतासंशयसहकृता मङ्गले समाप्तिसाधनतां बोधयेत्। अनुमीयमाना तु सम्प्रत्ययबोधिकैवेति तत्र योग्यतासंशयसहायसम्पादनमन्धायादर्शदर्शनमेव."

अर्थी समर्थः &c. ॥ (2)

This saying is found in a more complete form in *Vaiyâsikanyâyamâlâ* 1. 3. 9, namely, "अर्थी समर्थो विद्वाञ्शास्त्रेणापर्युदस्तोऽधिक्रियते," which is itself a reproduction of the following passage in *S'ânkarabhâṣya* 1. 3. 25:—"शास्त्रं ह्यविशेषप्रवृत्तमपि मनुष्यानेवाधिकरोति शक्तत्वादर्थित्वादपर्युदस्तत्वादुपनयनादिशास्त्राच्चेति वर्णितमेतदधिकारलक्षणे." Dr. Thibaut renders it thus:—"The S'âstra, although propounded without distinction (*i. e.* although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its

precepts), does in reality entitle men only (to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the s'âstra); are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the S'âstra); are, thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the *Upanayana* ceremony and so on. This point has been explained in the section treating of the definition of *adhikâra* (Pûrva Mîmâṁsâ vi. 1)." For the last-mentioned, see under **अधिकारन्याय** in the third Handful. This question of **अर्थित्व** &c. will be found also in *S'ânkarabhâṣya* 1. 1. 4 (page 54); 1. 3. 26, 33, 34; and 2. 2. 10.

अवयवशक्तेः &c. ॥ (1. Addenda)

The remarks under this are wrong and should be cancelled. They were written under the malign influence of that base associate *avidyâ* with its two powers of *âvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa!* This at length, gave way to what the poet* has called "man's third eye,"—"**तृतीयं लोचनं नृणां सम्यग्ज्ञानं तदुच्यते.**" The nyâya is, of course, a slight modification of the oft-quoted paribhâṣâ "**अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी.**" It will be found under this heading, and under the **रथकारन्याय**, in the third Handful. Though not in Patanjali's work it is included in Nâgojî Bhaṭṭa's and Sîradeva's lists.

अशोकवनिकान्यायः ॥ (1. Preface)

The only example of this that I have met with is in S'eṣânantâcârya's ṭîkâ on S'as'adhara's *Nyâyasiddhântadîpa*, page 11, line 1 of comment. The publication of this work began in the *Pandit* for April 1903.

अस्त्रमस्त्रेण शाम्यति ॥

With this compare Kâmandakîya *Nîtisâra* viii. 67:—

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* *Yas'astilakacampûkâvya*, vol. 2, page 325.

"विषं विषेण व्यथते वज्रं वज्रेण भिद्यते ।
गजेन्द्रो दृष्टसारेण गजेन्द्रेणैव बध्यते" ॥

आकाशमुष्टिहननन्यायः ॥

Much older instances of the employment of this nyâya are the following:—*Tantravârtika*, page 170, "यस्तन्तूननुपादाय तुरीमात्रपरिग्रहात् । पटं कर्तुं समीहेत स हन्याद्व्योम मुष्टिभिः" ॥ *Pancapâdikâ*, page 43, line 19, "तद्यदि नाम ज्ञानं लोके सिद्धं तथापि निरस्तप्रपञ्चात्मविषयमसिद्धमाकाशमुष्टिहननवन्न विधातुं शक्यम्." Then in *Nyâyakandalî*, page 56, line 6, we find the cognate expression "यथा कश्चिन्निशितं कृपाणमच्छेद्यमाकाशं प्रति व्यापारयन्."

आम्रसेकपितृतर्पणन्यायः ॥ (2)

This is found twice in the *Mahâbhâṣya*. In 1. 1. 1 (page 14) as follows:—"कथं पुनरेकेन यत्नेनोभयं लभ्यम् । लभ्यमित्याह । कथम् । द्विगता अपि हेतवो भवन्ति । तद्यथा। आम्राश्च सिक्ताः पितरश्च प्रीणिता इति." The second instance is in 8. 2. 3.

आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे ॥ (2. Addenda).

This, too, I have traced to Patanjali. It occurs in *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 2. 45 (vârt. 8), as follows:—"अन्यद्भवान्पृष्टोऽन्यदाचष्टे । आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे" ॥

आयुर्घृतम् ॥ (2)

I used to think that this was originated by writers on Alankâra, but it is found in Patanjali 1. 1. 59 (vârt. 6) and 6. 1. 33 (vârt. 6). Then, in 6. 4. 161, there is the statement "घृतभोजनमारोग्यस्यादिः." See under "दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः" in third Handful.

इषुकारन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

The second line of the verse containing this is quoted by

Citsukha Muni in explanation of the term **मनोनवस्थानात्** on page 78 of *Nyâyamakaranda.*

इषुवेगक्षयन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

In *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 3. 3. 32 (page 906), S'ankara says:—
"प्रवृत्तफलस्य कर्माशयस्य मुक्तेषोरिव वेगक्षयान्निवृत्तिः" ॥

उपजीव्यविरोधस्यायुक्तत्वम् ॥ (2).

I had previously met with this only in the Paribhâṣendus'ekhara. Other references are the following:—*Khaṇḍana.*, page 128; *Vedântakalpataru,* pages 231, and 556 (especially the latter); *Parimala,* pages 10, 11, 12. 451; *Nyâyamakarandaṭîkâ,* page 149.

उपयन्नपयन्धर्मो विकरोति हि धर्मिणम् ॥

This nyâya is the second line of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* ii. 35, the first line being "आगमापायिनिष्ठत्वादनित्यत्वमियादृशिः" ॥

उष्ट्रकण्टकभक्षणन्यायः ॥ (1. Preface).

Professor Louis de la Vallée Poussin has kindly pointed out the following quotation found in *Bodhicaryâvatâraṭîkâ* ix. 92, (page 330, bottom line):—"Âha ca । ahir mayûrasya sukhâya jâyate । viṣaṁ viṣâbhyâsavato rasâyanam । bhavanti cânandavis'eṣahetavo । mukhaṁ tudantaḥ karabhasya kaṇṭakâḥ । "

ऊषरवृष्टिन्यायः ॥ (2).

There is a good example in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* viii. 417:—

कषायपक्षिवृक्षेषु कृतघ्नेषु दुरात्मसु ।
एतेषु निष्फलं दानमूषरेष्वम्बुवृष्टिवत् ॥

ऋजुमार्गेण सिध्यतः &c. ॥ (2).

Is found also in *S'âlikâ*, page 86 (or Paṇḍit, Old Series, i. 108):—"ऋजुमार्गेणार्थसिद्धौ न वक्रमार्गमाश्रयेत." And in *Tarkabhâṣâ*, page 48.

कदम्बकोरकन्यायः ॥

The following instance of this is from Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭaparva* (i. 241):—

"पित्रा स्वपाणिपद्मेन स्पृश्यमानोऽवनीपतिः ।
उत्कोरककदम्बाभो बभूव पुलकाङ्कुरैः" ॥

कफोणिगुडन्यायः ॥

A second example is found in Udayana's *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 26, from which Mâdhava most probably took it. I have met with it nowhere else.

कांस्यभोजिन्यायः ॥ (2).

As stated in the Preface to the second Handful, this is taken from Jaimini's sûtra 12. 2. 34. In addition to the reference already given in *Tantravârtika*, other instances of it will be found on pages 577, and 907 of the same. It is explained and applied, too, in Appai Dîkṣita's *Vidhirasâyana*, page 50. See also *Vedântakalpataru*, pages 314, 425, 502, 517; and *Parimala*, pages 462, 572, 666.

काकदन्तपरीक्षान्यायः ॥

In *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 7, line 5, this appears in the form वायसदशनविमर्शन्याय.

कुड्यं विना चित्रकर्मेव ॥ (2).

Compare the following:—"सति कुड्ये चित्रकर्म," and भित्तिक-

चित्रकर्मवन्निराश्रयधर्मविधानायोगात्," from Mallinâtha on *Târkika-rakṣâ*, pages 111 and 176. See also *Sânkhyakârikâ* 41. Then in the commentary on *Nyâyasiddhântadîpa*, page 30, line 7 (The Paṇḍit for July 1903), we read "बलभद्राभिधानमभित्तिचित्रायितम्."

क्षीरनीरन्यायः ॥ (2).

All the examples already given are from works on Alankâra. It comes however from *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 2. 32:—"क्षीरोदके सम्पृक्त आमिश्रीभूतत्वान्न ज्ञायते कियत्क्षीरं कियदुदकं कस्मिन्नवकाशे क्षीरं कस्मिन्नवकाश उदकमिति."

क्षीरं विहाय &c. ॥

A second example is found in *Âtmatattvaviveka*, page 50. Mâdhava probably took this also from Udayana.

खले कपोतन्यायः ॥ (2).

This is not confined to works on Alankâra. It occurs in *Nyâyamâlâvistara* 11. 1. 3 (page 621).

गगनरोमन्थन्यायः ॥

In *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 453, it becomes व्योम्नि रोमन्थकेलिवत्. In *S'âlikâ*, page 154, line 16, and *Nyâyamakaranda*, page 129, line 1, we have the expression गगनग्रासकल्प.

गले पादुकान्यायः ॥ (2).

I have met with two more instances of this as गले पादिका, namely in Vâcaspatimis'ra's *Khaṇḍanoddhâra* (now coming out in the Paṇḍit), page 7, line 7, and also in *Upamitibhava-prapancâ Kathâ*, page 284. पादिका has no place in our dictionaries, however, in the sense of *shoe*.

गुडजिह्विकान्यायः ॥

The rendering should rather be, *The tongue* [smeared] *with treacle* [in order to disguise an unpalatable draught]. The passage of the *Kâvyapradîpa* to which only a reference was given in the First Handful, is the following:—"ये सुकुमारमतयोऽतिसुखिस्वभावा राजकुमारादयो नीरसे नीतिशास्त्रे प्रवर्तयितुमशक्यास्तान्काव्यं कान्तेव सरसतापादनेनाभिमुखीकृत्योपदेशं ग्राहयति गुडजिह्विकया शिशूनिवौषधम्। यदाहुः

स्वादुकाव्यरसोन्मिश्रं वाक्यार्थमुपभुञ्जते।
प्रथमालीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटु भेषजम्" ॥

As used by Vâcaspatimis'ra in *Bhâmatî*, pages 342 and 534, and again in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, pages 438, 441, the meaning is by no means so clear.

गोबलीवर्दन्यायः ॥

Other instances of its use by Vâcaspatimis'ra will be found in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ* pages 11 (line 8), 118 (line 1), 119 (line 15), and 404 (line 3 from bottom). Also in *Bhâmatî*, 3. 1. 11. That already given, should be 2. 4. 17.

घटीयन्त्रन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

Is found in a third work of Sures'vara's, namely *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, i. 42. Also in the Jain treatise *Prabandhacintâmaṇi*, page 62, as follows:—

"आपद्गतं हससि किं द्रविणान्धमूढ
लक्ष्मीः स्थिरा न भवतीति किमत्र चित्रम्।
किं त्वं न पश्यसि घटीर्जलयन्त्रचक्रे
रिक्ता भवन्ति भरिता भरिताश्च रिक्ताः" ॥

In *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, pages 52, and 418, it is found as अरघट्टघटीयन्त्रन्याय. In *Kîrtikaumudî* vi. 43, we have the compound भ्रमद्घटीसंघटितारघट्टखाङ्कारशब्दैः. The word अरघट्ट has become राहाट in Marâthî, as in राहाटगाडगें.

चिन्तामणिं परित्यज्य काचमणिग्रहणन्यायः ॥ (2).

There is an additional example in *Upamitibhavaprapancâ Kathâ*, page 420:—"निर्वाणसुखसंसारसुखयोश्च परस्परम् । चिन्तारत्नस्य काचेन यावत्तावद्गुणान्तरम्." Then, lower down on the same page, this and eight other figures are employed to illustrate the folly of one who, though acquainted with the Jaina creed, still clings to evil. The whole passage is reproduced for the benefit of those who have not the book to refer to. "यो जैनमपि सम्प्राप्य शासनं कर्मनाशनम् । हिंसाक्रोधादिपापेषु रज्यते मूढमानसः ॥ संहारयति काचेन चिन्तामणिमनुत्तमम् । करोत्यङ्गारवाणिज्यं दग्ध्वा गोशीर्षचन्दनम् ॥ भिनत्ति नावं मूढात्मा लोहार्थं स महोदधौ । सूत्रार्थं दारयत्युच्चैर्वैडूर्यं रत्नमुत्तमम् ॥ प्रदीपयति कीलार्थं देवद्रोणीं महत्तमाम् । रत्नस्थाल्यां पचत्याम्लखलकं मोहदोषतः ॥ सौवर्णलाङ्गलाग्रेण लिखित्वा वसुधां तथा । अर्कबीजं वपत्येष तूलार्थं मूढमानसः ॥ छित्त्वा कर्पूरखण्डानि कोद्रवाणां समन्ततः । वृत्तिं विधत्ते मूढोऽयमहं सश्रुतिकः किल" ॥ On page 170 there is yet another word of Siddharṣi's in regard to the *Cintâmaṇi*, namely "निर्लक्षणनरो नैव चिन्तामणिमवाप्नुते."

चौरापराधात् &c. ॥

I have no doubt that Raghunâtha took this nyâya from *Âtmatattvaviveka* where it appears on page 70, line 8 from bottom. The Khaṇḍanakâra is also its debtor, for that and a good deal more; for pages 633 to 636, together with the first four lines of page 637, of S'rîharṣa's work, are taken *verbatim* from page 70, line 8, up to page 72, line 1, of Udayana's.

छत्रिन्यायः ॥

This may have originated with S'abara in whose bhâṣya on Jaimini 1. 4. 28 we find the expression "यथा छत्त्रिणो गच्छन्तीत्येकेन छत्त्रिणा सर्वे लक्ष्यन्ते." It is quoted by Kumârila (who lived in the first half of the eighth century) as the छत्रिन्याय, in *Tantravârtika* 1. 4. 13 (last line), and in *Ṭup-ṭîkâ* 4. 4. 1 (last

line but one). It was doubtless from one of these two writers that S'ankara took the nyâya. He is said to have written his famous bhâṣya on the Brahmasûtras in 804 A.D. (See Macdonell's *Sanskṛit Literature*, page 289, for both of these dates).

जलकतकरेणुन्यायः ॥ (2).

There is an interesting example in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭa-parvan* ii. 4:—

"गुरुवाक्कतकक्षोदसंसक्तमभवत्सदा ।
प्रशान्तदुर्ध्यानमलं तन्मनोवारि निर्मलम्" ॥

Another will be found in *Nyâyamakaranda*, page 154.

ज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्नालंकारोपदेशवत् ॥ (2).

I have discovered a second instance of this simile in *Tât-paryaṭîkâ* (page 3, line 6) as follows:—"यदशक्यानुष्ठानोपायोपदेशकं तदनर्थकं यथा ज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्नाहरणोपदेशकं वाक्यं तादृशं चेदं शास्त्रमिति."

तक्रकौण्डिन्यन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

I have noted down seven instances of the occurence of this illustration in the *Mahâbhâṣya*, namely, 1. 1. 47; 6. 1. 2 (4); 6. 2. 1; 6. 4. 163 (2); 7. 1. 72 (3); 7. 2. 117 (2); and 7. 4. 61 (4). It will suffice to quote the first, as the other six are practically the same:—"लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । लोके हि सत्यपि संभवे बाधनं भवति । तद्यथा । दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेति सत्यपि सम्भवे दधिदानस्य तक्रदानं निवर्तकं भवति." See, also, Nâgojî Bhaṭṭa's *paribhâṣâ* LVII, and Professor Kielhorn's translation of the same. Other instances of it will be found in *Vâkyapadîya*, ii. 352; *S'lokavârtika*, page 617 (verse 15); *Tantravârtika*, page 262 (last 2 verses); and *Bhâmati*, 3. 3. 26 (page 628).

तमोदीपन्यायः ॥

Prakâs'ânanda's couplet is perhaps based on the following verse of Sures'vara's, namely *Taittirîyavârtika* 2. 1. 177 (page 79):—

" प्रमाणोत्पन्नया दृष्ट्या योऽविद्यां द्रष्टुमिच्छति ।
दीपेनासौ ध्रुवं पश्येद्गुहाकुक्षिगतं तमः " ॥

तुलोन्नमनन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

Other good examples of this will be found in *Nyâyavârtika* 3. 2. 12 (top of page 412), the substance of which is reproduced in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 456; in *S'lokavârtikaṭîkâ*, page 311 (where it is found in conjunction with the पद्मपत्रशतव्यतिभेदन्याय); and in *Vivaraṇaprameya*, page 99, line 4.

दग्धेन्धनवह्निन्यायः ॥ (2).

Perhaps the oldest instance of the use of this is found in *S'vetâs'vatara Upaniṣad* vi. 19, and quoted in *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 1. 1. 12 (page 106). S'ankara had previously applied it in 1. 1. 4 (page 76). See also Sures'vara's large Vârtika, page 1593, verse 1201; and page 1840, verse 724.

दण्डापूपिकान्यायः ॥

Writers on Alankâra have not the exclusive use of this illustration. For a much older instance of its use, see *Bṛihadâraṇyakavârtika*, page 909, verse 135.

दामव्यालकटन्यायः ॥ (2).

The story of these three Asuras, and of भीम, भास, and दृढ, is told in *Yogavâsiṣṭha*, Book 4, chapters xxv–xxxiv. The verse quoted by Raghunâtha, in regard to them, is 4. 34. 36.

देहलीदीपन्यायः ॥

A much better example of this is to be found in *Saptapadârthî*, page 52, line 13.

धान्यपलालन्यायः ॥ (2).

Vâcaspatimis'ra was not the originator of this illustration. It occurs four times in the *Mahâbhâṣya*, namely, 1. 2. 39; 3. 3. 18; 3. 4. 21 (vârt. 2); and 4. 1. 92. The following is the passage, the substance of which is reproduced in the *Bhâmatî* and *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"कश्चिदन्नार्थी शालिकलापं सपलालं सतुषमाहरति नान्तरीयकत्वात् । स यावदादेयं तावदादाय तुषपलालान्युत्सृजति । तथा कश्चिन्मांसार्थी मत्स्यान्सकण्टकान्सशकलानाहरति नान्तरीयकत्वात् । स यावदादेयं तावदादाय शकलकण्टकानुत्सृजति." See, also, Nâgojî Bhaṭṭa's *paribhâṣâ* 73. The nyâya seems to have a different application in Marâṭhî literature. Molesworth's definition is as follows:—"The law of the corn and its straw. Conquer the king and you conquer his subjects; accomplish or acquire a matter and you attain all it sustains or involves."

न हि कठोरकण्ठीरवस्य &c. ॥

Compare the "नाल्पीयसा महतोऽभिभवः संभवति" of *S'âlikâ*, page 94.

न हि खदिरगोचरे परशौ &c. ॥ (1. Addenda).

As already pointed out in the Preface to the second Handful, the meaning of this nyâya (which formerly somewhat puzzled me) is, *The Palâs'a tree is not cleft when the axe is applied to the Khadira tree;* and it is used to indicate the complete distinctness of two objects. I have already given four references to passages containing the nyâya, but have since found two of much older date; namely *S'lokavârtika*, page 157, "छेदने खदिरप्राप्ते पलाशे न च्छिदा यथा", and *Nyâyavârtika*, page 333, "न हि

खदिरे छिद्यमाने पलाशे छिदा भवति." See also an admirable example in *Tâtparyaṭikâ*, page 112, line 11. Akin to these is the following in *Tantravârtika*, page 546, "न हि देवदत्तस्य श्यामत्वे यज्ञदत्तस्य श्यामत्वं भवितुमर्हति."

न हि निन्दा निन्द्यं निन्दितुं &c. ॥ (2)

This is no doubt based on Jaimini's sûtras 2. 4. 8 and 20, and a reference has already been given to it in S'abara's bhâṣya on the latter. There is another at the top of page 16 of the *Tantravârtika*, and a further one in S'ankara on *Bṛihadâraṇyakopaniṣad* 2. 5. 16 (with the commentary).

न हि भिक्षुकाः सन्ति &c. ॥ (2).

Is found in two other parts of the Mahâbhâṣya, namely in 4. 1. 1 (vârt. 15), and 6. 1. 13 (vârt. 13).

न हि वरविघाताय कन्योद्वहः ॥

The oldest instance of the use of this illustration, so far as my knowledge goes, is in the *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya*, 4. 1. 2 (page 1041), where it reads "न हि वरघाताय कन्यामुद्वाहयन्ति." Dr. Thibaut omits it from his translation.

न हि सुशिक्षितोऽपि बटुः &c. ॥ (2).

References to this are given on pages 27, and 61. A still older example of it is found in *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 3. 3. 54:— "न हि नटः शिक्षितः सन्स्वस्कन्धमधिरोक्ष्यति." The parallel nyâya, of which one example is given on page 61, is found also in *Tâtparyatîkâ*, page 255, as "न हि तयैवासिधारया सैवासिधारा छिद्यते," and in *Nyâyamakaranda* page 131, we read "नो खल्वङ्गुल्यैवाङ्गुली स्पृश्यते छिद्यते वा धारयैवासिधारा." Both nyâyas appear together in *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, page 89, as follows:— "न हि सुशिक्षितोऽपि नटबटुः स्वस्कन्धमधिरोढुं पटुः । न च सुतीक्ष्णाप्यसिधारा

स्वं छेत्तुमाहितव्यापारा." Mr. F. W. Thomas tells me that there is a similar combination in Nâgârjuna's ईश्वरकर्तृत्वनिराकरण. There, the sword-nyâya comes first, and reads "न हि खरतरकरपालधारा स्वमात्मानं छेत्तुं समर्था भवति."

न ह्यप्राप्य प्रदीपः प्रकाश्यं प्रकाशयति ॥ (2).

The rendering should rather be, *A lamp does not illuminate until it* [i. e. its light] *reaches the object to be illuminated.* This is more clearly seen from the following passage of *Târkikarakṣâ*, page 271:—"न हि दाह्यमप्राप्तो दहनो दहति प्रकाश्यमप्राप्य प्रदीपः प्रकाशयति."

नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्यः ॥ (2).

Udayana did not originate the saying. Vyâsa in *Yogabhâṣya* iii. 14 (page 135), says "नान्यदृष्टस्य स्मरणमन्यस्यास्ति." The nyâya is found also in *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, pages 61 and 154; and in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 437, line 10.

पिष्टपेषणन्यायः ॥

Older instances are the following:—"न हि स्निग्धस्य स्नेहनं शक्यं कर्तुं पिष्टस्य वा पेषणम्", S'abara 9. 2. 3. Also 12. 2. 16 of the same, and *Tantravârtika*, pages 54 and 477. S'ankara's disciple, Sures'varâcârya, in his *Bṛihadâraṇyakavârtika*, 1. 4. 1216, has the following:—"विद्याविधानाच्चाविद्या ब्रह्मण्यस्तीति गम्यताम् । विद्याविधानं विज्ञाते पिष्टपेषणवद्यतः" ॥

प्रदीपे प्रदीपं प्रज्वाल्य &c. ॥ (1. Addenda).

In *Upades'asâhasrî* XVII. 41 (page 215), S'ankarâcârya says:—

"न हि दीपान्तरापेक्षा यद्वद्दीपप्रकाशने ।
बोधस्यात्मस्वरूपत्वान्न बोधान्यस्तथेष्यते" ॥

The following is from Sures'vara's vârtika on *Brihadâranyabhâṣya* 4. 3. 501 (page 1465):—

"ननु दीपः स्वमात्मानं स्वात्मनैवावभासयन् ।
दृष्टो दीपप्रकाशार्थं न हि दीपान्तराहृतिः" ॥

See, too, *Nyâyamanjari*, page 625, on sûtra 5. 1. 10.

फलवत्सन्निधौ &c. ॥ (2 Addenda).

The source of this is S'abara 4. 4. 19. See also *Nyâyamâlâvistara* 4. 3. 16 (sûtra 37).

बधिरकर्णजपन्यायः ॥ (2).

Compare the following from *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 405:— "तदेतद्बधिरस्य रामायणं वर्णितमस्माभिर्यं एवमपि श्रुत्वा वेदार्थपरिगमाभ्युपायं मृगयते."

भक्षितेऽपि लशुने &c. ॥

Occurs also in *Kalpataruparimala*, page 37; but I have met with it nowhere else.

मणिप्रभामणिमतिन्यायः ॥ (2).

My friend Mr. Arthur Venis has given me the following rendering of this nyâya:—"*The judgment that the given object is a gem is due to the gem-like brilliance* (perceived). In other words, I believe it is a gem because it shines like one." In the Bauddha chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 23 of Bib. Ind., and 27 of Jîvânanda's edn.) it appears in a slightly varied form as **मणिप्रभाविषयमणिविकल्पन्याय**, which, as interpreted by Mr. A. E. Gough, means *the supposition that the light of a gem is itself the gem.* He adds that, in this case, "we may yet handle the gem, because it underlies the light; while, if we were to take nacre for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver." The correctness of this view is established by an important

passage at the beginning of *Pancadas'î* IX, which treats of ध्यान as a means of arriving at a right knowledge of Brahman. Such meditation, being directed towards Brahman with qualities, is of course erroneous, inasmuch as that Impersonality has no qualities; but it nevertheless leads on to the underlying *nirguna* Brahman, just as the mistaken notion regarding the sparkle of the gem leads to the discovery of the gem itself. This is styled संवादिभ्रम, an error which has a corresponding reality underlying it. To mistake the distant shining of a lamp through the keyhole of a door for a gem, is an illustration of विसंवादिभ्रम, an error entirely devoid of an underlying reality. The passage is as follows:—"मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः । मिथ्याज्ञानाविशेषेऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ॥ २ ॥ दीपोऽपवरकस्यान्तर्वर्तते तत्प्रभा बहिः । दृश्यते द्वार्यथान्यत्र तद्वद्दृष्टा मणेः प्रभा ॥ ३ ॥ दूरे प्रभाद्वयं दृष्ट्वा मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः । प्रभायां मणिबुद्धिस्तु मिथ्याज्ञानं द्वयोरपि ॥ ४ ॥ न लभ्यते मणिर्दीपप्रभां प्रत्यभिधावता । प्रभायां धावतावश्यं लभ्येतैव मणिर्मणेः ॥ ५ ॥ दीपप्रभामणिभ्रान्तिर्विसंवादिभ्रमः स्मृतः । मणिप्रभामणिभ्रान्तिः संवादिभ्रम उच्यते ॥ ६ ॥ The commentator, Râmatîrtha, ascribes verses 2–5 to a *vârtika*; whilst Citsukha Muni, in his comment on verse 2, where it is quoted in the *Nyâyamakaranda* (page 148), names Dharmakîrti as its author. The vârtika may therefore be his. I may add that verse 2 is quoted also in Citsukha Muni's own work *Citsukhî*, ii. 18 (page 496 of Paṇḍit for 1883). In *Nyâyamanjarî*, pages 24 (line 1), 33 (line 4 from bottom), and 158 (line 10), the nyâya is found as मणिप्रभामणिबुद्धिवत्. Then on page 308 (line 9 from bottom) there is the following passage which corresponds with the extract from *Pancadas'î*, namely:— अर्थं हि मूलवर्तिनमुपलभ्य प्रवर्तमानस्तमाप्नोति अपवरकनिहितमणिप्रसृतायां कुञ्चिकाविवरनिर्गतायामिव प्रभायां मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तमानः । यत्र तु मूलेऽप्यर्थो नास्ति तत्र व्यामोहात्प्रवर्तमानो विप्रलभ्यते दीपप्रभायामिव तथैव मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तमानः ॥

Other references to the nyâya are *S'âlikâ*, page 22, line 4; *Tattvacintâmaṇi*, vol. i, page 263; and *Târkikarakṣâ*, page 16, line 2 (where the reading corresponds with that quoted above from *Sarvadars'anasangraha*).

मण्डूकप्लुतिन्यायः ॥

I noted this five times in the *Mahâbhâṣya*, namely, 1. 1. 3 (vârt. 2); 5. 2. 4 (vârt. 2); 6. 1. 17; 6. 3. 49; 7. 2. 117. See also Dr. Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyaya*, ii. 80.

मध्यदीपिकान्यायः ॥

The following from *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 212, illustrates this:—

" गृहे दधिघटीं द्रष्टुमानीतो गृहमेधिना ।
अपूपानपि तद्देशान्प्रकाशयति दीपकः " ॥

मिथिलायां प्रदीप्तायां &c. ॥ (2. Addenda).

The verse quoted from *Khaṇḍana*, is on page 278 of that work; and in the first line, read निर्ममः instead of निर्मेहः.

मुञ्जादिषीकोद्धरणन्यायः ॥

This is as old as the *S'atapatha Brâhmaṇa*, in 4. 3. 3. 16 of which, we find the following:—"तं देवाः सर्वस्मिन्विजितेऽभयेऽनाष्ट्रे यथेषीकां मुञ्जाद्विवृहेदेवं सर्वस्मात्पाप्मनो व्यवृहन्यन्माहेन्द्रं ग्रहमगृह्णंस्तथो एवैष एतद्यथेषीका विमुञ्जा स्यादेवं सर्वस्मात्पाप्मनो निर्मुच्यते यन्माहेन्द्रं ग्रहं गृह्णाति." See, too, Prof. Rhys Davids' *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii. 86 (page 88); from the footnote to which I obtained the reference to the above. For another example, see *Bṛihadâraṇya-vârtika* 4. 4. 1277 (page 1933).

याचितमण्डनन्यायः ॥ (1. Addenda.)

I have met with another instance of this in *Khaṇḍanoddhâra*, page 62, line 9 from bottom, as follows:—"इत्थमिन्द्रियजन्यत्वेनेन्द्रियजन्यसाक्षाद्धीर्लिङ्गपरामर्शजन्यानुमितिः । वाक्यजन्या शाब्दी । सादृश्यवैसादृश्यान्यतरधीकरणिकोपमितिः । संस्कारजन्या स्मृतिः । इयं च याचितम-

ण्डनमिव याथार्थ्यं दधत्यपि न प्रमेति चतस्र एव प्रमाश्चत्वार्येव तत्करणानि प्रमाणानीति."

I am still ignorant of the meaning of the nyâya.

रेखागवयन्यायः ॥ (2).

For *Nyâyamanjarî* read *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyaṭîkâ.* A second example is the following from *Kalpataruparimala,* page 363, line 9:—"यथा तात्त्विकारुन्धतीप्रतिपत्त्युपायतया नानापुरुषैः कल्प्यमानायां तत्प्राच्योदीच्यादिनक्षत्ररूपायां स्थूलारुन्धत्या यथा वा रेखागवयन्यायेन नित्यशब्दप्रतिपत्त्युपायतया नानाव्याकरणैः परस्परभिन्नप्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागेन कृत्रिमशब्द इति भावः ॥ See also *S'rîbhâṣya,* page 322 (page 77 of Dr. Thibaut's translation).

वधूमाषमापनन्यायः ॥ (2).

I am still without the slightest clue to the meaning of this. Is there no one amongst India's wise men who can throw light upon it?

वनसिंहन्यायः ॥ (2).

I am indebted to Professor Dr. Pischel for the following quotation *Udyogaparva* xxxvii. 46:—

"न स्याद्वनमृते व्याघ्रान्व्याघ्रा न स्युर्ऋते वनम् ।
वनं हि रक्ष्यते व्याघ्रैर्व्याघ्रान् रक्षति काननम्" ॥

See also verse 64 of the same.

वरगोष्ठीन्यायः ॥ (2).

Has the following remark of Kumârila's (*Tantravârtika,* page 169) any bearing on this? "कन्यावरणार्थागतमूर्खवरगोत्रप्रश्नोत्तरवत्."

वृद्धिमिष्टवतः &c. ॥

Another good example is *Pancadas'î* vii. 81:—

"वृद्धिमिष्टवतो मूलमपि नष्टमितीदृशम् ।
लौकिकं वचनं सार्थं सम्पन्नं त्वत्प्रसादतः" ॥

See also *Vedântakalpataru*, page 321. In *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, page 19, we find it in the form "लाभमिच्छतो मूलक्षतिरायाता." Compare Raghunâtha's "पुत्रलिप्सया देवं भजन्त्या भर्तापि नष्टः," and "चर्मतन्तौ महिषीं हन्ति." The former I have never met with, but the latter is doubtless based on the following verse in *Mahâbhâṣya* 2. 3. 36 (6):—"चर्मणि द्वीपिनं हन्ति दन्तयोर्हन्ति कुञ्जरम् । केशेषु चमरीं हन्ति सीम्नि पुष्कलको हतः" ॥

शतपत्रपत्रशतभेदन्यायः ॥ (2).

A much older example is found in *S'lokavârtika*, page 311 (verse 157), to which I append Mr. Gangânâtha Jhâ's translation:—"यत्प्रदीपप्रभाद्युक्तं सूक्ष्मकालोऽस्ति तत्र नः । दुर्लक्षस्तु यथा वेधः पद्मपत्रशते तथा." "You have brought forward the case of the lamp and the light emitted by it, as an instance of the simultaneity of the cause and the effect. But in this case also, there is a minute point of time (intervening between the appearance of the lamp and that of the light), though this is imperceptible; just as is the case with the piercing (with a needle) of the hundred petals of the lotus." Professor Jacobi has kindly pointed out an instance of it in *Nyâyavârtika*, page 37, in the form उत्पलदलशतव्यतिभेदवत्, from which, perhaps, Aniruddha took the nyâya rather than from the very modern *Sâhityadarpaṇa.* The same expression उत्पलपत्रशतव्यतिभेदवत् is found in the Jaina work *Syâdvâdamanjarî* (page 92) which is older than Mâdhava's *Sarvadars'anasangraha.* Besides these, I have met with the nyâya in *Tâtparyaṭîkâ,* page 334, line 2 (in the form शीघ्रतरबाणहेतुकशतपत्रशतव्यतिभेदवत्); in *Nyâyamanjarî,* page 498 (as सूच्यग्रभिद्यमानकोकनददलकदम्बकवत्); in

Tarkabhâṣâṭîkâ, page 24; in *Târkikarakṣâṭîkâ*, page 126 (as शतपत्रशातनवत्); and in *Citsukhî* ii. 9 (शतपत्रपत्रशतव्यतिभेदानुभववत्).

शिरश्छेदेऽपि शतं न ददाति &c. ॥

Probably taken by Mâdhava from *Âtmatattvaviveka* (p. 31). I know of no third instance of it. We may compare with it the following from *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 432, line 11:—"अथोच्यते न प्रत्यक्ष आत्मा किंत्वपरोक्ष इति नेदमर्थान्तरवचनं शिशव एवं प्रतार्यन्ते न प्रामाणिकाः."

शृङ्गग्राहिकान्यायः ॥

Other examples are *Brihadâraṇyavârtika*, page 611, and *Taittirîyavârtika*, page 197; *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, page 58, line 4; *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 245, line 13, and 277, lines 18 and 20. Molesworth defines it thus:—"In logic. Distribution; taking singly and severally all the particulars included under a general term, or all the individuals composing a body."

सकृत्कृते कृतः शास्त्रार्थः ॥ (2).

See *Mahâbhâṣya* 6. 1. 84 (vârt. 4), and 108 (vârt. 3); also 6. 4. 104 (vârt. 3). There are cognate expressions, too, in S'abara 11. 1. 28, 35; and 12. 3. 10. The nyâya is found also in *Vedântâdhikaraṇanyâyamâlâ* 4. 1. 1.

सहैव दशभिः पुत्रैः &c. ॥ (2).

Vâcaspatimis'ra no doubt borrowed this from Kumârila. It occurs in *Tantravârtika*, 3. 2. 36 (page 807).

सिंहावलोकनन्यायः ॥

Vâcaspatimis'ra was fond of this. In addition to the reference already given to the *Bhâmatî*, it will be found at least

six times in his *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, pages 97, 199, 230, 322, 403, 405; and again on page 36 of his *Sânkhyatattvakaumudî* (under kârikâ 7). It occurs also in Hemacandra's *Paris'iṣṭa-parvan* i. 63. Molesworth defines it thus:—"(The manner of looking of the lion, which animal is said to be constantly looking behind). Pausing and reviewing from time to time (the portion written or read, or done generally)."

सूचीकटाहन्यायः ॥

Outside works on Alankâra, I have met with the nyâya in the following treatises:—*Nyâyamakaranda*, page 181; *Saptapadârthî*, page 21; *Nyâyasûtravritti*, Book ii. page 2 of Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyâya*; and S'eshânanta on *Nyâyasiddhântadîpa*, page 39, line 3 from bottom.

स्थालीपुलाकन्यायः ॥

We have this in the *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 4. 23 (vârt. 15) in the following words:—" पर्याप्तो ह्येकः पुलाकः स्थाल्या निदर्शनाय." Other examples are found in *Tantravârtîka* 3. 5. 19 (page 1044); *Vedântakalpataru*, page 446; and *Kalpatauruparimala*, pages 115, 468, 667, 685. Of similar import is the following from *Paris'iṣṭaparvan* vii. 94:—"सिक्थेनापि द्रोणपाकं जानन्ति हि मनीषिणः."

स्थूणानिखननन्यायः ॥

An older example than those in the S'ânkarabhâṣya will be found in S'abara 7. 2. 1 (page 19).

स्वाङ्गं स्वव्यवधायकं न भवति ॥

Additional instances will be found as follows:—*Bhâmatî* 3. 4. 20 (page 682); *Tâtparyaṭîkâ*, pages 72, 90; *Târkikarakṣâṭîkâ*, page 50; *Tarkabhâṣâṭîkâ*, page 82; *Khaṇḍanoddhâra* pages 58, 62.

ALPHABETICAL LIST

OF

NYÂYAS EXPLAINED IN PARTS I, II AND III.

THE NYÂYAS BEING ARRANGED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER IN EACH HANDFUL, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO QUOTE THE PAGES. AS SOME OF THEM, HOWEVER, APPEAR A SECOND TIME IN THE ADDENDA OF EACH, WHILST OTHERS ARE FOUND ONLY IN THE LATTER, THE LETTER 'A' HAS BEEN ADDED TO INDICATE THIS, WHILST THE LETTER 'S' REFERS TO THE SUPER-ADDENDA OF PART III.

LIST OF NYÂYAS.

ERRATA.

Page 32, line 14 from bottom. For त्वैत्सर्गिकेण read त्वौत्सर्गिकेण.

Page 64, line 9. For दैवाद्दागतायां read दैवाद्दागतानां.

Page 89, line 12 from bottom. For "cut of", say "cut off.'